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The book you now hold in your hands is the primary offshoot of a project led by a team of writers and 
editors from the Institute for a Greater Europe (IGE) for the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum’s 2021 
Europe Lab. The project also comprises of online publications, events and discussions though the book 
does act as a sizeable pièce de résistance. 
The IGE is an independent youth-led think tank with members all around the world, based in Brussels, 
Europe’s most international city. Our organisation aims at fostering understanding and intellectual 
cooperation across Europe and beyond, regardless of borders. We privilege decentring narratives, 
knowledge and perspectives – and it is something we hope to have approached with this volume. 
Our project was started after the year of Black Lives Matter – or the spectacular resurgence of the 2013 
movement, which took the world by storm. Brussels, home to an incalculable number of diasporas, was 
also the theatre of numerous and intensive conversations on Belgium and Europe’s colonial past – and 
its present. Grievances echoed by generations of diaspora members prior where finally being put 
forefront and for a short while, history felt like moving forward. 
Eastward, a parallel trend could be observed, with an increasing number of academics and writers 
resorting to decolonial concepts and paradigms, in a wide variety of domains. How to explain this 
apparent success of decolonial theories in Central and Eastern Europe, a region where so many countries 
pride themselves in never having colonised anyone? Was it a simple export from the West or a 
homegrown school of thought? Did it exist independently outside of academia? 
These were the themes we set out to explore. Most of all we wanted to confront those two trends of the 
decolonial movement: the “Western” tradition, dealing with the legacy of the overseas empires, and the 
“Eastern” tradition, which explores similar concepts of exploitation, identity, and alienation in Central 
and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Our intellectual journey will be divided in three parts. 
The first part, Decolonialism in the West, something old, something new, examines several facets of 
the modern decolonial movement, the plight of diasporas, the efforts of activists and the many debates 
surrounding the legacy of empire in Europe and the Americas. 
The second part, Understanding Post-Socialism through Post-Colonialism, takes us to Central and 
Eastern Europe to confront the colonial fallout of a region historically dominated by the Russian and 
Soviet Empires, to understand how both the population of the post-Socialist region and their former 




Our third part, A Dialogue of the Second and Third Worlds, does away with the imperial core, and 
strives to foster discussion and exchanges between the former colonised peoples of the Global South 
and the inhabitants of post-Socialist states. We will explore both the history of this solidarity and its 
needed topicality. 
Our volume wasn’t envisioned strictly as an academic endeavour. True to the spirit of the decolonial 
tradition, we wanted to explore our subject through different types of essays, conversations, discussions, 
and fiction. The field is a varied, diverse and multi-layered one and we wanted to reflect that in the way 
we approached the matter, showcasing multiple perspectives, experiences and worldviews. To that 
effect, our writing team includes academics, writers, activists and artists from all over the world, whose 
diverse approaches bring us closer to that goal. 
Diverse as they are, we also wanted to highlight how common the experiences of colonised peoples 
across the world can sometimes be, and how remembering that the same sun shines upon places like 






Part I. Decolonialism in the West, 
Something Old, Something New 
 
The year 2020 definitely put the decolonial movement under a new spotlight. Decolonial studies and 
outlook, with wind in their sails, were given more visibility, but with it also came backlash. For example, 
most decolonial movements in France or the United Kingdom were often suddenly decried as seditious 
agitprop copied and pasted from the United States. This uninformed framing both disregards the fact 
there isn’t one radical group in the US whose members don’t send each other online drives full of pdfs 
of Frantz Fanon’s works, and the obvious older legacy of the decolonial movement in the West. Though 
undervalued, this abundant heritage is the result of an incessant and reciprocal transatlantic exchange, 
and this corpus is still the foundation for decolonial movements the world over. 
This first part explores different strands of the decolonial struggle in the Western world, be it tackling 
social justice issues, the decolonisation of institutions like universities and museums, the structural 
legacy of racism and the role of diasporas. It confronts both the history of colonial Europe and some of 
the ways people involved in decolonial movements engage with it and its ramifications. 
In a world changed by worldwide telecommunications, we also briefly question what the future of 
organising could look like, and how it could bifurcate from the historical tradition of decolonialism in 






1.1 Reflections on the Black Lives Matter mobilisations in 





Are slavery and colonialism underrepresented in Europe’s historical memory? Is the neglect of 
colonialism an expression of one or more fundamental underlying issues in European society? Is there 
a sense of superiority and latent racism in Western countries? As a result of the Black Lives Matter 
mobilisations that flared up across the world in the summer of 2020, these are some of the questions 
that have emerged in the centre of public debate in Western countries.1 
Whilst the ensuing anti-racism conversations made a lot of people uncomfortable – and still do to this 
day, the difficult conversations on colonial memory and decolonisation within Europe have at times 
seemed impossible. It is with that in mind, that I reflect back in this essay on the Black Lives Matter 
movement in Europe and look at how it mobilised itself in Western European countries – thereby 
leading to calls for a long overdue, new wave of decolonisation. By then, examining how Western 
countries have moved forward from the Black Lives Matter mobilisations, I contemplate whether its 
outcomes have managed to deal adequately with the underlying social issues at hand. 
 
The Black Lives Matter movement in Europe 
Black Lives Matter originally started as a protest movement in response to several high-profile cases, 
where unarmed African American men and women died at the hands of police officers.2 It began in 
2013, on the micro-blogging site Twitter, with the use of the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, after the 
acquittal of George Zimmerman, who shot and killed Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old black teenager in 
Miami, Florida. Since then, the movement has grown into a network of formal and informal grassroots 
organizations – all mobilizing around the principle and mantra that Black Lives Matter; and against 
police brutality and racism in the United States and beyond.3 
In 2020, as a reaction to the brutal footage of George Floyd’s killing – who died after being pinned 
under Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin’s knee for almost nine minutes, while being 




and seemingly effective response, calling for an end to injustice and police brutality. As a result, the 
Black Lives Matter movement returned to headlines and regained prominence. This time going beyond 
the United States and spreading to other parts of the world.4 
Watching the events unfold across the Atlantic - at a time when former United States President Donald 
Trump’s hateful rhetoric inflamed racial tensions5 and tarnished America’s standing in the world6 – and 
seeing the wave of heartfelt statements from European leaders speaking out against police brutality 
some Europeans spurred to action after having stayed silent on similar issues at home. Looking for ways 
to give a voice to their own anger, activists across Europe started mobilising and borrowed slogans from 
the civil rights movement that had inspired people on both sides of the Atlantic for decades.7 
In Belgium, for example, some 10,000 people gathered in front of the Brussels’ Palais de Justice for a 
protest organized by the Belgian Network for Black Lives. In a sea of hand-drawn “Black Lives Matter” 
and “No justice, no peace” placards, people held up signs calling out the country’s history of racism – 
“Belgium, too” and “We need to talk about Leopold II and Belgian colonies” – and the names of recent 
victims of police violence.8 
In France, the violent and deadly arrest of George Floyd resonated with acts of police brutality that 
occurred around the yellow vests movement, and the death of Adama Traoré, a 24-year-old black man 
who died in police custody in 2016.9 The movement’s actions heightened the political authorities’ 
awareness of organisations that have been working for years on integration, social mixing and facilitating 
access to social assistance – such as housing, education, health and employment.10 
In Germany, 15,000 people protested against racism in Berlin. Some spoke out about the country’s 
reluctance to acknowledge its colonial history and shared their experience of racism in Germany.11  
In the United Kingdom, thousands of people marched through London.12 In the town of Bristol, 
protestors tore down the statue of slave master Edward Colston, a member of the Royal African 
company responsible for transporting approximately 100,000 slaves from West Africa to the Caribbean 
and Continental America. Within hours of the statue’s removal, a petition circulated on the web to 
replace Colston’s statue with one of racial equality campaigner and Bristol native Dr Paul Stephenson.13 
All across Europe, in cities from Dublin to Copenhagen and from Amsterdam to Milan, protesters 
flouted COVID-related lockdown rules and filled streets and public squares to demand justice for 
people of colour. In particular, those who died in police custody in their own countries.14 
The Italian case, however, differed. In Italy, the Black Lives Matter movement was reported on, but 
not fully embraced. As such, the media mostly treated the protests as a news story rather than a cultural 
phenomenon worth being discussed and analysed.15 The reason for this is that there still is reluctance 




still often perceived as strangers who belong to other cultures. This is certainly influenced by the 
predominance, in recent years, of the migration crisis in the public debate.16 
 
A long overdue, new wave of decolonisation  
Simultaneously with all these Black Lives Matter mobilisations and demonstrations, renewed calls for 
a wave of decolonisation were gaining prominence. In other words, calls for a long overdue reckoning 
for countries became renewed. Until then many countries did not have a good track record when it came 
to tackling racism – or even admitting its existence. The underlying message being brought up was also 
– painfully – clear: colonialism was not a one-time event of which the consequences ended when 
colonizers packed their bags and granted colonies independence.17 On the European continent, this was 
particularly relevant given the prevalence of racial profiling, police brutality and discrimination against 
non-white citizens on the labour and housing markets. 
Even more so, as discussions on colonialism long remained a touchy subject in a number of European 
countries, some have put forward the claim that, for a long time, there was a “selective amnesia” about 
Europe’s imperial legacy and a “toxic nostalgia” that has tainted the general public’s understanding of 
that dark part of their history.18  
In France, for example, denial used to be particularly strong due to the deep-rooted image of the country 
as a neutral, colour-blind republic that champions liberté, égalité, and fraternité. As a consequence, 
efforts to organize around a racial identity have historically been hindered by an insistence – from the 
government and in society – that a person’s identity as “French” trumps any other. For example, that of 
“black, Arab or Algerian”.19  
Nevertheless, the reality of ongoing racial discrimination in France has caused this “ideal” to become 
more and more questioned. As such, a generation of French writers and activists are asserting their 
identity as “black” in a way that challenges France’s sense of itself as colour-blind. This is prompting a 
complex and heated debate about how and whether to think about race.20 
Outside of France as well, similar debates on race, racism in general, and racism against black people in 
particular, are becoming more of a common phenomenon. For example, in Belgium, increasing pressure 
is being put on the government to reckon with the country’s colonial past. This means that the long-
debated issue of how to address the nation’s colonial atrocities – especially in Congo – is increasingly 
being moved forward.21 
In Germany, the government is especially aware of the pressure from anti-racist movements and the 
need to support them, by doing some difficult self-examination. As such, German Chancellor Angela 




United States; whilst, at the same time, proclaiming that Germany should use this moment to look at 
its own issues with racism. Her statement makes clear that for a long time, Europeans pointed to the 
situation in the United States as a way of suggesting that racism is an American problem, and that this 
is simply not true.22 
In short, one could say that the renewed calls for decolonisation originated from the fact that more and 
more people questioned the status quo and wanted to know the truth about the dark past of the colonial 
powers and the continuation of neo-colonialism up to the present times. As a result of this questioning, 
perceptions of the greatness of emblematic figures of European colonialism (e.g. Jan Pieterszoon Coen, 
Winston Churchill and Cecil Rhodes) are now being deconstructed or the subject of salutary 
denunciations. At the same time, respect is being demanded for the lives that were lost and squandered 
to make the idea of a modern world – and in particular a modern Europe –possible.23 
 
Moving forward 
The public outcry witnessed across Europe has shown an unequivocal desire for change and for 
meaningful discussions on the prevalence of systemic racism in the region. Whilst the focus being on 
anti-racism is a necessary start, it will not be sufficient to make the fundamental changes that are needed 
to make Western European countries face their colonial legacy. To do this, however, Western countries 
must look for cooperative solutions that allow them to deal with the growing demand for a change in 
the visions and practices established between themselves, their former colonies, and their 
representatives.  
As such, there are the everlasting calls from the diaspora of former colonies to be recognized as equals 
in the countries in which they live, without having to forego the ties and relations they have with their 
countries of origin. This follows urging by organisations of the African diasporas and antiracist 
movements in Europe, who – for decades already – have been formulating demands ranging from the 
removal of statues of colonial figures24, the renaming of public spaces25 and the return of works of art 
taken from African colonies and kept in European museums26; to financial reparations for the violence 
of colonisation.27 
In their struggle, an underlying request for recognition and condemnation of colonial history can be 
deduced – for example by means of establishing a truth and reconciliation commission in the countries 
they reside. Such is currently being done in Belgium, which in July 2020 set up a Special Commission 
within the Federal Parliament to investigate Belgium's colonial past in the Congo, Rwanda, and 
Burundi.28 Notwithstanding, there is still the risk that – if done in a forced manner – these initiatives 
become nothing more than cosmetic operations at the service of the status quo; and just exacerbate the 




Similarly, the German experience – in which Namibia was offered and rejected a compensation for 
colonial atrocities that took place during the German Empire’s colonial rule30 – shows that the process 
of recognition and condemnation is one that is sensitive and deserves the proper time and scrutiny. 
Already since 2015, after having formally acknowledged their colonial conduct to be an act of genocide, 
closed-door talks with the Namibian government have been taking place.31 While producing tangible 
results (e.g. repatriations of human remains and pillaged cultural artefacts), some in Namibia have 
grown increasingly impatient – falling out with their government over this issue.32 And diplomatic 
linguistic wrangling from the German side, to avoid being legally mandated to pay monetary 
recompense, only adds to their strain.33 
Looking at the European level, there are few institutions which have the necessary funding and 
institutional capacity to support and complement the protest movements and their comprehensive 
demands. The reason being that Europe has not seen a tide-turning civil rights movement capable of 
making an impact on the political sphere. As a consequence, there is no European equivalent to the 
American Civil Liberties Union or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP).34 
Nevertheless, the European Union in particular, has a responsibility to not only engage marginalised 
people and their communities as consultants about these issues, but to change current power structures 
so that the people most impacted by structural racism lead these efforts.35 
The above is especially relevant as most European governments do not systematically collect data on 
how a person’s race or ethnicity affects their chances of employment or on the housing market, their 
treatment in health care or their interactions with police. Which is happening, despite the fact that a 
2018 study by the European Union’s agency for fundamental rights (“Being Black in the European 
Union”), showed that “people of African descent in the European Union face widespread and 
entrenched prejudice and exclusion”.36 
Originally, the European Union’s 2003 Race Equality Directive was supposed to deal with this. It 
required European Union countries to set up a dedicated equality body and to adopt legislation to 
address discriminations in housing and employment. But, since its implementation remains patchy, 
activists have criticized this approach. They claim that the Race Equality Directive’s design is 
ineffective, as it was designed to tackle individual cases of discrimination rather than to address systemic 
issues. 
Nevertheless, the European Union Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-25 – presented in September 2020 
by the European Commission – represents a new hope for a lot of Europeans, for the reason that the 
Action Plan confirms the link between colonialism and the persistence of racial discrimination in 




racism and discrimination in the European Union. And, as many hope, a large step towards addressing 
racism more effectively and building a life free from racism and discrimination for all. 
 
Conclusion: Keeping the conversation alive 
Considering what was discussed above, one could say that mobilising and protesting was the “easier” 
part. It managed to bring up, through a range of concerted efforts, a contested part of Europe's history 
and allowed it to be discussed by a range of actors. It allowed for a reflection on society and for looking 
at certain issues that were taken for granted, through another perspective. Perhaps, a perspective that 
has been needed for a very long time. 
Nevertheless, ensuring that these difficult issues remain at the centre of public debate, and that Western 
nations learn to come to terms with the legacies of British slave traders, Portuguese slave owners, 
Spanish conquistadores as well as German and Belgian colonial officers is the hard part. Until this is 
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Over the last few years, in the Kingdom of Belgium, a new generation of activists have been echoing 
older demands regarding decolonisation, police violence and discrimination against minorities. 
Belgium, a former colonial power that occupied Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), has since rebranded as a cosmopolitan and open democracy, whose capital-region, 
Brussels, is Europe’s most diverse city. 
But the spectres of colonialism still haunt the country. African diasporas, especially from the DRC, had 
been exposing Belgium’s contradictions for long. Belgian institutions have lately decided to meet some 
of the demands themselves, but how sincere are these efforts? 
 
Brussels and the Congolese Diaspora 
When exiting Brussels’ city centre, climbing up the southeast hills towards Ixelles, upon reaching the 
location where once stood the ancient Namur Gate, one is greeted by a massive reproduction of one of 
celebrated Congolese painter Chéri Samba’s works. On the painting, a text declaims: “I have travelled 
the entire world, and never have I seen a city like Brussels and a neighbourhood like Matonge in Ixelles. 
Here, everyone mixes (more than a hundred nationalities in this neighbourhood alone). Difficult to 
describe Matonge or Brussels herself in a word. […] Brussel eza lola. Brussels is a paradise.” 
Cross the street and you are now in Matonge. If we’d know nothing about Brussels, we’d call it a 
Congolese neighbourhood and claim it’s where most of Brussels’ Congolese community lives. Let's try 
to paint a more accurate picture though. Matonge gets its moniker from a vibrant eponymous Kinshasa 
neighbourhood and artistic hotspot. Matonge-Brussels is a hub for Congolese life in the Belgian capital: 
it acts as a meeting point, a first crashing place for African immigrants fresh off the plane, as well as a 
concentrated hotspot of South Asian-owned African grocery shops, African cafés, restaurants, and 
community centres. Like most of Brussels, it is rather diverse (the city boasts at least 193 different 




other immigrant populations, like the Senegalese, and pushed out by aggressive gentrification and the 
municipality’s long efforts to dislodge them. 
Only a minority of the Congolese diaspora live in Matonge. The community can be difficult to study, 
as the DRC does not recognise dual citizenship – many Congolese immigrants opt to take the Belgian 
nationality. Estimates put the number of Congolese and Belgians of Congolese descent at between 
40,000 and 50,000 persons, a number dwarfed by the number of Belgians of Italian (around 300,000) 
or Moroccan descent (550,000). In contrast to countries like Italy, Morocco, Turkey or Portugal, 
Belgium never signed any migration agreement with its former colony, and special precautions were 
taken in the colonial era to avoid colonial subjects visiting the metropole. The power that be frowned 
at the idea of seeing Congolese people walking the streets of Brussels, bringing home the logic of 
segregation that prevailed in the colonies. 
Though small, Congolese immigration is very diverse. Not only because the population of the DRC 
speaks an estimated 250 different languages, but also due to the particular dynamic of that migration, 
distinct from the general history of migration of Belgium.1 In the decades after the 1960 independence, 
a time that was marked between 1965 and 1997 by the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko (who renamed 
the country to Zaïre in 1971), most of the migration flux was made up of exchange students. As the 
dictatorial regime violently crumbled in the 90s and gave way to unrest and a series of wars, migration 
from the Congo peaked as many now applied as refugees. The decade opened with the 1991 and 1993 
lootings, the 1992 Katanga ethnic cleansing, and closed with the outbreak of the First Congo War. 
Due to that early overrepresentation in student migration, the Congolese and Belgo-Congolese 
communities display, on average, a higher level of education than the Belgian national average. They 
are however also overrepresented in unemployment (especially the youth), and among vulnerable 
populations. Ethnic discrimination remains however understudied in Belgium. 
Most Congolese immigrants choose French-speaking regions to settle, with a third of them choosing 
Wallonia, while almost half (49 %) live in bilingual Brussels. The remaining portion usually settle in 
Flemish cities, especially Antwerp. Those that live in the capital, usually settle more in the centre or the 
north-western municipalities (the historical neighbourhoods associated with poorer immigrants) than 
in Ixelles, where Matonge is situated. Congolese who take on Belgian citizenship do not differ that 
much, except the fact that they are even less likely to live in Ixelles. 
Worldwide, the DRC diaspora is one of the largest, with a quorum estimated between 10 and 16 
million. A majority of it is spread in other African countries, with a few millions scattered around the 
developed world. Every year, the diaspora sends billions back home, on average 2 billion USD a year 
according to the International Organization on Migration2, with some UN sources claiming a record of 




Brussels’ small Congolese community does seem to pale in comparison, but the city remains a diaspora 
hub, perfectly situated between Paris, London and Amsterdam, who also house sizeable Congolese 
communities. To many Congolese, like to many other immigrants, Brussels does feel like home. But 
it’s also a city that abounds with monuments reminiscent of some of the DRC’s darkest hours. 
Colonial Belgium 
Belgium’s colonial experience predates its official colonial ventures; it even predates the country itself. 
Like many other European countries, its development rests upon the establishment of the international 
colonial order following the conquest of the Americas. What is now Belgium, the Southern 
Netherlands, were long Europe’s most developed and richest region, safe from Italy. It was home to 
Europe’s first stock exchange, some of its largest cities and two of its wealthiest and busiest trade ports: 
Bruges and Antwerp.  
A dependence of the Spanish Crown from 1556 to 1648, the ports of Belgium saw an inflow of silver, 
sugar, ivory and spices. Antwerp, then the continent’s largest port, was known as the sugar capital of 
Europe, as most of the sugar extracted from the slave plantations of the Americas transited by the port 
on the Scheldt before being distributed elsewhere in Europe. It is worth noting that a notable amount 
of Belgium’s renowned delicacies are transformed colonial goods, often produced through slave labour: 
chocolate, fries or the famed speculoos, originally Frisian, whose Belgian recipe may require cinnamon, 
white pepper, cardamom, cloves or nutmeg. 
Belgians were active in the pre-industrial colonial era – it was a group of Walloon Protestants4 who 
founded Nieuw-Amsterdam, the future New-York – though they often took a back seat to their 
neighbours’ colonial adventures. Flemish merchants bankrolled early Iberian conquests, Belgian exiles 
founded the GWC5, and the Southern Netherlands briefly got its own charter trade company, the 
Ostend Company. Belgians also joined the ranks of overseas armies like Spain’s or, later on, Dutch 
colonial forces in Indonesia. 
Religious resentment, xenophobia, anti-authoritarian sentiment and economic anxiety led to the 
premature death of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and the birth of the Belgian state in the 
1830s. The country’s first king, Leopold I, slightly bored by his role as a constitutional monarch, set 
out to secure a colony pretty early on, with little success (a few settlers in Central America, a concession 
in China). Leopold’s efforts were overshadowed by his son’s. Leopold II, even more frustrated by the 
mild constraints of a constitutional monarchy, managed to have most of the Congo Basin recognised as 
his personal colony by the end of the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, on the promises it would be a 
territory open to international free enterprise. Contemplating crowning himself an emperor, Leopold 
II settled for the title of Roi-Souverain (King-Sovereign). Not once setting foot on Central African 




Originally a project solely fuelled by the king’s ego, the early colonisation of the Congo was bankrolled 
by several of his entourage’s wealthy bankers, businessmen and entrepreneurs. It was a private endeavour 
whose agents were internationally recruited, though a majority were Belgians. The colony’s “privatised” 
nature, coupled with Leopold’s authoritarianism, led to Leopoldian rule in the Congo to be the imperial 
age’s bloodiest. It coincided with a worldwide boom in demand for rubber, which grows in abundance 
in the tropical forests of the northern Congo. Rubber, alongside other precious raw resources, was 
extracted through forced labour, corvees, or at the barrel of a literal gun. The Congo Free State, 
Leopold’s private colony, grew extremely profitable for the king and his entourage as well as the Belgian 
corporations who were allocated concessions in the Congo but only insofar as it ran on extremely violent 
capitalist extraction and forced labour. 
Between 1885 and 1908, Leopoldian rule led to the death of millions of Congolese, be it through war, 
forced labour, displacement or disease (usually caused by the previous three). Estimates vary as to the 
exact number, ranging from five to thirteen million (as per one of the DRC’s most famous historians 
Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem6), though the number of ten million (associated with the works of journalist 
Adam Hochschild7) is usually the most often mentioned. Those are only estimates, based on incomplete 
data (there was obviously no proper census in 19th century Central Africa) and imperfect reports, stating 
for example that some areas in the northern Congo were entirely emptied of their inhabitants (without 
us knowing if they were casualties or refugees). We can however get a picture of what life was under the 
Congo Free State thanks to testimonies recollected by the 1904 Commission of Enquiry, which often 
depicts colonial violence in gruesome details. 
Said commission was authorised to tour various regions around the banks of the Congo River after years 
of international pressure, relayed by personalities such as Joseph Conrad, Arthur Conan Doyle8 or Roger 
Casement, who penned the famous 1904 Casement Report9, which detailed the systematic murders, 
tortures and mutilations (in particular, the infamous severed hands) to which were subjected Congolese 
civilians. That international pressure was echoed at home by Belgian anticolonial figures like socialist 
statesman Emile Vandervelde. The shock and uproar would eventually lead to the Belgian state 
annexing the Congo in 1908. 
To rehabilitate its international image, Belgium announced its intention to run the now-Belgian Congo 
as “model-colony” and publicise said colonial efforts at home and abroad. To this day, Belgian textbooks 
repeat propaganda talking points without much of a critical look. Structurally, few things changed for 
many in the Congolese population. Corvees and forced labour were maintained, a plantation economy 
developed, and any strike or revendication was met with military force. The Belgian Congo was not so 
different from an apartheid state. Residential segregation was a legal reality as of 1898, and White and 
Native neighbourhoods were separated by what was called “neutral zones”. The school system was 




people weren’t provided with proper public education (that role being filled with varying degrees of 
professionalism by religious congregations) and forbidden from studying beyond secondary education. 
Women in particular were purposely undereducated. None of them held a university degree by the time 
of the independence, and less than thirty Congolese men did. Natives were confined to manual labour 
– mining, forestry, transport – to assist in the plunder of the country’s natural capital. 
Congolese willing to be granted basic rights were expected to go through a gruelling process of 
“evolution” and emulate signifiers of Belgian life: a brick house with flowers in the front and electricity, 
European clothes... Successful applicants were granted the title of évolués (evolved) and allowed into 
white-collar jobs, without much of any other privileges. Their pay was often insufficient to maintain 
their lifestyle, and they were mocked in Belgian media for their white-mask-like simulacra of 
Europeanness, while at the same time being touted in propaganda as examples of Belgium’s civilisational 
oeuvre. When the Congo acceded to independence in 1960, that sort of white-collar middle class 
accounted for around fifteen thousand out of fifteen million Congolese. 
Traces of this apartheid-like regime are still visible in the DRC today, especially in the capital city of 
Kinshasa, today an immense city of at least 12 million. The mere size of the city is disconcerting, 
especially knowing that by the end of the colonial period it was only inhabited by around 100,000 souls. 
The colonial centre, by the Congo River, boasts large avenues, that, if they may seem a bit tight for 
millions today, do look a bit too wide for its former inhabitants who might have enjoyed some shade: 
their width impedes the construction of barricades and allows for the easy deployment of troops. Several 
outlying but busy neighbourhoods look far and poorly connected to the centre, their names are often 
adorned with the prefix “camp”: they were dormitory towns for Congolese workers, away from the 
colonial centre. Still today, most of the economic activity is concentrated in said centre, whose streets 
are congested by commuters. And most of them disappear at night. 
Truth is, Belgians never really intended to leave the Congo. And they never really did in some ways. 
Up to the last days of the colony, they expected to stay in Africa for another thirty years. They then 
sabotaged the DRC’s independence, supported two separatist movements and played a still unclear role 
in the assassination of the country’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. Belgian troops and 
mercenaries intervened in the country several times, and, in consort with the US, they propped up the 
dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko that lasted until 1997. As recently as 2008, then Belgian foreign 
minister Karel De Gucht expressed his belief that Belgium holds a “moral authority” on the DRC and 
claimed a “droit de regard” on Congolese politics. For this declaration that nearly led to Kinshasa 






The Colonial Museum and the King’s Imaginarium 
The colonisation of the Congo wasn’t always a consensual affair in Belgium, and not just because of the 
atrocities of the Congo Free State. Considered by many a risky or immoral adventure, colonisation was 
championed by the elites around the king and grand capitalists looking for investment opportunities. 
Among all of the king’s efforts to rally the Belgian population to his colonial projects, the most notorious 
was the erection of the Congo Museum (now Royal Museum for Central Africa or AfricaMuseum), 
between 1905 and 1908 in the royal park of Tervuren, next to the Palace of the Colonies, built for the 
same purpose in 1897, during the Brussels International Exposition. The park housed human zoos 
during the events, populated with 267 forcibly displaced Congolese, of which seven would die and be 
buried in Tervuren.10 
Built with wealth extracted at gunpoint from the Congo Free State, the Tervuren Museum was intended 
to showcase the Congo itself to the Belgian public. To this day, it houses an immense and disparate 
collection of variegated rocks (some radioactive), stuffed animals, desiccated arthropods, exotic plants, 
and manmade objects both common and artistic presented with the same reverence. It has captured the 
imagination of generations of Belgian children, often in awe in front of its large monoxylous pirogue or 
its stuffed giraffe, surrounded by neoclassical colonial paraphernalia. 
The Museum is one of the many buildings erected by Leopold II with his colonial wealth, a list that 
includes several landmarks in Brussels and Ostend – but mostly vanity projects destined to his own 
private use. The king’s blood money funded works on his personal palaces, like the royal family’s home 
in Laeken, and two luxurious villas on the Côte d’Azur. It also allowed him to try to turn Brussels into 
an off-Broadway version of Paris, with large avenues, parks, or neoclassical monstrosities, and fund the 
laborious construction of the Cinquantenaire Arcade, a monumental arch commemorating the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Belgian revolution – that was finished 25 years too late. One of the most curious of 
the king’s legs is a pagoda, rumoured to be Japanese, actually built by a French architect for the 1900 
Paris Exposition, that Leopold decided to buy and take home to Laeken. 
The king’s spree often prompted Congolese to assert that Brussels (and with it, Belgium) was built with 
their own money. Some humorously claimed the pagoda should be sent back to Kinshasa. To these 
boasts, Belgians often claimed, quoting a famous work of historian Jean Stengers, that the colony cost 
more than it paid back. This framing portrays a fundamental misunderstanding of what constitutes an 
imperial relationship, or what the purpose of a colony even is.  
A colony doesn’t even need to be in the literal green to be profitable. An extraction colony like the 
Congo’s primary purpose is to serve as a pool of raw resources fuelling its metropole’s industry and 
provide its corporations with investment opportunities as well as potential new markets where to dump 




private hands. And it's a job programme, providing the colonial power’s failsons, disgruntled petite-
bourgeoisie and exploited working class with employment opportunities, often consisting in 
administering a new racialized proletariat overseas. 
Along with this parasitic economic relationship, a colonial power often alienates its colonies 
intellectually and creatively. Not only does colonisation substitute the former elite with a Western one, 
it also subjects a colony to modernity’s scientific gaze. It gives anthropologists, biologists, historians, 
geologists... with a new world to conquer, study, document and classify. Aside from the prestige and 
the intellectual stimulation they generate, colonial sciences also allow empires to build a monopoly on 
all knowledge surrounding their colonies. 
The colonies also act as an imaginarium. A pool of endless novelty and creative matter. At a time where 
non-European art was regarded as inferior, European artists did endlessly tap into non-European forms 
to feed their celebrated creations. The strange world of the colonies also feeds into the imaginaries of 
the Europeans through colonial propaganda and goes on to inspire works of fiction that ensure these 
representations live on. In early-20th century Germany, pulp tales depicting exotic African adventures 
were all the rage.11 Contemporary British novels, whose authors were enthralled with Britain’s new role 
as the imperial caretaker of the Middle East, were often set in the region.12 In Belgium, colonial motifs 
and the Congo have never stopped being portrayed in the country’s comic book industry. Every year, 
creative Belgians travel to the DRC, to come back present Brussels’ cultural scene with photographs, 
movies or some other media project, often to be celebrated. Congolese artists do not always encounter 
the same success when talking about their country. Belgian authors, creatives and artists often still 
dominate what is said about the DRC, and it’s a go-to subject of study for generations of Belgian 
academics. As Fanon once wrote “it is the coloniser that made and continues to make the colonised”. 
The Tervuren Museum is the incarnation of this cultural alienation. Originally a catalogue for Belgian 
eyes to feast upon all their colony had to offer, it then pivoted to claiming being a purely scientific 
institution, despite its allures of 19th century cabinet of curiosities. Due to its hegemonic position as a 
very well-endowed regalian institution and its wealth of historical archives, it still holds a tight grip on 
much of the knowledge-production related to the Congo. Its reach doesn’t stop at the Belgian border. 
For example, Texaf Bilembo, a Kinshasa cultural centre that sometimes doubles as one of its hippest 
places, is one of his many partners. The centre’s library sells several books stamped with the logo of the 
AfricaMuseum. Congolese scholarship is in dire need of funds, and Tervuren often finds itself 
implicated in a sizable portion of what is published about the DRC. Some editions of aforementioned 
Congolese historian Isidore Ndaywel’s flagship historical sum are prefaced by Tervuren’s ubiquitous 
and seemingly unmovable director, Guido Gryseels. The Belgian institution was also involved in the 
setting up of Kinshasa’s new National Museum (MNRDC), though it still refuses to return any of the 




Hegemonic Decolonisation  
The aging Tervuren Museum, long in need of refurbishment, entered a four-year process of renovation 
in 2013. Opportunity was seized to revisit the permanent exhibition, an endeavour that was touted as 
an ambitious decolonisation project – a first for Belgium. The Museum promised to deeply cooperate 
and listen to the diasporas, without clearly explaining what that cooperation would entail. So far, their 
interactions with the diasporas had consisted mostly in inviting some Brussels youths to take part to 
urban-culture-themed events. 
Concretely, six members of Central African diasporas, most of them museologists or art historians (and 
usually Belgian themselves) were invited as consultants within the renovation working group. They were 
first intrigued by the fact that none of the five people of African descent working for the Museum were 
present in the room with them. They were kept seemingly out of the loop. The six consultants were 
then presented with the new concept of the collections, along with the framing of Congolese history 
that was to be passed onto the visitor. The group of six first deplored the absence of contextualisation 
surrounding several pieces (such as masks, presented static and without their full costume, or their 
religious and social significations) and the refusal by museum personnel to do away with their colonial-
era-style display cases. They question the necessity to adorn every room of the building with Congolese 
folk paintings (many of them by Chéri Samba). They also criticised the eurocentrism of the museum’s 
historical narrative. Most of these critiques fell on deaf ears, and it became clear the consultants were 
brought to validate the museum’s work rather than critique it. Behind the scenes, most of the scientific 
staff were reluctant to alter the way they worked. The six consultants dissociated from the whole process, 
and once their checks cleared, toured the media to publicly levy their critiques at the museum.13 
Reading the concepts and the documents produced by the working group14, the fallout between 
Tervuren and its consultants makes sense. The entirety of the material displays the scholarly quality of 
an undergraduate essay. It is a compilation of older, usually Eurocentric, historical works and colonial 
tropes, at times paternalistic and condescending. Concepts like imperialism are never properly 
explained, or obfuscated. There's nary a mention of Central Africa’s precolonial history. Complexity is 
reserved to the colonisers while the Congolese are painted with a very big brush. Jarring choices litter 
the documents. A section about education is eclipsed in size by one about crocodile-men and leopard-
men, an interesting yet inconsequential footnote in the history of the DRC, that was only made relevant 
by colonial propaganda. Among the other tropes found in the drafts: the inflated importance of the 
“Belgo-Congolese community” a 1950’s propaganda effort intended to quell international pressure and 
sublimate Belgium’s apartheid regime, the relevance of the 1956 Van Bilsen plan, presented uncritically 
as a good faith plan to emancipate the Congo – even though it pushed for another thirty years of Belgian 
occupation. The group of six were fed an alienating portrayal of what was their culture and history, 




validate – as objects – a knowledge of themselves handed down from a position of authority by 
Europeans marinated in colonial imagery. 
The Royal Museum for Central Africa reopened in 2018, accompanied by a rebranding campaign, and 
a fresh name: AfricaMuseum. Inside, few things had changed. Fewer objects were now exposed, from 
1400 down to 700, some of the most uneasy statues (like a leopard-man about to strike his prey) were 
moved to a different room. The dead giraffe is still there. The big pirogue too. So are the dozens of 
racist sculptures decorating the walls and the bas-reliefs glorifying Leopold II. They are part of the 
walls, and the Royal Museum is a protected monument. A memorial honouring the “Belgians who died 
in the Congo 1876-1908" – the time of the Congo Free State – was left untouched. A small text was 
added, mentioning “a demographic deficit of several hundreds of thousands, maybe a few millions”. 
Interestingly, the English version of the text is a bit less tame. 
All that colonial decorum, inseparable from the structure of the building, begs the question of whether 
it was even possible to decolonise what is the quintessential incarnation and perpetuator of Belgium’s 
colonial ideology. One does not simply decolonise the Colonial Museum. 
 
Reconciliation on the settler’s terms 
The renovation of the Tervuren Museum did have one good outcome: it can be credited with instilling 
a second wind to Belgium’s minorities’ calls for decolonisation. A Patrice Lumumba Square was 
inaugurated in Brussels in 2018. A UN expert group visited Belgium in 2019 to assess the human rights 
situation of people of African descent in the country. New generations were politicised and acquainted 
with the basics of decolonisation and were able to mobilise in 2020 during the worldwide BLM protests. 
The year was also marked by a declaration by King Philippe, who expressed his “deep regrets” regarding 
Belgium’s (and his family’s) colonial past, in a letter addressed to DRC president Félix Tshisekedi. The 
Federal Parliament announced the creation of a “Truth and Reconciliation” Commission, tasked with 
facing Belgium’s colonial crimes. 
Many were disillusioned when a list of experts expected to be part of the commission was leaked. The 
group comprised as many Belgians as Africans and Afro-descendants, mostly historians. Though the 
presence of acclaimed Congolese historian Elikia M’Bokolo was a welcome surprise, the selection was 
problematic. No Burundian name made it on the list. Some experts had no idea their name was on said 
list until it was leaked. In total, the names of 20 experts made up the list, as individuals. No political or 
civil society organisation was taken into account in any capacity. It came as no surprise then that the list 
had in large parts been put together by none other than the AfricaMuseum, whose “decolonisation” was 




One of the experts, political scientist Olivia Rutazibwa, herself of Rwandan descent, had not been 
consulted before her name was added to the list. Rutazibwa publicly refused to take part to the exercise 
and relayed the grievances of many in the diasporas in an open letter. She criticised the “White World 
logic” impetus of fixing a top-down historical truth, the clearly limiting scope rendering it near 
impossible to address the wider racism present in Belgian society as a result of its colonial history and 
denounced the would-be Commission as “a cosmetic operation at the service of the status quo”.15 
Again, the methodology of the Commission betrays a colonial gaze. The Belgian parliament, an organ 
of a former colonial state, still complicit in colonial exploitation, appointing experts (a majority of which 
are nationals) to establish its hegemonic truth regarding its colonial crimes. Again, you cannot 
decolonise the Colonial Museum for the racism is part of the walls. You cannot decolonise a colonial 
state with the same tools it used to colonise the world. It is time hegemonic institutions and emanations 
of the state let go of their positions, lest the only decolonisation left possible will be to rebuild them 
brick by brick – and get rid of the statues on the walls. 
Decolonisation is not a dialogue between an oppressor or an ex-oppressor that still holds most of the 
power and those who had to endure their rule. Decolonisation is a radical reclamation of self-
determination and of the knowledge of the self, where most of one’s identity were imprinted on them 
by a hegemon. The history of Belgian racism won’t be properly told but by the ones who had to live it, 
and its structures won’t be torn down by those who profit from it. Likewise, the Congolese should not 
have to negotiate how to frame the history of their occupation with their former colonisers. 
 
Conclusion 
Like évolution, hegemonic decolonisation is a spook. Should the Congolese or the diasporas ever 
commit to reclaiming their own status as subjects, it’s up to them to write their narratives, without the 
initiative coming from an institution legatee to the colonial apparel. Emulation between Africans (and 
other colonised populations) is the one that will help make sense of their history and experience, not 
conceding that authority to their former overlord. 
The way forward is in Africans reclaiming their history and their imaginary, and in diasporas not fearing 
adding their voices to the chorus. For those who have been treated as objects for too long to be able to 
create, study, produce... is one of the ways we can decolonise knowledge – as a stepping stone towards 
socio-economic emancipation. It requires time, effort, contention, coalition building and might be a 
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1.3 Colonialism Must Fall: Reflections on Student Activism 




A narrative told from a magnifying glass ceiling. 
Hear the quick call to decolonize our education. 




If there are two sides to every coin 
Well then here’s a little heads up 
Cause we’re flipping the tale and 
Flipping the switch 
Onto the side of a truth unspoken.1 
 
- Princess Ashilokun 
‘Ignorance Must Fall’, originally a spoken word piece 
 
Introduction 
For hundreds of years, the university has been an important institution for the production, exchange 
and dissemination of knowledge. While it has often been considered an elitist, exclusive organization, 
it has gradually expanded to encompass a more diverse cohort from different social classes, ethnicities 
and nationalities. Though academic in nature, its influence spans beyond the university walls: it shapes 




college heads of the University of Oxford recently stated in their open letter about anti-racist protests 
in 2020, education, and by association the university, is a key site which has the power to “promote, 
protect and advance equal dignity and respect, diversity of thought […] tolerance and multiculturalism”2 
in national and global contexts. It provides a suitable breeding ground for debate and discussion. It 
enables contestation of archaic thought processes as well as injustices of various kinds. And yet, in recent 
years outrage has grown at the attempts, or lack thereof, by British universities to demonstrate these 
values. Within a specific decolonial context, many institutions have failed to address their Eurocentric 
curriculums and pedagogies, and campus environments. They have also neglected to explore their 
histories and legacies of empire. In other cases, they have ignored the significance of the various colonial 
artefacts and architecture that make up their foundations. Equally, they continue to promote colonial 
figures.  
As a response to this, the UK has witnessed a rising number of activist movements, spearheaded by 
students across the country. These movements have sought to hold universities accountable and to push 
for a full decolonisation of academic spaces. Indeed, continuing the tradition of twentieth-century 
student activism, students have come together to protest with national campaigns like the UK’s National 
Union of Students’ “Why is My Curriculum White?” and #LiberateMyDegree campaigns and more 
localized movements, such as “Rhodes Must Fall” at the University of Oxford, “POC Squared” at Queen 
Mary University of London and “Broaden My Bookshelf” at the University of Huddersfield. While 
students have too often been portrayed as inexperienced and naïve in pushing for change, such 
movements showcase the power and agency of students in their efforts to decolonise academic 
institutions and work in solidarity with one another. This article explores these strengths in more depth, 
with specific focus on the “Rhodes Must Fall” movement and “Uncomfortable Oxford.” In my 
examination of these initiatives, I touch on the history of student activism, and highlight the great 
advances that have been made by contemporary initiatives in decolonising the university setting. 
Subsequently, I reflect on what is still needed for universities across the UK to reach their full potential. 
After all, there is still a long way to go to ensure that universities formally commit to taking 
decolonisation seriously. Despite the extensive work of institutions like SOAS (School of Oriental and 
African Studies) University of London in decolonising their institutions, as The Guardian found in 
June 2020, only a fifth of British universities have formally committed to decolonising their 
institutions.3 Clearly, there needs to be a more holistic effort to fully ensure that universities listen to 
students’ concerns. Moreover, we must question the university’s place in relation to British society and 







Decolonising the University 
My reflection on decolonising the university begins by firstly questioning what exactly decolonisation 
means in this space. Western universities have come to be known by pro-decolonial activists as a “key 
site” through which colonialism and the knowledge of colonialism are “consecrated, institutionalised 
and naturalized.”4 They have been built from colonial expeditions and exploits and have existed for 
several years, further entrenching violent and oppressive colonial narratives. This fact alone makes the 
prospect of decolonisation an incredibly complex and drawn-out process. As Gurminder K. Bhambra, 
Dalia Gebrial and Kerem Nişancıoğlu state in their edited volume, Decolonising the University, 
decolonisation is itself a multifaceted, and often contested, concept, with “a multitude of definitions, 
interpretations, aims and strategies.”5 In broad terms, it is “a way of thinking about the world which 
takes colonialism, empire and racism at its empirical and discursive objects of study.” Equally, it offers 
alternative means of thinking about the world and “alternative forms of political praxis.”6 As underlined 
above, there are various approaches and perspectives on how these two principal aims can be carried 
out. Decolonising the university has included a critical examination of pedagogical practices – i.e. 
examining the Eurocentric biases within teaching, knowledge exchange and production –, re-evaluating 
traditionally exclusive course curriculums, and making campus environments more inclusive. 
Additionally, it can entail providing anti-racist training for staff and students, implementing effective 
complaints procedures for those who have experienced discrimination, ensuring better representation 
of staff and students from minority backgrounds and addressing attainment gaps between white 
students and other disadvantaged students. Many students have also pushed for universities to examine 
their colonial legacies, contemporary ties to oppressive systems, and iconography. All of these examples 
have been interpreted and addressed in different ways, which has added to the complicated and disputed 
debate about what it means to decolonise the university in the first place.7 Certainly this unstable 
definition has often created an ambiguous response from universities themselves to commit to 
decolonisation. Such institutions are able to cherry-pick a few initiatives here and there, as part of a 
“tick-box” exercise that enables them to not have to be completely proactive in meeting students’ needs 
while remaining somewhat attractive to a new cohort of students in this era of ‘marketization’ and 
‘consumer satisfaction’.8 It is no wonder, then, that student activists continue to put pressure on 
universities to make more fundamental changes to their infrastructure, beyond what has tended to be 
adding a few authors from marginalized groups to course reading lists. As members of a younger 
generation, these students join other game changers of grassroots movements. They have the energy 
and vigour to provoke action from within. In the words of “Fill In the Blacks”9 co-founder Rochelle 
Meaden, they “sit at the perfect interchange of anger and hope,”10 and use their fearlessness to defy and 





A History of Student Activism 
The participation of students in political change is, of course, by no means a new occurrence. In fact, 
the student movements we have seen emerge in the UK have often been inspired by earlier movements 
in the twentieth century. On a global scale, the USA bore witness to the civil rights movements which 
encouraged the involvement of a number of students. These young people took part in a number of 
marches, sit-ins and meetings, most notably during the push for creating integrated schools, the lunch 
counter sit-ins of 1960 in North Carolina and “The Children’s Crusade” of 1963 in Birmingham, 
Alabama.11 In the 1950s and 1960s, many of the protests in Europe were staged to drastically reform a 
catastrophic “bourgeois” education system and express upset at conflicts in Algeria, Vietnam and Latin 
America. Others criticized autocratic regimes and held demonstrations of an anti-imperialist sentiment 
to call for national self-determination in colonized nations.12 In 1968 a wave of protests took place 
across the world. Students expressed their frustrations with the hopes of improving deep-rooted issues 
in society. In the UK, the “Long Sixties” consisted of a number of student movements which expressed 
similar outrage; they were created to condemn the Vietnam War, imperialism, the use of nuclear 
weapons, and outdated universities, through a range of events: marches, sit-ins, pickets and rallies.13  
The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa in the 1970s equally made room for student activists. 
Their intervention represented one of the “most distinctive characteristic features of anti-colonial 
resistance”14. Students and student organizations used universities and schools as mediums through 
which they challenged racial injustices. Many of these eventually expanded their contestations to 
encompass party politics and the wider community at large. The creation of student branches of national 
parties enabled a beneficial alliance between national and student change.15 Moving to the 1980s, 
student activism was further launched onto the international stage through the presence of divestment 
protests that sought to push universities to terminate their investment in companies in South Africa. 
Shanty towns on student campuses were built to expose the system of oppression and violence against 
impoverished black people in the South African apartheid.16 As Robert A. Rhoads has discovered, 
student protests of the 1990s in the USA changed their priorities from a focus on rights in the 
movements of the 1960s to opportunity, that is to say improving prospects for disadvantaged students. 
They aimed to make universities more accessible and prioritize multiculturalism and diversity within 
these spaces.17 From the 2000s onwards, student movements have expanded their focus to more societal 
issues, demanding society to address the prominence of sexual assault cases on university campuses, 
gender-based violence and feminicide. Emphasis has also been placed on protecting the rights of 
marginalized groups and to support movements like “Black Lives Matter” and decolonisation initiatives 
in various spheres of influence.18 Beginning with the 1960s up until the present day, what these student 
movements have in common is the understanding of young people as a force to be reckoned with. Their 
threat to the social order reveals the power that they hold in triggering local, national, and even global 




across the decades to expose the injustices and hypocrisies of society at large. These activists have 
become catalysts for other groups to act. They look to agents of the past as inspirations for continuing 
the quest to “force political, social and cultural debates of the era.”19 
 
Student Movements in the UK 
What perhaps separates contemporary student activism from previous movements is that recent 
initiatives appear to be much less elitist, and thus more accessible, to a more diverse university cohort. 
With the gradual rise of students coming from a variety of backgrounds, a slightly more representative 
group of people have taken part in shaping the future. They are more distanced from the white middle-
class model of students,20 and intervene in activism both for themselves and for future students. 
Moreover, in an age where the importance of identity politics has grown considerably, students are 
determined more than ever to demand more from their universities. They have often presented their 
critiques according to contemporary discussions about intersectionality, white privilege, structural 
racism, and equality, diversity and inclusion. Across the UK we find a range of examples of student-led 
movements which serve to tackle different aspects of decolonising universities. The University of 
Huddersfield’s “Broaden My Bookshelf” initiative, for instance, primarily concentrates on making sure 
that more BAME and LGBTQ+ authors appear on degree course reading lists and in libraries. It seeks 
to further question fundamental aspects of the traditionally exclusive and unequal nature of learning.21 
In 2017, this initiative was awarded £20,000 by the University of Huddersfield, which demonstrates the 
power that student-led projects can have in encouraging their institutions to invest, financially and 
emotionally, into their causes.22 This can also be seen in the numerous decolonisation initiatives in 
various universities, including “Decolonise the University of Manchester”, “Decolonise Sussex”, “the 
Decolonise Durham Network”, “Decolonising the Curriculum” at the University of Kent, as well as the 
National Student Union’s “Why is My Curriculum White?” campaign. Together, these have worked to 
challenge the barriers of exclusively white university curricula and the Eurocentric forms of teaching 
that are paired with them. Some of these decolonising initiatives have been furthered by universities 
themselves, further pointing to the ability for students to not only “shock and inspire”23 national and 
international audiences for their campaigns, but also engage with universities in a way that modifies 
their foundations on a more fundamental level. Often these projects also benefit from the connectivity 
that this new “Digital Age” of social media offers them. Leaders of various projects have the ability to 
form networks and to share and exchange ideas that have worked in pushing for positive change. They 
can also provide important support networks for when activism inevitably becomes emotionally 
exhausting. As Alexander Hensby notes in his exploration of mediated protest events in UK Student 
activism cycles, social media accounts provide opportunities to “accumulate a wealth of videos, 




different institutions. A strong social media presence also ensures a better chance for movements to 
sustain themselves and grow in influence. It even makes such movements more accessible to circles 
outside of the university setting who can tap into their available resources. At the very least, these 
movements set themselves up to receive more publicity opportunities that allow them a level of traction 
and continuity.  
Perhaps more than anyone, students are in the best position to advise universities on how best to 
decolonise all facets of the educational system. As consumers of and co-producers in education, their 
needs are what should guide the direction in which universities are heading. The experiences of students 
of colour reveal the failures of universities to provide inclusive spaces, to enable minority students to 
succeed in their courses, and to properly come to terms with their colonial histories. Indeed, students 
have first-hand experience of the long-lasting impact of colonization and racism on society. They offer 
a “unique insight” on how racism and inequality have had “catastrophic effects” and how these can be 
resolved in the university setting and beyond.25 We see this very clearly in the POC Squared project, led 
by a trio of physics graduates from Queen Mary University of London. Their aim is to make “systemic 
change” in STEM subjects, decolonising the science-related curricula which have all too often been 
presented as apolitical. Additionally, they seek to provide more BAME representation in STEM jobs 
and to highlight the work and stories of scientists of colour who have often been erased from history.26 
This group has not only helped to shape the environment in which students of colour study, but also it 
has thought critically about life beyond university. The founders have emphasized the importance of 
their institution in preparing students of colour for future careers. They demonstrate the need to link 
universities to the wider world, in order to understand the all-encompassing impact that colonial 
narratives have had on society. As the initiative has grown, POC Squared has become a social enterprise 
which has received funding from The Royal Astronomical Society. Thanks to this financial 
contribution, it now pays contributors of their initiative. It is an important counteraction to the sad 
reality that people of colour are not always recognized, by universities, for their time and work in equality 
and diversity initiatives. On their website, the project’s founders have included a podcast and guides for 
BAME people applying for positions in STEM, as well as a detailed course module, entitled “Diversity 
in STEM”, which concentrates on postcolonial theory in STEM and how imperialism has influenced 
science.27 With their often international perspective, students like these think more critically about 
university environments outside of a Eurocentric framework. It is a mutually beneficial act, which helps 
universities to grow with the times and empower students themselves to become “change actors” who 
have an important stake in education as “co-producers of knowledge.”28 As we have seen with these few 
examples of student-led projects, students themselves have brought a new energy to decolonisation 
movements. They are a “vanguard for social change”29 whose dynamic projects can cover more ground 





Student Activism at the University of Oxford  
This cannot be more apparent in the University of Oxford, an institution that is built on tradition, 
prestige and colonialism. In recent years it has become home to a number of student activist projects, 
including “Rhodes Must Fall” and “Uncomfortable Oxford”. Both projects have sought to uncover and 
challenge the uncomfortable history of violence and oppression with which the university is connected. 
“Rhodes Must Fall”, especially, has gained national and even international attention in the press. It was 
originally inspired an incident at the University of Cape Town in which a student threw a bucket of 
faeces at a statue of the imperialist Cecil Rhodes. Following this, “Rhodes Must Fall” in Oxford sparked 
debates about the decolonisation of education in the UK and the role of iconography in perpetuating 
racism and oppression. It focused on the areas of iconography, curriculum and representation and tried 
to reform the university from within. Their efforts, the group hoped, would spark further change in 
other institutions.30 On the 6th of November 2015, 250 Oxford students came together in front of Oriel 
College to call for the statue of Cecil Rhodes to be removed. They argued that the university used the 
statue to glorify “an international criminal,”31 alongside other imperialists like Christopher Codrington, 
Benjamin Jowett and Pitt Rivers who have various buildings named after them. As they stated in their 
first official statement: 
“Oxford continues to colonise the minds of future leaders through its visual iconographies, the concepts 
and histories of its curricula, the networks of power, the cultural capital, and the ‘civilised’ culture of 
‘taste’ in which students are steeped.”32 
Despite being depicted by some as unruly perpetrators of erasing history, the “Rhodes Must Fall” 
organisers have gained much support over the years. Admittedly, the project experienced a slight dip in 
influence as many of its supporters graduated from the university; however, the death of George Floyd 
and “Black Lives Matter” protests all over the world in 2020 incited a new wave of support and fervour 
for the movement. This support led to a peaceful demonstration on the 9th of June 2020, which 1000 
people attended. “Rhodes Must Fall” became attractive to a set of people who were awakened by 
questions of privilege and racism; these supporters started to question their own contribution to racist 
structures. People engaged in speeches, petitions, marches, and dance protests, which were shared across 
social media platforms. Such activism complemented other movements like “#LeopoldMustFall'' at the 
Queen Mary University of London. Relentless campaigning and a strong news coverage appeared 
alongside other events which involved the toppling of statues (namely, slave owner Edward Colston in 
Bristol33). These finally led Oriel College to vote in favour of removing the statue of Cecil Rhodes in 
June 2020.34 Since then, the university has made a bigger effort to assess its relationship with 
imperialism, including a re-evaluation of course curricula, facilities and resources for BAME students. 
Some colleges have also invested in research into the university’s colonial legacies. This has been, of 




and individual staff and students. This exhilarating decision on behalf of Oriel College exemplifies the 
strengths of student activism that have already been discussed in this article. Indeed, “Rhodes Must 
Fall” has presented itself as a striking force which capitalized on social media, a variety of protest events 
and connectivity with other groups to carry out its aims. As the official “Rhodes Must Fall” book reveals, 
collaboration with other student initiatives like “Decolonise Sussex” and “Decolonising SOAS” has 
created much bigger debates about decolonising education and oppressive iconography, all of which 
have been more strongly embedded in the consciousness of students up and down the country.  
Along similar lines, “Uncomfortable Oxford” started off a student activist project which perceives 
colonial artefacts and architecture with a critical lens. Kickstarted by DPhil students, Olivia Durand 
and Paula Larsson in 2018, it has now become an academic led- social enterprise. It aims to create 
discussions about “empire, race, class and gender,”35 primarily through the walking tours that guides 
lead around the city of Oxford. These tours, entitled “The Original Uncomfortable Tour”, “Oxford and 
Empire”, “Uncomfortable Literature”, and “Follow the Money”, have often been described as “Oxford’s 
tour[s] of shame.”36 They are positioned as something unique alongside the usual pubs, ghosts and city 
tours that are available to locals and tourists. During the COVID-pandemic, the organization has 
managed to adapt to uncertain times by providing virtual tours which take participants on a tour around 
particular buildings and monuments to explore material culture and colonial discourses that permeate 
the city. The adaptability of its program to this new virtual setting has enabled its expansion to not only 
residents and tourists in Oxford, but also to the alumni community of the university. Alongside this, a 
number of online panel discussions, workshops, podcasts and talks have further extended the 
organization’s ability to spread awareness about Oxford’s uneasy history. As tour participants are taken 
around Oxford, they are made to feel uneasy about what they are confronted with: statues, buildings 
and ideas that reflect the oppressive and violent attitudes of imperialism. To take this further, tour 
guides offer an interactive aspect of their tours which encourages discussion. Participants are encouraged 
to share their responses to questions and to discuss topics which do not have definitive answers. This 
creates a constructive space in which people can learn from each other without the fear of being chastised 
or dismissed. It equally helps visitors to “think more about beautiful architecture they’ve just seen” and, 
in the words of co-founder Paula Larsson, “to apply […] questions to every space they walk into next.”37 
It is about being more analytical and critical of the environment which you inhabit and thinking more 
deeply about racist structures that are very much entrenched in society. The interactive element of their 
walking tours, I believe, has been a huge contribution to the organization’s success. Instead of being fed 
information that they may later forget, participants are encouraged to engage more profoundly with 
questions of power and memory, and to spark further dialogue about these in other spaces with different 
people. “Uncomfortable Oxford” does not simply look into the university, it projects outwards to the 
wider city to eradicate the traditional “Town versus Gown” division. It successfully brings together 




various institutions around Oxford, including Oxford colleges and museums, as well as other student-
led projects like “Common Ground”, a movement which examines Oxford’s colonial past.38 Much like 
“Rhodes Must Fall”, “Uncomfortable Oxford” has gained media attention from British newspapers, 
which has furthered interest in its work. It has shown itself to be equally successful at staging debates 
about decolonisation in the West, bridging together the city’s history and global events.  
 
What is still needed?  
It is clear that both Oxford student movements, and other examples of UK student activism mentioned 
above, have shown remarkable successes in an era of decolonising education. However, it seems 
appropriate to state that there is still a long way to go. As mentioned earlier, despite the hard work and 
enthusiasm of student activists in sparking change, the university remains a place of frustration. As a 
recent Guardian article revealed in July 2020, out of the 128 British university institutions only 24 have 
committed to decolonising their curriculum. 11 out of the 24 have formally declared to reform the whole 
institution, with most of the work being directed at a few departments and/or a small group of academics 
and students.39 To many institutions, decolonisation remains a buzzword which is used to raise the 
profile of a university without really putting in the hard work to make academic spaces more inclusive. 
In the new age of “marketization” in which universities look to students as consumers, universities are 
more and more conscious of their public image. They wish to tick boxes whilst not wishing to do 
anything that may seem too radical or seemingly political in a country which still experiences a great 
level of ignorance and misguided pride towards the British Empire. As well as taking students more 
seriously in their calls for decolonisation, their movements need to be incorporated into the 
infrastructure of the university itself. Colonial legacies are deeply rooted in the university framework; 
incorporating initiatives that help to dismantle it not only formalises the procedure, but also encourages 
different members of the university to play a part in this, not just BAME students and staff. Breaking 
away from the prominent assumption that decolonisation only concerns minority groups, implementing 
working groups and training with specific and attainable goals will help to improve various facets of the 
education system. It will also facilitate better collaboration with students and staff and enable a better 
and more sustainable way of ensuring that the university becomes a more inclusive and continually self-
critical space. It also acts as a possible solution to the risk of extinction that student movements 
potentially face when students inevitably graduate and move away from student activism.40 The 
incorporation of student movements into the university itself is entirely achievable. The “Decolonising 
SOAS” project, for example, is built on the previous work of student activists. It is funded centrally by 
the university’s administration, paying, and calling on a working group to interrogate learning, teaching 
practices, and to provide resources and toolkits for decolonising higher education institutions.41 In fact, 




activists. It seeks to collaborate with other institutions to spark further change in the UK. In a society 
in which we now have more official data on the impact of colonization and education on BAME 
students, such as attainment gaps between white students and students of colour, universities owe it to 
students to listen to their needs and resolve long-standing inequalities.  
 
Beyond the University 
It is, however, a detriment to the work of student activism if we only think about universities in their 
own right. Indeed, as we have discovered, the university is an important institution of power, which has 
the ability to reflect and influence knowledge, perspectives and theories of contemporary society. In 
many ways, colonial issues with universities are symbolic of the UK’s deep-rooted issues with racism 
and empire. In the grand scheme of decolonisation in the UK, there is a great lack of education and 
lack of willingness for many to educate themselves about the horrors of the past. Moreover, as a YouGov 
study in 2014 found, 59% of British people are even proud of Britain's colonial past. While almost half 
of young people felt ashamed about the Empire, two-thirds of over 60s viewed it with pride.42 In light 
of the recent treatment of figures such as Meghan Markle in the British press, and the media’s and the 
British government’s often negative depiction of “Black Lives Matter” protests, it is hard to imagine 
that these statistics have drastically changed. Alongside this beaming pride for the Empire, there is also 
another set of people who are too uncomfortable and ashamed to face their country’s colonial past. This 
uneasiness will always present itself as a barrier to the UK formally acknowledging its colonial legacy 
and trying to dismantle racist structures that are still in place. The whole of society, and not just young 
people, need to engage in this practice. On a more profound level, British people need to embrace 
vulnerability by viewing their history through a more unpleasant lens, and in the process, refrain from 
belittling and misrepresenting student activists as “anarchistic rebels,” “the woke police” or even 
“snowflakes.” They must move away from the assumption that students wish to replace or erase history. 
This reluctance to be open to a new dialogue about British colonial history is what sometimes prohibits 
student initiatives from penetrating a wider audience and accessing more influential change makers, like 
members of parliament. It makes the job of acknowledging the UK’s colonial heritage much more 
difficult, as well as investing in official channels and programs to repair racial inequalities in society.  
 
Conclusion 
These improvements for universities and British society in general are, of course, only a few suggestions 
that should be considered in discussions about decolonisation. They are by no means easy to implement. 
Decolonising any space, let alone one as big as education, is a huge task that needs to be thought about 




Student activists in the UK have come a long way in kickstarting this process. As we have seen with 
recent grassroots movements across the country, there is a deep urgency for change in the university and 
an understanding of students as powerful agents who seek to make academic settings more equal and 
inclusive. Students have raised key questions about the importance of the production and exchange of 
knowledge about the UK’s past and how it continues to influence the structures that benefit some and 
discriminate against others. While such movements have come up against challenges of their own, both 
in terms of struggling to be heard by universities or being misrepresented in wider society, they offer 
hope for many that much more will be done in the future to ensure that the UK comes to terms with 
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1.4 “Was Kant a racist?”: the public discussion on Germany’s 
belated intellectual decolonisation 
 
Robin F.C. Schmahl 
 
Introduction 
In April 2021 German and Nigerian authorities reached a compromise that will lead to the restitution 
of the Benin Bronzes held in the Humboldt Forum, Berlin. The discussion on the restitution of looted 
art was re-initiated in 2017 (Sarr and Savoy 2018; Savoy 2021) at a time when the Herero and Namaqua 
Genocide regained considerable attention with Germany deciding to repatriate the human remains of 
several former Herero and Nama prisoners from its ethnological archives (Rücker and Ziegenfuß 2018). 
Besides the aspects of restitution and repatriation the debate on German colonial practice focused on a 
third issue: intellectual decolonisation. In 2020, a discussion on the influence of European colonialism 
on the German intellectual canon as well as its role for the development of scientific racism emerged 
across all channels of mass media production in Germany. Public debate concentrated mostly on a re-
examination of the oeuvre of Immanuel Kant – the figurehead of the German Enlightenment. 
This chapter provides a survey of the German public discussion on intellectual decolonisation in 2020 
and 2021. It offers a case study of what happens when a question, i.e. Was Kant a racist? leaves the 
academic realm and enters public discourse. The meaning of such a question, its answer as well as the 
significance of both are dependent on its discursive surroundings. To comprehend the question Was 
Kant a racist? posed in public discourse, we must understand why and when it is raised as well as how 
and where it is answered. This chapter sets out to explore these notions through the method of a four-
dimensional Foucauldian discourse analysis after giving an overview of the scientific literature on racism 
in Kant’s writings. 
Before we start, I must address my positionality on the issue (Foucault 1982; Bourdieu 1992; Göğüş 
2019). Having received my education from German institutions of Philosophy and History, I am 
endowed to their intellectual tradition and thereby influenced by Kantian philosophy or its critical 
reception. The importance of Kant for German culture and identity cannot be overstated. People with 
comparable backgrounds have encountered him numerous times in school, university, the media, or 




Aufklärung? (Kant AA VIII)1 a now almost universally read piece in German schools, I have never 
ceased to think, talk, or read about Kantian ideas in my admittedly bourgeois-esque fascination with 
this author. Upon a reflection of my intellectual ambitions, I have come to realize how important his 
philosophy was for my work, even though my career is only peripherally concerned with him. As such, 
an attentive reader could understand this chapter either as an inside glimpse into decolonial endeavours 
in Western Europe, or as an awkwardly biased account of German society. Given my own positionality, 
I leave this question to the attentive reader to answer for his or herself. 
 
The Academic Debate: how to reconcile racism with universalist moral philosophy? 
Kant’s racism receives peripheral though ever-growing attention within research. The first widely read 
studies on the topic appeared in the 1990s (Neugebauer 1990), with only a handful of theoretical works 
to draw upon (Moebus 1977; Sutter 1989). The subject was prominently introduced through the 
writings of Hill and Bernasconi (Bernasconi 2001; Hill Jr and Boxill 2001) which produced a 
philosophical and not merely historical engagement with racism in Kant’s practical philosophy. Based 
on Kleingeld’s research, there is now a wide consensus on identifying the evolution of Kant’s thoughts 
on race in five phases: (1) white supremacism in the 1760s, (2) a normatively neutral hierarchy of race 
based on climatic environment in the 1770s, (3) a scientification discarding previous normative 
dimensions in the mid-1780s, (4) a teleological concept of race and re-introduction of normative 
hierarchies in the late 1780s, and (5) condemnations of colonialism and a possible adherence to a non-
normative race theory since the mid-1790s. (Kleingeld 2007; 2014a) 
Traces of Kant’s racial hierarchies can be found as early as in his 1764 Beobachtungen über das Gefühl 
des Schönen und Erhabenen (Kant AA II) and in the lectures on physical geography (Kant AA IX). 
These passages display notions of white supremacy and were apologetic of the oppression of indigenous 
people of North America or sub-Saharan Africa (Sutter 1989). Kant attributed different levels of agency 
as well as rational capabilities to different races, among which the white European would constitute the 
closest degeneration (Abartung) from an original human race. As such, Kant was the proponent of a 
monogenetic though normative theory of race — a notion that was contested within the anthropological 
discourse of his time (Sutter 1989; Kleingeld 2007). 
 
1 When referring to Kant’s work I will use the standardized version of reference based on the Akademie-Ausgabe (AA) 
available under https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/kant/verzeichnisse-gesamt.html (accessed 27.03.2021). For reasons 
of brevity, I refrain from direct citations; most relevant passages can be found quoted in German in the studies of Sutter, 
Leutgöb, Hentges and Diop, and in English in the works of Kleingeld. See (Sutter 1989; Hentges 2004; Kleingeld 2007; 




A change of his views can be detected in his Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen (Kant AA 
II) and in the 1785 Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrasse (Kant AA VIII) that constituted a 
reaction to criticisms posed by Herder. Here, Kant accounts for the occurrence of physiological 
differences between races by referring to climatic environments (Hentges 2004; van Gorkom 2020). 
These writings abandoned his earlier conception of the white European as the closest degeneration of 
an original human race as well as any normative hierarchies. This scientification (Sutter 1989) of race 
theory utilized skin color as a moral-independent method of distinction showcasing a monogenetic 
theory solely based on hereditary physiological differences. Kleingeld has shown that his normative 
hierarchy of race was merely pushed to the background of his thought (Kleingeld 2007), as it would 
occasionally re-appear in other writings (Sutter 1989). 
Kant’s theory was not well received by the anthropological community of his time (Kleingeld 2007). 
Georg Forster criticized him for relying on teleology instead of empirical data and reproducing white 
supremacist ideologies (Diop 2012; Gray 2012). As a justification of his ideas, Kant revisits race in his 
essay on teleological principles (Kant AA VIII). Ignoring the lack of empirical evidence, he defends his 
theory and “re-attaches”(Kleingeld 2007) a normative dimension while endorsing anti-abolitionist 
ideas. 
As Kant did not restate his racial theory, we would have to assume the continuity of his outlook in his 
later life — a notion that, however, appears to be in open contradiction to his universalist moral 
philosophy and cosmopolitan political theory. Scholars have developed three different approaches to 
reconcile this apparent contradiction: 
The first proposes a shift in Kant’s attitude towards race and colonialist practice during the 1790s 
(Muthu 2003; Kleingeld 2007; 2014a; Storey 2015; Eberl 2019). This approach emphasizes how the 
introduction of (legal) cosmopolitanism (Weltbürgerrecht) and the absence of a normative racial theory 
after 1792 indicate a change in thinking. Kleingeld demonstrates that a close reading of his 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Kant AA IV) and Zum Ewigen Frieden (Kant AA VIII) 
exhibits an acknowledgement of equal agencies across all races and includes condemnations of 
colonialism. 
The second approach understands Kant to be implicitly racist and his philosophy not all-inclusively 
universalist (Sutter 1989; Eze 1994; Bernasconi 2001; Mills 2005; Sandford 2018). This approach 
shows how his moral philosophy might be permeated with inherent racism. Sutter and Mills stressed 
how Kant characterized non-European races to live in an ahistorical state that is non-significant for the 
progress of humankind. Those races would be unable to progress from their violent state of nature, 
inevitably leading to their enslavement by European powers. Even more so, non-European races are 
animalized (Sutter 1989) or denied personhood (Mills 2005) which leaves them un-effectuated by 




The third approach detaches Kant’s racism from his moral philosophy by contextualizing it as an 
insignificant and historically conditioned side note to his oeuvre (Louden 2000; Hill Jr and Boxill 2001). 
Louden parallels Kant’s remarks on race with his problematic thoughts on gender and asserts that 
“Kant’s theory is fortunately stronger than his prejudices, and it is the theory on which philosophers 
should focus.” (Louden 2000, 105) This view is only occasionally expressed within research anymore, 
as it has been shown that Kant himself deemed his teleological notions of race as central to his work 
(Kleingeld 2007) and that his ideas were not shared by contemporaries (Diop 2012). 
 
Iconoclasm and Beyond: German Public Discourse in 2020-2021 
In this chapter, I understand public discourse to be a juxtaposition of what I described above as academic 
or scholarly discourse — both being subcategories of the Foucauldian concept of discursive formation 
(Foucault 1961; 1969). Whereas scholarly discourse takes place within academic institutions, mostly 
between scholars as speakers/writers as well as listeners/readers, public discourse on the other hand, 
entails some notion of the public as an audience. The latter typically takes place in mass media outlets, 
while enabling its audiences through different forms of conveniences, e.g. linguistic accessibility, to 
partake as speakers/writers, but more often as listeners/readers. 
In his Archeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1969) Foucault understood a discourse as the re-occurrence 
of verbal relations between words, objects, subjects, or subject matters, and the regulation of the 
production of statements. He identifies four dimensions appertaining to the production: (1) occurrences 
of objects, (2) stabilizations of authority, (3) how statements are grouped and their desired effects, and 
(4) the materiality of the production (Foucault 1969; Ophir 2018). As such, four corresponding 
dimensions of analysis can be developed: (1) what object is produced?, (2) who or what authorizes the 
production?, (3) what is its inherent logic and terminology?, and (4) what are its strategic ends? (Diaz-
Bone et al. 2008). The discourse must then be operationalized in sources that are susceptible to analysis. 
I have opted for a selection of German TV- and radiobroadcasts, social media productions, podcasts, 
public lectures, as well as magazine and newspaper articles from 2020-2021.2 
As for the first dimension of analysis, the produced object is expectable: Kant and racism in enlightened 
thought. With the exception of one newspaper comment that questioned the occurrence of racism in 
Kant’s writings (Wolff 2020) all sources accepted one of the three outlooks described above (Willaschek 
2020; Aguigah 2020; Frank 2021). 
 
2 When describing the particular characteristics of the discourse I did not resort to reference all sources in which these can be 
detected. Instead, I have opted to reference mostly those sources in which these particularities are especially exuberant, 




More interesting than the produced object is what is omitted. Usually, the sources did not offer a 
discussion of the validity of the three different approaches, but rather opted for the presentation of one 
without elaborating on the academic debate surrounding the topic (Die Anstalt 2020). Furthermore, 
the concept of race itself, or the (critical) philosophy of race is not discussed at all.3 Current racism or 
how Kant’s theories of race conduce to racial discrimination today is also left out completely. Even the 
concept of decolonisation (Boulbina 2019) is not present, at least overtly, in almost all sources. The 
existence of only one exception from the rule confirms this notion: within a 50 minute interview by 
Deutschlandfunk Kultur one guest scholar mentions the concept once when describing the aspirations 
of African philosophers to change international academic discourse (Aguigah 2020). Colonial history 
appears occasionally; however, it is most often articulated as British colonialism, whereas a discussion 
of specific German colonialist practices is usually omitted. 
Although the discourse engages with experts, the discussion moves beyond the dominant question 
within scholarly discourse. Whether Kant was a racist does not appear to be the primary object of 
discussion, but rather how to engage with him today. Public debate is not concerned with a theoretical 
reconciliation of Kant’s racism and his moral philosophy, but rather raises the question of intellectual 
iconoclasm (Denkmal-/Büchersturm). Kant’s is characterized as the “father of the Enlightenment” (Die 
Anstalt 2020) and oeuvre as an intellectual monument. His person is elevated to be a symbol (Küveler 
and Lühmann 2020) and central to cultural identity. Almost all sources discuss iconoclasm and the 
metaphorical toppling of Kant’s monuments, either acknowledging its necessity though impossibility 
(Wuttke 2020; Die Anstalt 2020) or framing it as a misguided form of “cancel culture”(Scobel 2020) 
and as a consequence of excessive political correctness (Küveler 2020). As such, iconoclasm moves at 
the center of the debate with its opponents calling for utilizing Kant’s universalism to fight racism today 
(Gerhardt 2020; Scobel 2020; Lieder 2021). 
The second dimension of analysis questions who or what authorizes the enunciative production. Public 
figures with their institutional backgrounds in media outlets are the primary speakers within the debate. 
Especially when scholars are only engaged with indirectly, if at all, the sources focus on the issue of 
iconoclasm (Scobel 2020; Küveler and Lühmann 2020; Die Anstalt 2020). 
 
3 I suspect this is due to the reason that the current acceptable use of the German language in public discourse does not allow 
for the usage of the German word for “race” (Rasse) in a prominent way. Contrary to discussions in the anglophone world, the 
word Rasse is nowadays completely omitted because of its reminiscence of the despicable hygiene theory (Rassenhygiene) of 
the national-socialist movement in the 1930s and 1940s. See on that (Weingart, Kroll, and Bayertz 2001; Harten, Neirich, 
and Schwerendt 2006). Note that in some sources the speakers/writers had no issues with using the English term race in a 
German lingual context while substituting the term Rasse almost entirely with words such as origin, skin color or ethnicity, 




What authorized the discourse is a universally shared characteristic. The growing attention for the Black 
Lives Matter movement (BLM) over the course of June and July 2020 is portrayed as the primary cause 
for the start of the discussion in almost all sources. This notion is quite often coupled with the physical 
toppling of monuments within the Anglophone world, especially that of Edward Colston in Bristol. 
Here the discussion on BLM entered German discourse as a call for intellectual iconoclasm (Wuttke 
2020; Küveler and Lühmann 2020). However, no spokesperson of the German BLM movement took 
part in the debate about Kant within any prominent mass media outlets. 
Furthermore, even people of color (PoC) did not speak about the issue in any prominent way. Die 
Anstalt, a popular TV satire by the ZDF that is hosted by two white comedians, aired an episode on 
racism in German society where the role of hosting the show was given to PoC. However, in the section 
concerning racism in Kant’s thought, these left the stage for a “typical” white German to discover racism 
within the German intellectual tradition through an imaginative conversation between him and 
German intellectual idols (Kant, Marx and Arendt). At the end of the scene, the presenters returned to 
the stage lamenting the inability of white Germans to perform intellectual iconoclasm and citing 
Malcolm X — apparently as an alleged echelon of their own intellectual tradition (Die Anstalt 2020). 
Granted, this does not represent the authentic agency of PoC and one should conceptualize the 
episode’s artistic choice as a political ruse to showcase the alleged multicultural environment of the 
production. Nonetheless, it is interesting how the engagement with racism within the German 
intellectual tradition is portrayed as an exclusive endeavor of white Germans. Furthermore, the show 
implied that authors such as Kant, Marx or Arendt cannot be intellectual idols of (German) PoC. Upon 
closer scrutiny, this instance appears to showcase a wider trend within the discourse: as the public debate 
on Kant’s racism is almost exclusively performed by white Germans, the discussion is, at least 
subliminally, portrayed as a racially exclusive issue restricting the participation of PoC. 
The third dimension of analysis is concerned with the inherent logic and terminology of the enunciative 
production. Indeed, the discursive formation seems to be constituted mostly by singular arguments 
(Geier 2021), conversations (Küveler and Lühmann 2020) and interviews (“Kant und die Rassismus-
Debatte - ‘Die Vertreter der Aufklärung sind nicht unschuldig’” 2020), or stage productions (Die 
Anstalt 2020). The discourse does not prominently feature any proper discussion, i.e. a debate between 
speakers of differing opinions who can critically engage with one another in a direct manner.4 The used 
terminology ranges from academically elaborate to polemically comedic according to medium and 
genre-type. Iconoclasm, playing a central role in the discourse formation, appears in different verbal 
constructions (Denkmalsturm/Denkmalsturz/Büchersturm/Ikonoklasmus). 
 
4 There is a small exception to this rule. The FAZ published a series of opinion pieces which commented on one another. See 




The terminology within one source was particularly interesting. In a roughly 23-minute-long video 
Gert Scobel, a prominent media figure with an academic background in philosophy who now runs a 
successful internet mini-series on philosophical topics for the ZDF, unpacked the debate on Kant’s 
racism in his usual editorial style — a source with about 60000 views as of 29th of March 2021 and 
perhaps one of the most widely heard voices within the discourse (Scobel 2020). Although the video 
starts with an expectable register of style, the used language takes a militant turn in the second half of 
the video. Scobel repeatedly emphasizes the importance to “combat” (gegen…zu kämpfen) racism 
“armed” (bewaffnet) with the ideals of the Enlightenment. This “battle” (Kampf) however is impossible 
to fight without “fortifying” (stärken) Kant’s universalist arguments. For that matter, an Orwellian 
“radical intellectual iconoclasm” (radikaler Büchersturm) and an expulsion of Kant from the 
philosophical canon would equal a “flight from the inner enemy” (Flucht vor dem Inneren Feind). 
Scobel’s terminology is surprisingly combative and belligerent though exemplary for the emotional 
nature of the discourse. Engaging with racism is often portrayed as a battle, whereas the real enemy 
should not be identified with historical figures, but with racists today. This “real enemy” might assume 
that he or she has the echelons of German philosophy on his or her side, if German society will not 
fight the battle with the intellectual weapons developed by that very tradition. 
The last dimension of analysis asks for the strategic ends purported by the discourse. In my overview, 
public discourse moves beyond the challenge to reconcile Kant’s racism with his philosophy. Instead, 
the dominant question is not what Kant was but how to deal with him today (Chodura et al. 2021) and 
whether intellectual iconoclasm is necessary. This question is in turn answered in the negative, either 
as it would be impossible for (white) German society or bereave it of the tools its intellectual tradition 
has to offer. It is apparent that the public discussion did not purport a decolonisation of German 
institutions or intellectual canon as it does not thematize German colonial practices. Neither does it 
admit postcolonial voices nor authorize PoC to participate as speaking agents. Furthermore, since direct 
engagements can hardly be found, the discourse did not seem to offer a free venue for open debate. 
Although the sources presented some arguments on the topic, these were merely a means to justify a 
preconceived conclusion and not organized in a dialectical manner. While the discourse appears to be a 
discussion on the outset, it is rather an exercise in parallel speech, whereas different media figures 
present their views without any significant rules of engagement. 
The strategic goals of the discourse constitute a defensive reaction to the challenge of iconoclasm 
imposed by BLM in the Anglophone world. The discourse is a presentation of possible responses to 
similar challenges for German society. While it offered new opportunities to speak about notions of 
race within history it re-affirmed the self-perception of tolerance and inclusivity. Germany is portrayed 
to be able to discuss its troubled past without the need of iconoclasm or decolonisation. The discourse 
did not produce an equal discussion between people of different ethnic backgrounds on race and colonial 




discourse itself. In other words, what the public debate about Kant offered was a superficial 
decolonisation — a decolonisation in appearance, but not on a deeper societal, contentual or 
philosophical level. 
With the end of 2020 and to satisfy the interest of the public, the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of 
Sciences and Humanities has launched a digital lecture series (Beckmann 2020; Zorn 2021a; 2021b) on 
racism in Kant’s writing. As it seems, it has closed the matter as a hot topic of debate for now. 
Unfortunately, the lectures did not address decolonisation and what deeper implications the discussion 
could carry for the future of German society or combating racism today. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis presented above showed how public discourse offered a way to re-assure the conscience of 
Germany’s bourgeois, white mainstream society. The debate moved away from an engagement with 
racism to the question of intellectual iconoclasm. Iconoclasm is then dismissed either through its 
impossibility, or unnecessity. German society is imagined to be able to address racism in its intellectual 
tradition without having to initiate the arduous process of meaningful decolonisation that would involve 
proper discussions across all different layers of society and a comprehensive debate of German colonial 
practice. 
I admit that my initial working hypothesis predicted a different outcome for studying German public 
discourse on Kant. I assumed that the discussion would be marbled with what Nietzsche described as 
critical history — a historiography for the “oppressed and those indigent for liberation” (dem Leidenden 
und der Befreiung Bedürftigen) that mainly purports the damnation of all that lies in the past (Nietzsche 
1988). A form of historiography that, when left unbalanced by the other two forms identified by 
Nietzsche,5 is capricious and unconstructive for the improvement of society. However, what I found 
was that public discourse was almost entirely devoid of a discussion of history as it took place, but rather 
concerned with meta-historical aspects, i.e. how to deal with history itself. In the end, I was surprised 
by how unproductive and exclusive the debate would turn out to be. In conclusion and as an impassioned 
appeal to German society as well as the German intellectual community, I believe that, following 
Nietzsche, exercising more critical history in the form of a belated though meaningful intellectual 
decolonisation would help Germany coming to terms with its colonial past and racism today. 
  
 
5 Nietzsche described those as a monumental history for the “active and determined” (Thätigen und Strebenden) as well as an 
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1.5 Colonial Legacy in the Americas: Effects on Latin 





Formal independence from colonial rule in Latin America began early in the 19th century and spread 
quickly. This first wave of decolonisation in Latin America led to the independent states we know 
today, which share similar histories, power, and societal structures. Still, we await a second wave to 
complete their struggle for independence. 
Latin America’s first decolonisation wave began with Haitian independence from France in 1804. It 
continued with independence from Spain and Portugal on the mainland, spreading quickly due to the 
turmoil of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, which provided an opportunity for many nations to break 
free. Their battle for independence was seemingly concluded, justice supposedly done, and autonomy 
over their societies won. 
But the reality is far more complex – and problematic. The decolonial process has never been completed. 
Colonialism and its legacy continue to have profound negative effects on Latin American nations and 
Indigenous peoples. The descendants of those who migrated to Latin American nations during colonial 
rule – and the US, which plays an outsize role in the region and historically has represented a colonial 
mentality – keep colonial systems of governance, culture, language, and religion in place. These Euro-
centric power structures disadvantage the indigenous people of the Americas, who have yet to achieve 
full independence and equality. 
Before I continue, I also want to acknowledge that the term Latin America itself gives authority to the 
colonial identity of the region and its people. Latin is a European language, the language of the Roman 
Empire that evolved into the modern Romance languages we know today. The term Latin American is 
now used to describe anyone from the Americas, excluding the US and Canada, regardless of race or 
ethnicity. While we can envision a unifying identity for all peoples of this diverse region, this one still 
carries the weight of colonialism. The label chafes – particularly for those who are indigenous to the 
Americas, with ancestry stretching back tens of thousands of years, yet who now represent a minority 




Western hemisphere and its continent(s), yet this identity unites people based on the imperialist 
mentality that created colonial nations throughout the region.  
 
Euro-centric histories 
The fight for independence from colonial rule was led by descendants of upper-class European settlers. 
The history of the Americas is commonly taught today from this perspective, framing independence 
movements as a rebellion against the parent colonial state resulting in the liberation of Latin Americans. 
It centers Mestizo and Euro-Americans at the expense of other groups.  
For example, Simon Bolivar was a Creole (a person of Spanish parentage born in the Americas), a Latin 
American aristocrat educated in Europe. Known as “the liberator,” he is celebrated for his role in 
fighting against the Spanish to release much of South America from colonial rule. Bernardo O’Higgins, 
the hero of Chilean independence and the first president of Chile, was of Irish descent, the son of an 
Irish Viceroy of Peru. José de San Martín, an officer in the Spanish army, famously defected to liberate 
Argentina, leading the Army of the Andes across Argentina, Chile, and Peru. In contrast, natives and 
Afro-Latino people are regularly absent in prevailing narratives of the fight for independence in much 
of Latin America. 
Placing Creole leaders as central figures in the struggle for independence has helped to maintain 
white/Mestizo majority rule ever since. It accorded these groups legitimacy and status that persist today. 
Thus, the history and mythology of nations in Latin America began with colonization and then 
extended into the era of independence when nations rejected Europeans’ formal imperial power but not 
the ongoing dominance of their descendants, cultures, and ideals. Meanwhile, the indigenous, Afro-
Latino, and Mestizo populations of many nations remain at the margins of society, fitting themselves 
into the mould introduced by their former colonial rulers. They often try to emulate European ideals of 
citizenry and governance and look to those of European descent for their sense of self and national 
identity. As in settler-colonial nations elsewhere in the world, this has set up nations for ongoing 
inequality based on citizens’ ancestry.  
 
Continued colonial practices and wealth inequality 
The power accorded to those of European descent placed them in positions of control over land and 
wealth. This, combined with the embrace of European ideals (i.e., development, profit, and paternalistic 
attitudes towards non-European people, cultures, and ways of life) led to ever-increasing settlements in 
indigenous territories. Continued European-descended rule, along with invitations for US and 




inequalities. Descendants of colonial setters, foreign companies, and European individuals and entities 
hold most of the land and wealth of the region at the expense of indigenous and Afro-Latino citizens. 
Eight of the world’s twenty most unequal nations are in Latin America, more than any other region on 
the planet (Sandin 2020). Comparing them with similar unequal societies in former African colonies 
like South Africa, where European-descended minority populations still own a vast majority of the 
arable land, we can observe similar outcomes related to the distribution of wealth. The deep inequality 
former European colonies suffer – and the violence that inevitably results from it – is part of the legacy 
of colonialism. 
One stark example is Chile. While considered to be one of Latin America’s most stable democracies, it 
has become a nation mired in deep inequalities. These inequalities were strengthened during and since 
the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, who overthrew the democratically elected president Salvador 
Allende, a socialist. The former was less concerned than the latter with inequality or marginalization. 
Under his rule, Chile’s constitution was drawn up into the only constitution in Latin America not to 
acknowledge its indigenous peoples. At this time Chile also became the playground of Milton Friedman 
and the “Chicago Boys,” a group of Chileans educated at the University of Chicago who embraced 
Friedman’s ideas. These technocrats promoted US-backed free-market liberalization and privatization, 
predicting that these changes would produce an economic “miracle” for the nation. Chile’s deep 
inequities continue today, and unsurprisingly, the most marginalized of its citizens are the indigenous 
peoples who live there. 
The history of the indigenous Mapuche nation in Chile is illustrative of postcolonial inequality. 
Between 1976 and 1990, Pinochet’s government engaged in colonial-era-style theft of land, displacing 
the natives from much of their territory. This land grab reflected the elevation of European concepts of 
land ownership over the Mapuche nation’s territorial claims and the valuing of lands primarily for their 
business and development potential. The land was sold to individuals and companies, including farming 
and logging interests. Tensions have grown due to these companies’ unsustainable industrial practices 
and to other projects that disregard Mapuche values, such as the construction of a hydroelectric plant 
that floods areas they consider sacred. 
For decades the Mapuche have been vocal in advocating for their autonomy, the return of ancestral 
lands, and the right to practice their culture. They have also engaged in violent resistance, attacking 
banks, churches, forest industries, and security forces, and the government has retaliated with violence 
of its own. Clashes with Chilean military police have led to casualties on both sides.  
The conflict has intensified in recent years. In 2020, tensions boiled over and resulted in overt fighting 
between Mapuche activists and security forces, with many Mapuche arrested or shot. On August 1st, 




Mapuche community members who were on a hunger strike in one of Chile’s poorest regions. This 
attack raised the temperature of the conflict, and Mapuche activists later responded by occupying the 
municipality of Tirúa in southern Chile and removing the statue of Chilean founding father Bernardo 
O’Higgins. The Mapuche’s demands for dialogue to resolve this conflict have not yet been met (Iqubal 
2020). This seemingly eternal struggle between the Chilean government and its indigenous peoples 
dates back to before the nation was even established. Independence for colonial settlers and their new 
state did not bring independence for natives; their fight against colonial rule continues. 
In contrast, Brazil recognizes its indigenous population in its constitution, and compared to other Latin 
American nations, it has a relatively high proportion of land controlled by the indigenous population. 
However, that has not stopped the federal government and non-indigenous population from 
encroaching on their territories and conducting genocide against them. Before European contact, there 
were estimated to be 2000 tribes and nations in what is now Brazil. Diseases introduced by Europeans 
decimated the indigenous population; smallpox and measles were at times deliberately spread through 
native populations by those who wanted their land.  
The history of Brazil’s indigenous groups exterminated by disease was echoed in February 2021, when 
the last surviving elder of the dwindling Juma tribe died of Covid-19. We may attribute the tribe’s fate 
to the nation’s leadership and its disregard for the lives of its most marginalized citizens. For two decades 
beginning in 1964, Brazil’s military dictators pushed for massive construction in the Amazon with little 
regard for the original inhabitants of these lands. Business interests engaged in ethnic cleansing of 
Amazonian tribes with impunity. The Juma were one such tribe, suffering a massacre in 1964 that left 
only twelve survivors. Fast forward to 2021: Indigenous groups, lacking healthcare access, were at 
heightened risk of being hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Brazilian government had downplayed 
the danger it posed, with President Jair Bolsonaro antagonizing governors and mayors who attempted 
lockdowns to curb the spread of the virus. The extinction of the Juma tribe is thus a direct result of 
national policies, past and present, that fail to value or protect indigenous people. 
President Bolsonaro has continued a legacy of Portuguese and Brazilian encroachment into Amazonian 
lands, encouraging farmers to burn the forest and replace it with grassland for beef production. President 
Bolsonaro, an admirer of dictatorships past, holds an attitude towards indigenous people similar to his 
predecessors. And he showed his intentions immediately upon rising to power in 2019. Within hours 
of taking office, he attempted to reassign the power to delegate the identification of traditional lands 
from the FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Índio, “National Indian Foundation”), a governmental 
organization granted that right under the Brazilian constitution, to the agriculture ministry, which has 





Laws still in place from the former colonial period allow one percent of the population in Brazil to own 
almost half of the nation’s land (Navarro, 2015). Among the one-percenters are the descendants of the 
former royal family of Brazil. And under a system termed enfiteuse, which requires the Brazilian public 
to pay property taxes to former Portuguese royals and nobles, the population of certain regions has to 
pay taxes to the former royal family to live on their historic lands. Many places, like Rio de Janeiro’s 
most expensive districts, force this obligation on average citizens. The Brazilian people pay for the 
continuation of European royal existence, a continuation of colonial domination, and they do so on top 
of the regular taxes they pay for their seemingly independent state (Navarro 2015). 
Guatemalan independence from Spain in 1821 brought little relief to the majority of its citizens. The 
ruling class was able to lay claim to the majority of the land. United States-based multinational 
corporations have controlled most of the land and wealth for decades. Guatemala has the highest 
indigenous population of all the states in Central America, most of which were not settled as the North 
and South continents were. “Three main companies—Dole, United Fruit, and Del Monte—dominate 
the banana industry in Latin America. These MNCs have participated in cartels, have used their 
enormous political influence, and have chronically abused the rights of their workers” (Clark, 2021). 
The United Fruit Company, notorious for its influence in Washington, D.C. and over the nations 
subject to US imperialism, was one of the worst abusers. One UFCO policy required “all persons of 
color to give right of way to whites and remove their hats while talking to them.” The company and the 
US treated the indigenous population as subjects who existed to labor for them (Gaffey, 2020). In 1954, 
Guatemalan President Jacob Arbenz attempted to reform the system after hundreds of years of 
oligarchical and MNC rule by redistributing land among the population. The United States then 
conducted Operation Fortune, a CIA-sponsored coup ousting the democratically elected president, 
ensuring no land reform would take place, and protecting the interests of wealthy corporations. The 
ousting of Jacob Arbenz gave rise to Guatemala's 36-year civil war (1960-1996). After the coup, a series 
of military generals took control spreading violence and killing thousands of indigenous Mayans, all 
with US backing. Many people, mostly native Guatemalan refugees sought safety in the United States. 
Neo-colonial practices by the US caused the same devastation and instability former colonial powers 
initiated during their rule. To this day it has one of the most unequal land distribution records in the 
world. The majority of land in Guatemala is held by a few multinational corporations and elites, with 
roughly two percent of the population owning 70% of the land (Viscidi, 2004).  
 
Indigenous Language death  
Colonial-era laws and inequality of wealth are not the only systems of inequality that remain in place 
throughout the Americas. Colonizers also perpetuated these inequalities through societal norms that 




nations and languages that pre-dated colonization, a number survive to this day. Language loss is the 
region’s most acute crisis after climate change. Before colonization, estimates place its linguistic diversity 
at 300 different languages spoken by 5 million people in what is now Mexico and Central America, and 
over 1400 languages spoken by 9 million natives in South America and the West Indies (Marques 
2021). These linguistic and cultural groups were joined by European populations including Spanish, 
Portuguese, French, British, German, Italian, and Dutch, as well as Africans, brought over during the 
slave trade. The resulting intermixing of people and languages has no comparison anywhere else in the 
world. But like most colonized regions in the world, large numbers of indigenous languages have not 
survived; and those that have are in danger of extinction as colonial languages dominate. 
Why did colonial languages replace the region’s indigenous languages? Colonization’s power structures 
gave rise to linguistic hierarchies as well. Throughout the region, indigenous speakers of different 
ethnicities are marked as primitive and/or rebellious, unable or unwilling to assimilate into the dominant 
society. They face discrimination for speaking their native tongues, as this is considered to cause friction 
in larger societies. These attitudes represent the region’s colonial past being carried on, and the linguistic 
diversity of the region continues to dwindle as a result. Spanish is the most widely spoken language in 
the region today, followed by Portuguese, French, English, and Dutch. Indigenous mother tongues 
have been lost and side-lined because of aggression, discrimination, and lack of representation. Latin 
America has been a linguistic battleground for centuries, and because of colonial conquests, the 
linguistic scenery has changed forever. 
More widespread native languages like Quechua and Nahuatl (indigenous languages of the Andes and 
Mexico and Central America, respectively) are making a slight resurgence today. This follows their 
attempted extermination in 1770, when both languages were banned by Carlos III, King of Spain. Since 
the Portuguese arrival in South America, over 1,000 languages have disappeared in Brazil (Ore, Diaz, 
2019). The Brazilian government only recognized the right of indigenous people to use their native 
languages in 1988.  
The mix of historical and legal discrimination, abolition, and globalization has killed most indigenous 
languages in the Americas. Languages shape how humans experience the world. They help us 
understand the range of our perception and creativity – and of how others perceived and created before 
us. The continued erasure of indigenous American languages in favor of a handful of colonial tongues 
cuts us off from the full breadth of the region’s humanity. 
In contrast, Bolivia – Latin America’s only indigenous-run nation – has taken steps to recognize the 
value of diversity, rectify the damages of the past, and prevent further language loss. Bolivia recognizes 
37 national languages, reflecting the nation’s commitment to maintaining the linguistic diversity of its 
people. Other nations should follow Bolivia’s lead in granting indigenous languages the status and 




Direct colonial rule in Latin America 
Lying 7000 km from France on the East coast of South America is French Guiana. French Guiana is 
formally considered to be a part of France, not an overseas territory, though it is frequently absent from 
the everyday consciousness of the French public. A majority of its population is Afro-descended, and 
while French is its official language, the population primarily speaks Guianese Creole. French Guiana 
is an often-overlooked part of Latin America, one of the few lands in the region still subject to foreign 
rule. 
Besides French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and a handful of other islands in the Caribbean 
remain under direct French control. They serve as a strategic window to South America for France and 
the EU. In addition, French Guiana is home to the Guiana Space Center, the second busiest spaceport 
in the world (after Cape Canaveral in the US). These Latin American nations join a list of various other 
French colonies around the world, including territories in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. 
This, from the nation that claims with conviction to have acknowledged the wrongdoings of colonialism 
and made amends with its colonial past. 
The typical French discourse about these territories is usually very familiar, reflecting colonial attitudes 
that consider a colony’s dependency on the paternal state rather than equality between partners. After 
World War II, given the need to restructure the French Republic, France sought to make its remaining 
colonies a part of the state. This strategy reflected a desire to retain strategic influence and overseas 
markets while recognizing (and celebrating) the formal end of colonial relationships. However, these 
colonies remain underdeveloped, unequal to the mainland, and exploited through typical colonial and 
neocolonial dynamics. 
By 1999, the rate of poverty in French overseas colonies was higher than in any region of the French 
mainland. The majority of French Overseas territories have some of the highest unemployment rates 
in the E.U. And almost half of the young people under twenty-five have no diploma, compared to only 
a fifth in France proper. In French Guiana, 50 % of the population have only completed primary-level 
education. In Martinique, the percent of children living under the poverty level is almost double that of 
France’s, while in French Guiana, 32 % of the population cannot afford their basic needs (Verges, 2021). 
Despite rampant poverty and unequal opportunity to those in mainland France, the cost of living 
continues to rise, in part because 80 % of everyday consumer products in French Guiana are imported 
from France. This is because France requires that products, even those from neighboring Brazil, must 
first pass through France before returning to South America (Verges 2021). Such regulations elevate 
the interests of the French mainland at the expense of the residents of its colonies. 
France’s territories ache under the rampant inequality that is the legacy of colonialism. Multiple revolts, 




inequalities, exclusion, and racism. But so far, such efforts have failed to secure more than promises 
from Paris.  
 
Colonial Social Hierarchies 
It’s no secret that the colonial era created social hierarchies and norms that pervade the minds of 
formerly colonized peoples around the world. Higher social status afforded to people of European 
descent in colonial settler societies provides opportunity and generational wealth not available to the 
rest of the population. While many Latin American societies favour whiteness over other racial 
identities, race in Latin America is not such a clearly defined concept as in the United States or Europe. 
Often “race” is closely associated with ethnicity and socioeconomic status; the higher a person's SES, 
the closer they are to perceived whiteness, phenotype aside.  
Since colonization, European immigration to the Americas has historically been viewed as positive in 
many nations. Europeans are seen as bringing wealth and skills that otherwise would be lacking. 
However, the movement of Natives and Afro-Latinos - whether within a nation or between nations - 
has often been judged more harshly. Even when they attempt to migrate due to instability, itself often 
brought on by the effects of colonialism and imperialism, they are considered undeserving, “illegals,” 
burdens on society rather than contributors. Reflecting these attitudes, a policy termed Blanqueamiento 
was enacted in many Latin American countries at the turn of the 20th century. These policies promoted 
European immigration as a means to whiten and “civilize” the population while removing Native and 
Afro-Latino peoples, pushing mestizos and mulattoes to the margins of society. For example, in 1889, 
Brazil enacted a policy to grant automatic naturalization to immigrants who arrived from Europe, and 
in 1921 the Brazilian Congress passed a law that specifically prohibited Black immigrants (Hernandez, 
2015). 
Argentina, too, looked to European immigrants in order to “modernize” the nation. Argentina’s 1853 
Constitution, still largely in force today, demonstrated a preference for European immigration. Not 
until 1994 did the Argentine Constitution receive amendments in an attempt to eliminate explicit racial 
discrimination in the nation’s highest laws. The new amendments prohibit discrimination, aim to 
ensure equal civil rights to nationals and foreigners, and recognize indigenous communities previously 
excluded (Randall, 2012). Yet racial discrimination persists against indigenous peoples, Afro-
Argentines, Mestizo-Argentines, non-European immigrants, Jews, and Arabs because of social 
conventions that favor the ruling class.  
In contrast to Argentina and Brazil, Peru has a white minority and a majority population of indigenous 
ancestry. But the population is still confined to colonial hierarchies in its collective national 




country’s indigenous communities and UNESCO World Heritage Sites represent a large source of 
national pride and produce a great deal of tourism income. Still, people of indigenous or African descent 
earn 40% less than mixed-race or white Peruvians (Collyns, 2010). Under the regime of former Peruvian 
President Alberto Fujimori from 1990-2000, 270,000 indigenous women were sterilized without 
consent. Controlling their birth rates was seen as a way to preserve resources and combat economic 
downturns (Benvidas, 2021). Today the majority of Peruvians identify as mestizo or of mixed ancestry, 
a common phenomenon throughout Latin America because of the benefits associated with proximity 
to European identities.  
 
Conclusion 
Historical and contemporary analyses of colonialism are important as we chart a future for all formerly 
colonized nations. The legacy of colonialism is still pending heavily over much of the planet and still 
looms large in Latin America. Formal colonialism itself persisted as recently as September 1981, when 
Belize gained independence, making it the last nation to join Latin America’s first wave of 
decolonisation. The region has not yet had time to reconcile its colonial history, much less its 
aftereffects. The battle for human rights, land rights, economic equality, and cultural dignity rage on. 
Direct colonial rule still persists, ensuring resources and influence over the region for a handful of 
nations at the expense of the local population.  
As William Faulkner said, “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” So long as the consciousness of 
the region is bound to the legacy of their former rulers, and historically dominant groups maintain an 
unwillingness to embrace the diversity of the region, there will never be a chance for the nations of 
Latin America to break free of their colonial past.  
Latin America has the opportunity to be a model for an increasingly interconnected world. The region’s 
diversity represents a possibility for people of all backgrounds, languages, religions, and customs to live 
together as nowhere else in the world. The embrace of that diversity, the extension of equal opportunity 
to all people, and the restructuring of societies to end the colonial legacy has the potential to open 
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1.6 Antiblackness and the "Unsayable": A Philosophical 
Investigation 
 
Hannah Joseph Asikhia 
 
The unsayable is often characterised as a by-product of trauma and is thus a topic of great concern. 
First-person accounts such as Brison's express difficulty in articulating what is dubbed as the 
unspeakable: “how to speak about the unspeakable without attempting to render it intelligible and 
sayable” (Brison, 2002, xi).1 This is an important theme that creative accounts like M. NourbeSe Philip’s 
Zong! (an account of a massacre perpetrated by the crew of an eponymous slave ship that threw over 
130 of its captives overboard) highlight how language can become fragmented when we talk about the 
traumatic experiences: “w w w w a wa/ wa a wat/er…” (Philip, 2008, 3).2 Often, however, traumatic 
incidents in the public domain (and out of it too) are pushed out of the public mind and thus scripted 
as unspeakable. This is especially pertinent when we discuss antiblackness, which either undergoes a 
type of dismissal. A process of silencing—acts of violence are then invisibilised and uprooted from their 
violent context. However, the question remains what is unsayable? 
 
Section One: A Phenomenological Context for Antiblackness 
Husserl proposes that the flesh is general for us all, that there are conditions that are universal to the 
embodied. However, if we consider the experience of racialised Bodies and especially that of Black 
Bodies, it is evident that bodies do not move through the world in the same way. The body is not only 
the method by which we experience the world but also the reason for why we experience it as it is. How 
the White body experiences the world is likely to be very different to how a Black body does. The Black 
Body then acts as the signifier for the conditions of its social experience (Seawright, 2018).3 If this is 
so, then the unsayable is characterised by the violent conditions Black subjects experience. For example, 
France takes on a colour-blind model for public policy or even how the racial dimensions of poverty are 
treated as irrelevant in public conversations. Thus, the racial dimensions of violence are either removed 
or dismissed. The essay aims then to analyse how antiblackness emerges when the violent conditions 
are treated as unspeakable. We will analyse how the Black subject is treated as malleable in the face of 
the unspeakable and what the consequences entail. By malleable, it is meant as the way meaning changes 
when Black is added to a context. This thesis will also be paying close attention to how antiblackness is 






Section Two: The Conditions of the Black Body 
The unsayable is characterised as the violent conditions that are signified by the Black Body. By this, it 
means the displacement of people in the transatlantic slave trade and then again, the deportation of 
members within the Windrush generation -- a generation of Caribbeans who arrived in the UK between 
the years 1948 and 1971. In both cases, it is noteworthy that these communities were forced or explicitly 
invited -- in the case of the Windrush generation -- for their labour. State control through police and 
prison violence and then that Black women are represented at a more significant proportion in birth 
fatalities. If the unsayable is characterised by the refusal to articulate the violent conditions of Black life, 
then it follows that they must undergo a change. These conditions are not represented as unsayable 
because they are never spoken but rather because the racial dimensions of these conditions are often 
ignored or whitewashed in public discourse. For example, Black women are represented at a higher 
proportion in birth fatalities or even the way racism is so quickly dismissed as a reason for police 
violence. "This did not happen because x was Black but rather because they did this" is a common 
method of dismissing antiblackness as a reason. The gap between the condition of Black life and the 
racialised dimension of why it is happening allows for these conditions to take place and remain removed 
from past and present patterns of racial domination. For example, would public discourse necessarily 
relate its casual stereotyping of Black subjects as aggressive to police responding to Black subjects with 
a higher level of violence? Individualising incidents of antiblackness, however, naturalises it. If we treat 
incidents of antiblackness as separate then they appear as a natural fact of Black life rather than related 
to historic and present contexts of domination. 
However, we still need to assess the relation language has to antiblackness in the face of the unsayable. 
If the unsayable is the violent conditions of Black life, then incidents of racial discrimination appear as 
separate occasions rather than a long pattern of racial discrimination. Returning to the theme of 
plasticity, we see a change in the lexical meaning of terms such as 'girl' or 'boy' when Black is added to 
it. Children, for example, are characterised as much older when Black is part of that context. However, 
while this sentiment might be viewed as wrong or even racist, would the violent undertones of it be 
articulated in the public domain? Consider how children are viewed as older and the violence levied 
against them -- as shown by the case of a six-year-old Black girl who was arrested in Orlando, Florida 
(Zaveri, 2020).4 Or even how the language of anti-abortionist supporters changes when Black 
communities are included in the conversation: "If it were your sole purpose to reduce crime," Bennett 
said, "You could abort every black baby in this country, and your crime rate would go down." (Glaister, 
2005).5 Highlighted here is the way words lose their significance and meaning when occupying the 




Furthermore, if the unsayable is something that means violent conditions, dominant groups can then 
assume that there is no consequence to their words—for example, someone who characterises Black 
people as invulnerable to pain. People might note that there is a racial underline to what they say, but 
would they then conclude that this exact sentiment leads to violent consequences? The unsayable then 
characterises antiblack notions as something unconnected to Black life and its positionality to violence. 
It is from this; the historical conditions of the Black female subject are permissible. Similar to present 
contexts, Black enslaved women underwent a stripping of meaning and lexical contexts. The Black body 
was treated as both the signifier and location for commodification. It is this context that excluded Black 
female subjects from Western narratives of female bodies. This then allowed Black female subjects to 
simultaneously experience gendered violence as well as the violence assigned to men (Spillers, 1987).6 
This process of lexical plasticity allowed for the commodification of Black female subject's reproductive 
labour. This refusal to acknowledge and articulate the violence of these conditions goes on to make 
them permissible. There is a reason why the violence of a slave's conditions was articulated first when 
abolishment was beginning. The use of language then not only reaffirms Black subjects as a commodity 
but also conceals the violent conditions of Black life under the unsayable. 
This comes into greater clarity when we analyse mother and child relationships. Childbirth is commonly 
characterised as something imbued with possibilities. However, within the context of the Black female 
slave, reproduction is instead imagined as labour, a source for new workforces (Hartman, 2016).7 Once 
again, the lexical meaning is changed and transformed when concerning Blackness, now only pertains 
to its most basic meaning. New reimaginings of kinship and motherhood were eradicated within these 
contexts. Motherhood in all these contexts only led to continued commodification and an increased 
workforce. Toni Morrison illustrates the impossibility of acquiring new meanings in her novel Beloved 
by having her protagonist Sethe, a fugitive enslaved woman, kill her own daughter to avoid her being 
brought back into slavery. She stops the process of commodification but also ends all possibilities of 
dominant conceptions of motherhood. 
It is important here that mother-children contexts for the Black enslaved are not sustainable when it is 
so easily cut through. However, historical responses to infanticide show rhetoric more often than not 
focused on punishment, thus denoting these incidents as singular. Punishment responds to the crime 
at hand; it does not allow us to consider why it is taking place. However, by doing this, the violence of 
these contexts is obscured. It is not merely that conditions of the slave life are violent and challenging; 
instead, it is impossible for mother-child relationships to exist in these violent conditions. The violent 
conditions of Black life are concealed as unspeakable, then splits actions and harms away from their 
context. These contexts can then go unquestioned even while structures of slavery become undone. If 




transatlantic slave system then can be recreated in the form of mass incarceration of Black subjects or 
unsafe water pipes in predominantly Black communities. 
 
Section Three: Silencing  
However, we still have the question of how antiblackness forms in silence. What takes place when the 
unsayable is not merely impossible to say but refuses to be articulated? This is a pertinent question when 
we consider that accounts of antiblack violence have often been unacknowledged, thus escaping 
articulation. Furthermore, attempts to articulate experiences of trauma or antiblackness are dogpiled. 
In 2011, a series of riots, dubbed as the London riots, lasted from the 6th to the 11th of August. 
Commonly known as the London Riots, criminality is popularly touted as the reasoning behind the 
riots. This articulation then invisiblises the origin of the beginning protests which took place due to 
police violence. Silence on the unsayable then allows for the misconstruction of it. The continued silence 
of the unsayable, however, not only perpetuates misconstructions but also sides the bystanders with the 
perpetrator (Herman, 2015). 8 Through this, whole communities are rendered invisible, their 
epistemologies and experiences discounted by dominant thoughts. It is this refusal to articulate cases of 
abuse that lead to cases similar to the London Riots. It is this exact space that allows violence to take 
place once more. It has been stated often enough that articulating experiences offer the opportunity for 
healing (Ratcliffe, 2020, 1).9 If that is so, silence, similar to the change in lexicon meanings, reaffirms 
experiences of violence and trauma. This is further emphasised when we consider inmates in prisons. 
The possibility of a dialect between prisoners and the general public is cut short by the separation of 
people. This then removes an opportunity for both the public and prisoners to articulate the harm that 
is done. What is instead created is a lopsided dialect. The general public, for example, has a lot to say 
about the harm done by prisoners, but prisoners are unable to respond. Invisibilisation then removes 
the possibility to heal and have harm rectified. 
 
Section Four: The Removal of Language Possibilities 
This forced silence, however, also happens through the removal of all language possibilities. All 
language possibilities are stripped away, only leaving coloniser languages as a possibility for articulation. 
What is illustrated is the isolation of self in relation to a habitual world via the removal of all known 
languages. 
 




which was soon converted into terror, when I was 
carried on board. I was immediately handled, and 
tossed up to see if I were sound, by some of the crew; 
and I was now persuaded that I had gotten into a 
world of bad spirits and that they were going to kill 
me. Their complexions, too, differing so much from 
ours, their long hair, and the language they spoke 
(which was different from any I had ever heard), 
united to confirm me in this belief (as cited by Spillers, 1987. 99). 
 
Equiano, the author of these lines, notes that throughout his journey, he was given three different 
names: Michael, Jacob, Gustavus Vassa (35,36). First-person accounts of the enslaved demonstrate that 
the process of cultural undoing took place in all linguistic iterations, with slaves forced to speak 
exclusively English and criminalised for being able to read or write in most slave states. The stripping 
of all cultural meanings then is only denoted by the removal of all language possibilities. Speaking the 
unspeakable then did not only become almost impossible but dangerous altogether. Speaking the 
unspeakable in English, for example, opened up the possibility of misconstruction from the dominant 
group and thus further abuse. This, again, was reflected in attempts to speak home languages. Slave 
owners attempted to render slaves not only invisible but also silent. New modes of articulating the 
unspeakable emerged from new modes such as song. However, this was directly related to the removal 
of all other language possibilities. Perhaps what is most noteworthy here is whom the articulation of 
the unspeakable was meant for. Songs that illustrated the violent conditions of life took place because 
all language possibilities were removed and because most other possibilities to be heard by the right 
people (other slaves) were removed. Articulating the unspeakable for public groups often led to violence 
misconstruction and attempted to render the enslaved as silent. For example, when abolitionist and 
feminist Sojourner Truth gave her iconic speech at the 1851 Ohio Women’s Rights Convention, 
asserting her womanhood, ‘Ain’t I a Woman’ was met by violent misconstruction. “But that was before 
he stopped talking English because there was no future in it.” (Morrison, 2016, 25).10 Speaking the 
unspeakable in public spaces then is met with hostility. 
It goes deeper than this still, if articulating the unspeakable in public spaces is often met with dismissal 
and silence, then how are Black subjects meant to speak of the violence that conditions their life if that 




conversation is so aware of the violent conditions of Black life and the other participant has dubbed it 
as unspeakable? What is then formulated is an unequal conversation; it is from there violence is allowed 
to persist. Furthermore, it is from there violence at the unspeakable being spoken takes root. Public 
conversations on race often fixate on the improvement of Black life, thus avoiding the historicity of a 
context of violence from where Black life emerges. This then does not simply silence Black subjects in 
public conversation or leave them open to abuse but also to the invisiblisation of these violent conditions. 
It is from these conversations that Black experience can be concealed as the unspeakable: "You know 
when they come here, you invisible. You know you don't even have a number in the system." (Solange, 
2016).11 What then takes place is linguistic domination in the public domain that both make sure to 
hide Black experiences and the violence that conditions it to the unspeakable, all whilst reproducing 
new forms of violence via invisibilisation and abuse. Take, for example, people who bring discussions 
of antiblackness to the public's consciousness and the response that they get, which can range from 
dismissal to dogpiling to outright violence.  
 
Conclusion 
This essay aims to highlight how characterising violent conditions of Black life allows antiblackness to 
emerge. Close attention has been paid to how the unspeakable being characterised as such has allowed 
new modes of lexical domination to occur. This is especially pertinent when we consider how Black 
subjects are silenced when talking about antiblackness in the public domain. This, in addition to the 
whitewashing of racial dimensions, allows for antiblackness to be imagined as singular unconnected 
incidents. This historical pattern allows for new modes of violence to only worsen. However, whilst this 
essay highlights how antiblackness distorts language possibilities, it is important to note that new 
possibilities for articulation are being created by and within our communities. These language 
possibilities rooted in grassroot offer the space to discuss the conditions of Black life openly and 
honestly. Liberational language possibilities have often taken place from the margins. Conversations 
regarding Black life become depoliticised within the public sphere. I, therefore, reject a need to root 
these conversations in the public if we wish to lead conversations that are open and imaginative.  If 
anything, this essay has laid out the ways in which it is impossible to bring this form of discourse into 
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“History is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and rewritten, so that "our" east, 
"our" orient becomes "ours" to possess and direct.” 
- Edward Said 1 
 
“Democracy is the best school to learn soft power.” 
- Joseph Nye 
 
“Perception, unfortunately, always trumps reality” 
- Simon Aholt 
 
Introduction 
Across the world norms are both the same and different. If we take into account the overlap between 
hegemony and orientalism, it further allows us to build a more robust understanding of nation-branding 
and soft power. Norms are customs of conduct dependent on one's identification in a certain social 
context in which actors adhere to a “logic of appropriateness”.2 International hegemony is rather a 
mobilisation of leadership by a predominant power to order relations among actors.3 Historical contexts 
matter with nation branding, as history is a cornerstone of how countries market themselves. 
Hegemonic influences are as powerful today as ever before. One undeveloped feature of soft power is 
the processes by which one person is drawn to behave in line with the desires of another actor.4  
Soft power differs from hard power in that no brute coercion is used to persuade the adversary to follow 
one’s own desires. Soft power is used by countries to show and encourage their interests, such as freedom 
and equality. They influence other countries to share their interests as a result.5 This may include the 




transmission, and climate change. The inducements a country uses to exert influence under hard power 
as “carrots” and the threats as “sticks”6 where one must coerce or influence the other based on material 
objects.7 
Power is described as a country’s ability to exert influence over other countries and political groups in 
order to regulate their actions. The scale, wealth, and capacities of a nation decide its fiscal, military, 
and political strength. Nations may use their influence to persuade other nations to join them in 
pursuing their goals. Most global frameworks for studying hegemony centre on relations among states 
and other political communities. The construction of difference is established across socio-cultural 
things within society, from novels and paintings to even political/government reports.8 The notion of 
orientalism equipped Europeans with the skills and ideology to engage with the ‘Orient’ on a number 
of levels.9   
Since the 19th century, the term hegemony has been generally interpreted to symbolise the political 
supremacy of one state over another.10 This essay will look at how, through the prisms of hegemony 
and orientalism, we can better understand nation-branding and the establishment of social norms. The 
implications and impact of promoted images of countries are substantial as they can affect the audience 
through the creation of expectations, and the desire for image verification.11 
Nation-branding as a term refers to a country’s whole image on the international stage, covering 
political, economic and cultural dimensions12 Nation-branding is a metaphor for how effectively 
countries compete with each other for favourable perception,13 often through intangible links like 
tourism, culture or heritage. National branding goes beyond the narrower purpose of country-of-origin 
or place brands to promote specific economic interests.14  
 
The case of hegemony and orientalism 
The impact of hegemony 
Many scholars view the field of international relations to be marked by the rise and decline of dominant 
powers. In this way, some focus on the processes of economic transformation, some political dynamics, 
and sometimes both of these things. A hegemon has been defined as something (such as a political 
state) having dominant influence or authority over others.15 Within this, hegemonic ordering takes place 
within existing international structures, which creates opportunities and constraints. Hegemons may 
find themselves constrained by elements of an international order that they helped produce.16 Yet, 
hegemons rarely enjoy sufficient power to completely overhaul order entirely. Such was the case with 
the US, where the terrorist attacks and Washington’s responses adversely affected the vital ‘soft’ 




hegemony and the apparent legitimacy of the exercise of American power.17 In turn, this constrained 
US hegemonic power by limiting the effectiveness of foreign and security policies.18 
The relationship between the concept of hegemony and empire has always been fraught. Hegemons 
putatively control the foreign relations of other polities, while empires impinge on their domestic 
politics.19 Hegemonic ideologies can be generated by philosophers, policymakers, and scholars who 
study certain parts of society and then advocate a certain perspective.20 Hegemonic relations describe 
patterns of leadership and control among nominally autonomous polities. On one hand, some conclude 
that “hegemony” is just a substitute for “empire”. On the other hand, some suggest a variety of 
procedures for detecting when a hegemonic relationship is really one of informal empires. Empires arise 
when constituent units no longer enjoy such nominal autonomy.21 Yet we see a problem when we begin 
to try to distinguish hegemony and informal empire, as both bleed into one another. 
For Antonio Gramsci, cultural hegemony is ultimately the domination of a culturally diverse society by 
the ruling class which manipulates the culture of that society.22 This can range from belief systems, 
perceptions, values, in a way that a ‘ruling-class’ worldview becomes the accepted cultural ‘norm’. Yet, 
cultural hegemony can only be realised as a concept if it is taken within a variety of contexts. For Jackson 
Lears, relying on one single definition is misleading.23 Cultural symbols can have an integrative 
significance within particular communities24 Yet, often such symbols may not be realised within wider 
socio-economic or even political structures. In turn, it allows for inequalities of power to be subsumed 
by an implicitly functionalist "cultural system."'25 Ultimately, cultural hegemony was aided by 
“intellectual historians trying to understand how ideas reinforce or undermine existing social structures 
and social historians seeking to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the power wielded by 
dominant groups and the relative cultural autonomy of subordinate groups whom they victimise”. 26  
 
The impact of Orientalism 
Orientalism as a concept has gained its strength directly from cultural hegemony. Some, like Edward 
Said, believed that central narratives of Western scholars governed the East.27 In this way, the ‘East’ 
was the geographical territory spanning Asia, North Africa and the Middle East whilst the ‘West’ was 
seen as the European Great Powers.28 Said argued that the perception of the orient, or the ‘East’ in the 
West, was one that was primitive and exoticised, which directly fuelled the assumption of Western 
superiority.29 The paradigm itself depicts Eastern cultures as static and irrational, compared to Western 
society, which are understood to be both modern and civilised. The process of orientalism, or indeed 
otherisation of representation, by directly comparing hegemonic powers and everything else, allows 
scholars to examine how international orders themselves shape hegemony and bids for hegemony.30 In 




powers.31 Consequently, this was manifested throughout all forms of discourse including literature, 
research and conversation both due to, and in order to, perpetuate the power of these dominant groups.32 
At its core, orientalism is the sheer exploration of how the colonial gaze framed (and still frames) the 
Orient as visionary opposite to the Occident to be governed. Said’s critique of orientalism has been seen 
as highly valuable for demystifying the Western narrative of ‘world history’ as an accepted universal 
reference point.33 Indeed, his highlight of how such a binary representation of Europe in the context of 
the wider colonised world remains relevant today. Nevertheless, his work is not without challenge or 
criticism. For some, the Said’s re-articulation of a complete binary between the East and the West34 
was problematic as power relations were fixed and one-way (West to East).35 Orientalism, as a concept, 
in this way, represented the sheer dominance of the West (the Occident) over the East (the Orient)36 
from the beginnings of capitalism and imperialism to the present. For some, Said didn’t cover the true 
representation of what the concept of orientalism means. Bernard Lewis, argued that Said’s account of 
Orientalism was a reduced representation of the West presented through an ideologically loaded 
narrative and imperceptive of its own assumptions37 whilst Western scholars were depicted as evil.38 
Nevertheless, before the peak of 19th century European colonialism, scholars who focused on the orient 
mostly studied Islam alongside other non-western civilisations out of intellectual curiosity.39 Some 
orientalist scholars were opposed to European imperialism. Ian Burma (2008) argues that some 
orientalist scholars held the ‘othered’ perspective of the orient, to directly contract and oppose 
colonialism. Such is the case of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), a German Romantic philosopher, 
who advocated the exotic "otherness" against the rationalist opinions of imperialist powers.40 
Orientalism as a lens of study has been understood to be a pretext for oppression and imperialism. It is 
a political doctrine and nobody can write, think or act on the orient without being influenced by 
orientalism.41 It was also able to reinforce colonial stereotypes about the east.42 Orientalism was popular 
because it was able to explain a complex and diverse culture in a simplistic way. Where it argued that 
uneven power relations between two unbalanced halves distort knowledge43 where non-European 
cultures for the most part became objects of discussion, rather than equal participants within the 
dialogue. In turn, such a perspective has portrayed Eastern cultures as inherently subservient to 
Europeans. Though geographies of power and inequality have shifted dramatically in the last two 
centuries, the concept of orientalism still has relevance due to new discussions of belonging, race and 
difference. Any orientalism binary oppositions do not go far enough to explain an ever more globalised 
world. The argument of such a binary does not account for the fact that the flow of information between 
countries is greater with global interconnectedness than ever before. 
The legacy of orientalism is an interesting one. Drawing on the role of hegemony, the presence and 
construction of “certain cultural forms which dominate over others”, Said sought to prove how 




concept fully, failing to offer the necessary depth in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.45 Nonetheless, one 
of the biggest legacies of orientalism is the elevated awareness and reflections amongst scholars of the 
positions from which they write. For some, having such a level of self-consciousness can quickly dissolve 
into identity politics or even support the view that only one group of people can write about 
themselves.46 This viewpoint highlights the often-contradictory links formed by the postcolonial realm. 
Indeed, scholars have expanded orientalism's resolutely binary opposition between west and east into 
the richer concept of cross-cultural hybridity.47 For some, hybridity is a situation of democratic strain 
and resistance against imperialism; others instead have criticised it as a neocolonial dialogue closely 
aligned with transnational capitalism.48 Cross-cultural hybridity is then where something no longer 
allows itself to be realised within the binary meaning and instead upends it by occupying, resisting and 
disorganizing the space around it.49 
For several decades, accusations of orientalism have mainly been directed against those on the political 
right. Some argue that in the wake of 9/11, the Bush administration was influenced by orientalist 
influence where the stance of “good west versus bad Islamic world” became dominant.50 The effect that 
US foreign policy had post 9/11 can still be felt today: they then constructed an orientalist paradigm 
through which most US actors still view the Middle East today. available to rising states as they seek to 
challenge the existing order. To be drawn to US society, public policies, or political values, one nation 
must be prosperous or benefit others in other countries51 or even share common values. For Daniel W. 
Drezner, the logic of resistance and revisionism for a number of nation-states has been directly in 
response to the American hegemonic organisation of the world economy.52 Drawing on Susan Strange’s 
notion of “structural power,”53 Drezner examines the strategies available to rising states as they seek to 
challenge the existing order where rational revisionist nation-states would attack the “ideational” 
dimensions of the existing hegemonic order.54 Indeed, F. Gregory Gause III points to the importance 
of variation in the “international institutional context” for British and American dominance in the 
Middle East in shaping the effectiveness of their power-political efforts.55 Such insights forward the 
notion that hegemonic polities are both order makers and order takers.56 
 
Impacts on norms, soft power and nation-branding 
The influence of both hegemony and the gaze of orientalism on norms, soft power and nation-branding 
cannot be overstated. Norms are a rule or standard which governs conduct within society which serve 
as a guide, control or even regulate behaviour. For some, it is a societal expectation, where it has become 
a standard to which we are expected to confirm whether people choose to or not.57 The concept of a 
norm remains complicated at best, as scholars have interpreted it in a variety of ways.58 All societies 
have rules or norms specifying appropriate and inappropriate behaviour and are based on cultural values, 




necessarily things that are deemed ‘good’ nowadays. However, within the sense of a given norm, actors 
who partake in that norm assume that their acts are natural.60 Norms can be identified as efficient or 
inefficient only if we know the ends they are to serve. 
Norms are effective in the sense that they direct behaviour61 by creating a sense of obligation amongst 
groups.62 Understanding this sense of obligation is critically important to understanding norms63 and 
how they in turn operate. Norms become obligatory as they are internalised64 and it is this system of 
internalisation that provides their peculiar force. The norms are blueprints for behaviour, as they set the 
limits in what people may seek alternate ways to achieve their goals.65 The assumption of self-interested 
behaviour underlying the norms necessarily leads to an evaluation of performance that is based upon 
whether such goals of actors are fulfilled.66 Such standards of behaviour may appear at several levels, 
including for example at a local level, state level or at an international level where a community of 
individuals or actors share a common identity.67 The diffusion of norms is mainly concerned with 
whether a given norm is effective in obtaining the desired result by the party that has the power to 
approve or deny such a norm.68 This is indeed true in the case of nation-states. 
Norms are directly influenced by hegemony and Orientalism. Social norms must either be shared by 
other people or be partly sustained by their approval and disapproval.69 Norms can spread across 
different individual entities, such as epistemic societies70 or transnational advocacy networks.71 At a 
nation-state level, norms are spread via epistemic groups, or people that share a shared identity based 
on the empirical method.72 Hegemony and norms are intrinsically tied together. The case of the rise of 
China in the past twenty years is important here, especially in the context of global governance and the 
norms which hold them up. In the past two decades, China has re-emerged as a dominant power, with 
the world’s second-largest economy and a world-class military. Indeed, as China embraced the open 
international order it aligned with US values.73 At present China is pursuing a multipronged strategy 
toward global governance. With one hand supporting international institutions and agreements aligned 
with its goals and norms, like aligning with the World Bank or the Paris Agreement regarding climate 
change.74 With the other hand, China seeks to undermine those values and create alternative institutions 
and models when it isn't convenient for it, such as the case for human rights. Furthermore, in areas 
where norms or institutions are not fully present, like internet governance, China acts on its own accord 
to work with other authoritarian powers such as Russia to create standards that reflect their interests.75 
The divide between which norms nation-states choose to adhere to, or not, will be an ongoing problem 
when trying to address common challenges. It also creates the narrative whereby having two systems of 
global governance will badly undermine any cooperation as no one will be held to account.  
Much like norms, soft power is incredibly influenced by hegemony and orientalism. Nye's soft power is 
described as the ability to draw others so that they want what they want76 by examining how one country 




the other's expectation over their choices such that one's end intention becomes the other’s sought 
approach. In the case of nation-states, the effect of soft power can depend on how they gain admiration. 
The ambition to attract another is the capacity to modify the other's expectation over their choices such 
that one's end intention becomes the other’s sought approach. Soft power can be expressed by 
intellectual capital, national values, and international policies. Some academics consider knowledge,77 
charity or philanthropy,78 and diplomacy79 to be modes of soft power. A country's culture embraces its 
views, goals, and group actions, as well as its popular culture. As Nye also says, the receiver filters 
knowledge and soft power in the form of community and other qualities.80 Nye implies that credibility 
is one of the most valuable soft power tools81 yet without defining how one becomes dependable to their 
soft power. 
Perceptions of trust and attractiveness matter, as they shape behaviour and how a country is understood. 
In turn, such understandings of a country have a direct impact on its economy by affecting the foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and tourism levels.82 The case of Georgia is incredibly interesting within this 
nexus. In the wake of the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, 
Georgia was sprung with a unique opportunity. Georgia created an image for itself as a trustworthy 
country through ongoing engagement with international norms, and greater alignment with the 
European Union. At the same time, its location as a cultural crossroads between East and West has 
shaped its open outward-facing culture and in turn how others think of Georgia. Tourism is now a 
strength of the Georgian economy accounting for just under 8% of GDP in 2019.83 At the same time, 
Georgia is now a partner in the Creative Europe Programme allowing for any cultural and creative 
organisation to team up with wider partners based within Europe, further supporting Georgia's cultural 
networks and influence. Moreover, Georgia punches above its weight in sports, and is currently ranked 
twelfth in the world for rugby.84 From having the world’s oldest wine-making industries to some of the 
most popular cuisines and a collection of cultural festivals, Georgia's soft power is growing. 
Nation-branding is a subset of soft power and is directly influenced by hegemony and the concept of 
orientalism. Nation branding is driven largely by practitioners and there is an urgent need for conceptual 
and theoretical development of the subject.85 Scholars pertaining to this political perspective on nation 
branding are critical about the emphasis on market positioning and competitiveness as outlined above, 
stressing that attempts to brand nations can be risky and even counterproductive in that it might create 
mistrust and prejudice efforts to win the hearts of others.86 Scholars looking at nation branding from a 
political perspective see it as coordinated government efforts to manage a country’s image in order to 
promote tourism, investment and foreign relations.87 In this light, nation branding is seen as a powerful 
political tool, especially for small, peripheral nations eager to strengthen their economic position and to 
compete against the economic, financial or military clout of superpowers.88 With the rise in digital 




Historical contexts matter with nation branding, as history is a cornerstone of how countries market 
themselves. Hegemonic influences are as powerful today as ever before, just in different ways, through 
the utilisation of digital engagement. The concept of orientalism also remains an important lens to 
examine nation-branding, as how we compare ourselves to others is a vital part in identity building. 
National identity representation requires building a positive image to a variety of one’s self to external 
and internal audiences. However, doing so in the context of digital can prove difficult. Indeed, search 
engines have indeed already exceeded the credibility of traditional media.89 So how can nation-states 
build trust effectively, when we now live in an age where information is always available at the touch of 
a button, through search engines and other digital platforms?90 Digital technology has upended how 
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1.8 Colonial Imaginations and Post-colonial Realities: The 
Cameroonian Diaspora and the ‘Anglophone Crisis’ 
 
Hilary Koum Njoh 
 
Introduction  
The popular African media Instagram account @nweworldwide has built its identity on the promotion 
of a transnational Black community. Specifically, one that is rooted in a shared African identity which 
spans across the continent and its many diasporas. The account celebrates the independence days of 
each country in the African continent. On 1 October 2020, @nweworldwide made a highly controversial 
post expressing “Happy Independence Day British Cameroon”.1 There was a clear divide in the 
comments: between those who supported the celebratory post for recognizing the plight of a minority 
community, and others who condemned the account for promoting division that plays into a separatist 
ideology. The latter’s concern was that this move validated a narrative which contradicts the 
conventionally held belief in a single unified Cameroon. This had resulted in heated debates in the 
comments where multiple comments under the post asked for the picture to be removed.2 The anxieties 
of the commentators reflect valid concerns over the state of the country, and the fragile relationship 
between Francophone and Anglophone Cameroonians. 
The ongoing “Anglophone Crisis'' demonstrates how allegiances to Anglophone and Francophone 
identities have survived decolonisation in Cameroon. This essay, while written in the context of the 
current conflict, is also a personal reflection on how I as a member of the Francophone Cameroonian 
diaspora in Canada have had the privilege of being removed from the immediate threat of political 
violence, juxtaposed with my deep sensitivities towards the crisis. This position has forced me to think 
critically about the unique role that we, in the diaspora, play as agential in the conflict and the 
subsequent movement. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: it begins by providing a 
brief colonial history of Cameroon, then background information on the “Anglophone Crisis'', followed 
by a critical discussion of a post-colonial identity formation. Thereafter, an analysis of social media 
activism and how this medium has been used by members of the Cameroonian diaspora. At the end, a 
personal anecdote will conclude this topic. The central question explored in this paper deals with the 
role of the Cameroonian diaspora, and its influence in furthering the post-colonial movement in the 
context of the “Anglophone Crisis”. This essay maintains that social media activism by the 




Brief Colonial History  
To understand the current context of the crisis and the decades-long post-colonial movement some 
background information on the Cameroonian colonial experience is required. The country which is now 
known as Cameroon was a previously held German colony from 1884 to 1916.3 Germany’s defeat by 
the Entente Powers during the First World War marked the partition of the colony between France 
and Britain. Where France occupied four-fifths of the territory and Britain controlled the remaining 
one-fifth of the land.4 The British controlled areas were the Southern and Northern regions bordering 
Nigeria – another British colony.5 The different colonial administrations resulted in the development 
of two distinct Cameroons, that each had their own unique cultural, social, economic, and political 
systems.6 This had a lasting effect on the construction of Anglophone and Francophone identities, as 
identity construction took place under separate conditions.7 After demanding reunification and political 
and economic independence, the Francophone nationalist party Union des Populations du Cameroun 
(UPC) pushed to begin the process of formal decolonisation.8 French Cameroon obtained its 
independence on 1 January 1960. In contrast, Britain originally had the intentions of administering 
their trustee territory in the North and South as a part of Nigeria, with the hopes of eventually 
integrating the regions.9 On 11 February 1961, the British Northern Cameroonians voted to join 
Nigeria, whereas the British Southern Cameroonians had opted instead to join independent French 
Cameroon. 10 Subsequently, after gaining their independence in October 1961 Southern Cameroon had 
entered into a two-state federation.11  
Notably, the proposal of reunification was not a popular option for Southern Cameroon since this was 
not a harmonious partnership between two equals. Southern Cameroon was presented with the choice 
of either “being absorbed into the emerging giant to the West” or “trying their chances at a loose 
federation with French speaking Eastern Cameroon”.12 Thus the decision evolved mostly as a rejection 
of the Nigerian option, in the hopes of preserving some type of socio-cultural specificity within a two-
state federation.13 Unfortunately, contrary to these desires, the 1961 two-state federation was temporary, 
as the country ultimately transitioned into a highly centralized, unitary state.14 In the 44 to 45 years 
period where Cameroon was arbitrarily divided then later ‘reunified’, the French and British colonial 
administration had undoubtedly left a legacy beyond a linguistic tradition which troubles the region to 
this day.15 Issues over integration in the post-colonial era have been hotly debated by those within the 
country’s borders and beyond, as conflict in Cameroon ensues.   
 
Summary of the Anglophone Crisis  
What is referred to in this essay as the “Anglophone Crisis” predates the conventionally held 2016 




longer concern, although 2016 is the date when this topic began trending internationally. The 
“Anglophone Crisis” describes the failure of ‘reunification’ following colonial rule, coupled with a 
resistance to assimilation on the part of the Anglophone minority.16 A minority which continues to 
reject a state-sanctioned erasure of cultural specificity during the 60 years following reunification up to 
the present time.17 During this period a deeper Anglophone consciousness of being marginalized 
intensified,18 furthering the conceptualization of an Anglophone Cameroon that has a meaningful 
difference to Francophone Cameroon beyond mere differences in the official language.19 Nonetheless, 
there is significance behind the 2016 date since September saw Anglophone lawyers engaged in peaceful 
protests over what they viewed as a government sanctioned erasure.20 Largely due to the development 
of policies that ignored an Anglophone legal tradition in favour of the ‘francophonisation’ of the 
common law system practiced in the Anglophone regions.21  
In October 2016, a strike was organized, and in November, the Anglophone Teachers Trade Union 
also staged a strike to protest against the ‘francophonisation’ of the educational system.22 The peaceful 
protests quickly turned violent when the military shot at protesters, wounding many and killing several.23 
The period since 2016 has been characterized by an escalation of violence including random police and 
military checks, the burning of villages, targeted attacks on schools, and the kidnapping, assault, rape, 
and murder of multiple civilians.24 The consequences of such violence have created a spirit of rebellion 
and a want for Anglophone succession.25 On 1 October 2017, championed by Anglophones in the 
diaspora, who had taken over the leadership of the Anglophone rebellion, there was an official 
declaration for the restoration of Anglophone Cameroon as an independent state titled the ‘Federal 
Republic of Ambazonia’.26 This marked a transition from peaceful protest to violence on the part of 
Anglophone separatists.27 Terrorist attacks and arson use against schools in particular had intensified.28 
The exchange of violence between the Francophone government and the Anglophone minority has 
proven detrimental. As of October 2018, there were over 400,000 internally displace people in 
Cameroon and as of February 2019 35,000 Cameroonian refugees had escaped to Nigeria.29 The UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in their North-West and South-West Crisis 
situation report stated that as of 31 July 2019, there are more than 700,000 children who have been out 
of school in the past three years.30 Many groups have proposed different solutions to the conflict. Some 
of the Anglophone protestors have advocated for two-states or four-states federalism, some 
Francophone sympathizers made suggestions for a ten-state federation instead, which they define as a 
true decentralization.31 However, none of these options have been seriously considered by the Paul Biya 







Post-colonial Identity Formation  
As aforementioned, this paper discusses a tension between the binary construction of Anglophone and 
Francophone identities. It adopts a critical lens in constructivism that highlights the way individual and 
collective identities are constructed and evolve through narratives of the ‘self and other’.32 From this 
theoretical perspective, identity formation in Cameroon is cemented by a shared sense of belonging that 
excludes an ‘othered’ minority.33  The Anglophone and Francophone labels come from the colonial 
administration of the state between 1916 to 1960 in the case of Francophone Cameroon and 1916 to 
1961 for Anglophone Cameroon. One ought to ask what the significance of the linguistic divide is. 
Since this identity formation is based on languages that were foreign to the region which had its own 
history prior that 45-year colonial moment. Cameroon is referred to as Africa in miniature due to the 
multitudes of ethnicities and dialects present in the country.34 It is a state that is characterized by its 
sociocultural diversity, yet overshadowed by the failings of its sociolinguistic diversity, principally its 
bilingualism.35 An Anglophone versus Francophone binary fails to account for the cultural richness of 
the state and all of its complexities. This essay maintains that the hyper-visibility of this linguistic 
tradition is a colonial legacy that runs contrary to a decolonizing spirit. This is not to disregard the 
unique Anglophone experience in Cameroon or to further the myth that “Cameroon has always been 
one and no more”. 36 However, it is a call to think critically about the origins of these labels and the 
significance of their continued use. 
For the purpose of the paper the Cameroonian post-colonial movement is understood in the tradition 
of other Black renaissance movements from the Harlem Renaissance to Negritude which call for a 
decolonisation of the mind. In the case of the aforementioned movements, this advocacy resulted in the 
formation of pan-Africanism and the establishment of transnational anti-colonial networks.37 In order 
to rescue Cameroon from the colonial imagination, decolonisation of the mind calls for the collapse of 
a French colonial policy of assimilation and the “illusory” promise of British colonial legacies.38 The 
challenge post-colonial Cameroon is faced with is the need to embrace a national identity that 
harmonizes a wider cultural identity rather than merely the binary of Anglophone nationalism or 
Francophone nationalism. This is why the creation of Ambazonia does not represent a utopia, as it 
formalizes old colonial era linguistic fault-lines.39 These contemporary divisive policies and practices of 
pitting groups against one another are reminiscent of those established by colonial powers.40 Therefore, 
reconciliation requires engaging in post-colonial discourses and political action across the linguistic 
divide rather than using the tactics of the former colonial regimes. This is only possible when all citizens 
benefit from the same rights and privileges of citizenship. In this respect, the crisis, although founded 
on colonial logic, can be understood to have evolved into an issue of governance in the post-colonial 





The Role of the Diaspora in Social Media Activism  
Social media has evolved the landscape of political activism in Cameroon. When used during times of 
crisis, social media platforms provide a space and community for all those who seek to voice their 
concerns despite the limitations of geography. Social media has been used to mobilize support for 
various causes, including encouraging individuals to actively participate in political discussions and 
collaborate on political action.42 Additionally, it makes it possible for any individual to post material 
that has the potential to reach mass audiences; this ability has expanded the potential for news 
production, distribution, and consumption by allowing anyone to influence the flow of information.43 
In the context of the “Anglophone Crisis”, social media has played a major role in applying pressure on 
the government. Recognizing the power that this ability holds, the Biya government shut down internet 
access in Anglophone regions of the South-West and North-West to diminish the spread of 
information from affected areas. 44 Starting in October 2017 activists in the diaspora took cues from 
activist on the ground and started using the hashtag #bringbackourinternet to draw international 
pressure.45 Their efforts proved successful as internet access was restored in March 2018.46  
For those living in the diaspora of Europe and North America, the use of online spaces to mobilize 
political action is not new. For example, in July 2001 the Southern Cameroon National Council- North 
America created their websites as a part of its ongoing strategy: “to unite the forces of Southern 
Cameroons’ liberation in the diaspora and on the home front”.47 Defining the website as “a one stop 
source to learn and update themselves about Southern Cameroon, one of the only African countries still 
under colonialism and seeking its independence”.48 Currently, social media platforms such as 
WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Tik Tok and Clubhouse allow a new generation of 
Cameroonians to be agential in the context of conflict by sharing developments, ideas and resources 
with ease. Interestingly, this has resulted in an interplay between social media and mainstream media. 
Traditional media platforms use social media for news distribution and citizens have the ability to bring 
issue areas on the radar of major news networks.49 This cyclical relationship, though imperfect and 
unequal, provides a great space to participate in the news distribution process. From a knowledge 
production standpoint this is extremely powerful in that it challenges the monopoly that individual news 
networks and governments have in their ability to frame particular incidents as ‘newsworthy’. In 
polarizing crisis situations like that of Cameroon, the framing of this information is critical as it may be 
subjected to bias.50  
 
The Diaspora and the ‘Contemporary’ “Anglophone Crisis”  
The year 2020 saw a rise in transnational Black consciousness raising as political activism on social 




brought into the spotlight the interconnected nature of oppression. Cameroon was not the exception as 
#anglophonecrisis, #endanglophonecrisis, #justiceforcameroon captivated the attention of international 
audiences and their governments. This attention increased substantially following the Kumba massacre 
which saw the murder of eight school children, and at least 12 other children injured by gunmen in 
civilian clothing on 24 October 2020.51 “Anglophone Crisis” specific social media accounts administered 
by those in the diaspora have used their platforms to take political action, bringing the conflict to the 
attention of their domestic governments mainly in the United Kingdom and United States. These 
actions have proven fruitful as the United States Congress passed H.Res.358 (116th) which called for 
an end to all violence in the Conflict by both the government of Cameroon and armed groups.52 These 
awareness campaigns serve a dual function in humanizing those affected by the crisis and in 
“dewesternising” international interest by focusing on Cameroon. When stories of political violence in 
Africa and the African diaspora are shared, they speak to issues of survival and of stories of resistance. 
In collaboration with actors in the country, Cameroonians in the diaspora have used social media to 
exert a more prominent role in the conflict. These political actions are consistent with the post-colonial 
tradition of emancipation from oppressive regime tactics. The freedom provided by online spaces can 
be regarded as emancipatory, since this is a medium where critical political thought and action can be 
explored.53  
 
Personal Anecdote: From External Observer to Engaged Actor  
The first time I was forced to confront the realities of the “Anglophone Crisis” was in 2018 when my 
family and I went back home to celebrate my sister’s wedding. On what was meant to be a happy 
occasion I observed the humanitarian crisis and felt tension and fear permeate the air, as talk of civil 
unrest was spoken in hushed tones. What surprised me most upon returning to Canada, was discovering 
that many of my peers were completely unaware of the severity of the conditions on the ground. At 
first, I was overwhelmed with feelings of anger and sadness, then I thought of my own positionality and 
the privilege I hold as a member of the Francophone Cameroonian diaspora in living in Canada. I have 
the ability of being removed from the immediate harms of political violence and travel to the country 
for a celebratory reason because the region of Francophone Cameroon where my family and I are from 
is not under a state of emergency. While experiences of political violence are not exclusive the 
Anglophone minority, I recognize that some, like myself are able to navigate through the country freely 
and escape the engulfment of terror and civil conflict. The ‘Francophone guilt’ that I felt on the basis 
of my privilege, is similar to White guilt in that it is absolutely useless unless it is paired with political 
action. Additionally, it centres the concern on myself, and how the suffering of others makes me feel 
rather than the fact that political violence is a harm in itself regardless of who it is enacted upon. As a 




be better reserved for Anglophone scholars to speak their experiences? This position has forced me to 
think critically about the role that we in the diaspora play, in this conflict and the subsequent larger 
decolonial struggle. Moreover, the responsibility we all hold to those in our home country and to each 
other. Rather looking at the conflict as my Francophone ‘self’ is against an Anglophone ‘other’, I think 
about how to view this inherited conflict as a collective ‘us’ against the crisis.  
Other young diaspora Cameroonians and I have used social media to educate ourselves and to help 
mitigate the humanitarian concerns of the conflict. We have used the aforementioned social media 
platforms to mobilizing support, collecting resources, and apply pressure onto the Biya Government. 
On this I have divergent thoughts. Personally, I see the use of the online space as a continuation of 
Black liberation in the 21st century, which comes with a new set of challenges and responsibilities.  I 
believe the significance of social media in spreading awareness cannot be disregarded, however 
awareness is only the first step in inciting a meaningful change. After the topic stops trending and 
performative activism no longer provides social clout, I ask myself if we in the diaspora will continue to 
hold ourselves accountable. To keep the dialogue going and to continue to support the decolonizing 
agenda in the country. In the hopes of expanding the reach of comradery to include all those who view 
being Cameroonian as a meaningful part of their identity. 
 
Conclusion  
Members of the diaspora have been involved in the decolonisation project from conception of the 
original decolonisation movements of the 1950s and 1960s to our present times. The decolonizing 
agenda has remained, despite the modes of activism changing. The political landscape is now digitized, 
democratizing the landscape of who can get involved with the movement. The diaspora has continued 
to play a significant role in furthering the post-colonial movement in the context of the “Anglophone 
Crisis”. Granted it is not always productive as there are limitations in social media activism as well as 
the continued use and entrenchment of colonial era identity markers being the Francophone and 
Anglophone identity. The objective in the essay has been to describe how these identities have survived 
a formal decolonisation in Cameroon. This essay began by highlighting a contemporary debate on 
Instagram about a 60-year-old problem. Then it introduced the foundation of this concern in the 
Cameroonian colonial experience and provided a brief summary of the “Anglophone Crisis”. Next, a 
critical analysis of post-colonial identity formation was advanced. Thereafter it explored the role of 
social media in period of crisis and its impact of the “Anglophone Crisis”. After approaching the topic 
from the position of an academic, I conclude the essay with a personal reflection on my experience and 
perspective as a member of the diaspora. The “Anglophone Crisis” demonstrates the importance of 
maintaining a transnational dialogue on the conflict and its consequences. My hope is that the diaspora 
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Part II. Understanding Post-Socialism 
through Post-Colonialism 
 
Over the last few decades, many writers and academics from the post-Socialist region (that is European 
and Eurasian countries up until 1989-1992 dominated by a communist party or satellites of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics) have been taking inspirations from their counterparts in the West - from 
Audre Lorde to Edward Said – to articulate their experience and the particular trajectories of their 
homelands. In this part, we try to examine some of the tenets of applying decolonial theory to Central 
and Eastern Europe as well Central Asia. 
We interrogate the colonial nature of the Russian state, the local hegemon, but itself a European 
periphery. Then again, didn't the Russian Empires carry out the Circassian Genocide, exterminating a 
million of indigenous Caucasians and ethnically clean its Siberian frontier? Didn’t the Soviet Union 
displace entire populations, Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and North Caucasians, and conduct 
atomic experimentations regardless of the health of its Central Asian subjects, much like other colonial 
empires? In this part, we try to ask how different was the Russian Empire from its overseas counterpart, 
how colonial was the officially anti-imperialist Soviet Union, and what was that history’s fallout 
(sometimes literally) in the region. 
We also explore the region and its peoples’ relationship to the West, the other prevalent imperial force, 








2.1 Post-Colonial Offerings for Post-Soviet Beings: Tools 




EastEast is an online magazine on culture, art, philosophy, and everyday life, with a core goal of 
challenging and reinventing notions of the East. The EastEast project essentially began in July of 2020, 
by a remotely assembled editorial team. Composed entirely of individuals either from or based in post-
Soviet countries, each member brought a unique set of experiences and interests to the task at hand and, 
having not all met one another in person, through conversations we began to both introduce ourselves 
and lay out our visions for the introduction of our platform. One of those initial conversations is 
presented here, along with a follow-up discussion that took place nine months later, in which we 
reflected on our shifting perspectives and observations about the nature of our work. Throughout these 
editorial exchanges, we ruminate on the ways we treat our legacies, our individual and collective 
presents, and consider the potential of decolonial tools and the ways we may implement them in 
constructing the future. The participants of the conversation are editor-in-chief Furqat Palvan-Zade, 
senior editors Kirill Rozhentsov and Lesia Prokopenko, responsible for Russian and English versions 
respectively, photo editor and ethnographer Nastya Indrikova, music and food features editor and copy 
editor Ben Wheeler, special features and news editor Elizaveta Fokina.  
*** 
August 1, 2020 
 
KIRILL ROZHENTSOV: When thinking about EastEast as the platform’s name, I’m always 
reminded of the image of a compass. Between the east and south cardinal points, apart from the 
southeast, intermediate directions such as east-southeast and south-southeast are also mentioned. So, I 
see “East-East” as both a metaphorical and geographical direction, that gravitates towards that very 
East people are accustomed to defining or capturing, but still never coincides with it completely. And 
in this gap, the possibility of heterogeneity appears, this is where multiplicity is born. 
 






LESIA PROKOPENKO: I also think that, in addition to the direction, the East in this case is also 
about the place where the movement in this direction starts. Thus, the title mentions it twice.  
 
KIRILL ROZHENTSOV: And we are looking eastwards from the East, right? 
 
LESIA PROKOPENKO: Well, yes, because we are also “the East.” 
 
KIRILL ROZHENTSOV: By the way, I have never perceived it that way. For example, I was born in 
Mari El — a national republic in the Volga region, which is often exoticized. For instance, there was 
Alexey Fedorchenko’s film Heavenly Wives of the Meadow Mari, art and research projects dedicated 
to the Mari people and their traditions, attempts at reconstruction that we are now observing. I am 
partly Mari myself, only I didn’t grow up in the outback, but in Yoshkar-Ola — a rather depressive 
provincial capital, where I never experienced all this ethnic originality. Then I moved to Moscow, and, 
consuming unified American and Western European media formats, I never got in touch with anything 
that could be identified as “the East.” I mean, I never thought of myself, Mari El, or Russia as a part of 
the East. Perhaps, it has to do with the problem of the dominant view of the East, which is very clichéd, 
and there was nothing in my personal experience that I could refer to as the East. But maybe this 
multiplicity we are trying to talk about and which is embedded in the name of the project will help me 
to find new images that would correspond to the reality I see around, to find myself in the East and the 
East — for myself. 
 
FURQAT PALVAN-ZADE: For me, the East is my native environment, which is always around. At 
the same time, now I find myself on the post-Soviet periphery, where, due to various historical 
circumstances, many things in culture are deeply intertwined. My dad is a Marxist and atheist, while 
my mom is a believer, she prays five times a day. The question of whether it is the east or west has never 
been raised, it is just a part of my identity. This seems to me a universal thing. One can take a somehow 
easy approach to the issue, not from the colonial trauma perspective — like there is one part of your 
identity that you can describe as eastern. In my opinion, it’s a universal situation, similar to one’s female 
and male components in gender. The fact that we are looking east from the East also seems important 
to me. 
 
LIZA FOKINA: It is not my idea, but this is exactly how I imagine EastEast’s mission, although it 
might sound a bit radical. I think it is about collecting the fragments of a cultural vessel broken by the 
hegemony of Western civilization. As a visual example, I recall Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn by Ai 
Weiwei. But in this case, we’re not aiming to collect these fragments to recreate some kind of vessel, 
but instead we are giving them the possibility to take their own shape — which would still retain the 





BEN WHEELER: Growing up in the Pacific Northwest of the US, I even had the perception in my 
childhood that the “East” encompassed all the lands outside of my home in a way; starting with what 
was directly east, the rest of the country and the east coast of the US (which were already new and 
foreign places to me), across the Atlantic to Europe, Africa, Asia, and back across the Pacific to me, 
arriving from the west. My mother was raised in the same town as me and in her childhood while 
walking along the beach she would collect curious, stained green-glass orbs that would occasionally float 
up onto the shore. These turned out to be Japanese buoys used by sailors that had come loose in storms 
and were pushed by currents for who knows how long across the Pacific Ocean, arriving on the beaches 
of my small hometown. For me as a child, these were precious relics from some unknown “East,” but 
in fact they’d floated in on waves from the west. In a sense the opposite of Furqat, my native 
environment was the West: the west coast, the Pacific Northwest, the American west, and all of the 
reductive images and associations with the “East” that went along with my upbringing became things I 
had to gradually question and unlearn. 
 
LESIA PROKOPENKO: There is an idea I’m very much fond of — the idea of disidentification. I’ve 
been reminded of it again just recently. Initially, it caught my eye in Preciado’s Testo Junkie. Later, in 
2018, I was at the Berlin Biennale Curators Workshop, where we had intense discussions around various 
issues related to belonging and (de)colonial situations, with colleagues from African countries and from 
West Asia, from South America and Eastern Europe. It was then that we brought up this concept and 
talked a lot about one’s disidentification from particular borders. And recently, Antonia Majaca, a 
researcher who curated this workshop, has mentioned disidentification in her new essay: in it, she 
connects it to belonging and comes up with the hybrid notion of “disidentified belonging.” It has always 
been important for me to challenge the concept of national identity. And so, I got really interested in 
how, on the one hand, one could go through such disidentification and, at the same time, stay aware of 
one’s own complex origins and relation to certain territories. I find the idea of “disidentified belonging” 
to be a very valuable tool. At some point, I had felt that I had to question the imposed static “Ukrainian 
identity,” which belligerently defends its quasi “Westerness” as opposed to the ex-USSR: I always saw 
it as something very synthetic and eventually got interested in the possibility of the plurality we are 
talking about here now. But I believe it is important to combine the rejection of such categories with 
some kind of materiality. For example, the way Oxana Timofeeva describes land or how she talks about 
belonging. 
 
NASTYA: May I also ask a question? Remember a month and a half ago we had an internal discussion 
about the dichotomy of centre and periphery? We’ve decided that we do not want to work within the 
framework of this particular opposition and operate with the concepts of “centre” and “periphery”, that 




FURQAT: I wouldn’t say that we have actually come to this conclusion and that we’ll never come back 
to this way of thinking. We need to understand that the very concept of periphery arose in certain 
historical circumstances and bears particular connotations. We must approach it critically but with 
humour. For example, I personally perceive my country as peripheral. On the other hand, for me, as a 
researcher and editor, what is happening off-centre is much more interesting. It seems to me that we 
have not decided that we will not think in this logic—we somehow still operate within such categories. 
Yes, they need to be challenged. But perhaps first it would be good to realize that centres and periphery 
exist. I'm not sure that many people, in general, understand that there is the centre of the capitalist 
system and countries that serve it—this picture of the world is not obvious. 
 
LIZA: I agree with Furqat that the periphery is more complex and unpredictable than the centre. 
During my school life in my hometown of Kineshma, in the Ivanovo region, I thought that living in 
the province implied a certain form of backwardness. But everything is a little more complicated, as I 
see it now, and if it weren’t for the motivation to possess the centre’s tools, no will for a critical 
understanding of life outside of it would appear. At the same time, the periphery produces some 
unexpected spiritual and intellectual potencies that are simply inaccessible to the centre, which often 
lives within the framework of certain clichés. In general, staying curious seems to be the best strategy. 
 
BEN: This may just be my own take on the title EastEast, but I feel that both its repetition and 
ambiguity are meant to spark the reader’s curiosity, almost like a challenge to follow us to a series of not 
yet specified locations, a route that may move from centres to peripheries while stopping in between.  
 
LESIA: Also, the distinction between centres and peripheries seems to always depend on the place one 
is speaking from. Since 2013, I have been engaged in various activities of the Institute for Public Art, 
which holds its annual meetings in Shanghai. The Institute operates a particular division of the world 
into regions, which at some point really impressed me, because it was not what they would come up 
with somewhere in Germany, for example, and certainly not in America. According to them, the world 
is divided into such regions, I’m reading: Eurasia; West, Central and South Asia; East and Southeast 
Asia—these are three different regions. Then, Oceania, Latin America, North America, and Africa. I 
am a specialist from Eurasia. 
 
FURQAT: Is Eurasia Central Asia and Eastern Europe? 
 
LESIA: I represent the entire region of Eurasia. Nobody cares about Eastern Europe! 
 
NASTYA: I’ve just thought that it is probably more interesting not to be a world citizen, but to be a 




good realizing that I own a place and that everything is arranged the way I want it, because I'm a 
Moscow native bleeding poor Russia dry. This is precisely why this feeling is so hard to fight. 
 
LESIA: What if one develops such a feeling regardless of where they are? It could be quite efficient. 
Of course, it is very convenient if location defines you as a centre. But there are many other factors that 
can define you in this way. I am very much aware of what it means, because over time, I have also 
developed this feeling. At the moment, I am not even in Kiev—I’m in a small town an hour and a half 
away from it, and it doesn’t bother me in the slightest. 
 
LIZA: During the quarantine, I visited my hometown and there was a feeling that many of the centre’s 
advantages had ceased to exist and the division was no longer relevant. 
 
KIRILL: I have a similar nomadic sense of “self.” I’ve never become too attached to any of the places 
where I’ve lived, often taking them for granted. I may like a certain place better than another, but I have 
never overidentified either with Moscow as “the capital of our homeland,” or, conversely, with Yoshkar-
Ola as the periphery I needed to escape from. Or St. Petersburg, where I find myself, having been 
pushed away by the environment of Moscow. Everywhere you just search for something you need, for 
existence opportunities, build relations and settle down for a while, put down roots—but without plans 
of staying there for good. And this is a kind of a situational state, which, in principle, does not bother 
me. But at the same time, I do not have any anxiety that is driving me to new places. 
 
LESIA: Yes, it is not anxiety that should be driving one to new places. If anxiety is driving you to new 
places, you will never really get there. There should be something else. 
 
*** 
April 1, 2021 
 
FURQAT: Since the beginning of EastEast in July 2020, we have definitely evolved: it’s hard to say in 
which way exactly. But this balance of playfulness and critique has been important the whole time. 
 
LESIA: We could discuss how our views and goals have been changing. Do you think our initial 
aspirations, our focus on the decolonial vocabulary, and the ways we discuss identities have changed 
with all this experience?  
 
FURQAT: I have changed my location, moved from Tashkent to Amsterdam, and it got me thinking 
even more about these decolonial frameworks and postcolonial optics. Here, I see people using these at 




the general impression we want to convey, we ended up wishing to be more specific, more focused on 
certain materiality, with objects and stories... 
 
LESIA: I agree with what you said about artificiality. Just like any fresh political agenda, this trending 
decolonial discourse provides one with the feeling of being completely infallible, entirely morally clean, 
knowing who is right and who is wrong. And this is the most dangerous thing about it because once 
we have this fixed idea, we are entering the same vicious circle of judgement. Maybe decolonizing our 
thoughts means precisely getting rid of such black-and-white optics, it is about seeing things in their 
complexity. 
 
BEN: I could say that over the eight months, the experience of working as a copy editor has affected 
me on a logistical, everyday working level. I didn’t approach the process with the impression that there 
is somehow one correct form of English, but my understanding and emphasis on maintaining that way 
of thinking has become much more nuanced after seeing the ways that different contributors apply the 
language. I’m thinking about my role as a copy editor: how do we reflect the way people use this 
language, how do we show their interpretation of it? I’m trying to avoid ascribing the hierarchies of a 
“correct” language, especially since we are talking about English, which, in its special parasitic way, 
tends to really infiltrate other languages and take over. But it’s precisely the infectious nature of English 
that allows for numerous peculiarities. I hope I’m getting better at maintaining intelligible texts that 
allow for flexibility, rather than automatically funnelling them through a native speaker’s perspective on 
the language.  
 
LESIA: I liked something Furqat said about turning to the material and pragmatic side of things rather 
than sticking to rigid ideologies. I guess this is, in a way, what you, Ben, are talking about too. It’s not 
about what we are proclaiming, but more about the ways we are dealing with our work, and the constant 
transformation it requires. 
 
BEN: And allowing yourself, not just as an individual but also as a team, to actually evolve and change 
as we move forward. It’s important to resist the need to establish immovable lines and stances. 
 
LESIA: This work at EastEast in particular is often teaching me how to be wrong, how to accept being 
wrong. The way it overlaps with ideological discussions is particularly important. 
 
NASTYA: As a photo editor, I really started enjoying “bad,” unprofessional photography . . .  
 
KIRILL: When we were just starting the project, I was, of course, fascinated with the decolonial 




fascination was mainly caused by my own exclusion from this academic context that I was accessing 
through secondary sources: I didn’t get a chance to study in Europe or the US. Paradoxically, my interest 
in decoloniality had to do with the desire to be more like one of these white academics... The fact that 
we are not that widely read in Russia, apart from a certain circle of people we know, has really cooled 
me down and made me consider it more pragmatically. On a personal level, it somehow made me 
immune to a fascination with trendy philosophical theories. One should treat them with some healthy 
suspicion and not let them occupy you, since these discourses reproduce many of the same structures of 
domination that they seemingly criticize. It might be clear for everyone, but for me this has been the 
most important paradox of decolonial thought.  
 
FURQAT: For me, decolonial thought is still a certain truth of life, one of the optics that helps me in 
navigating this world, and I keep looking at the world through the logic of interaction between centre 
and periphery, the logic of power relations between them. But indeed, this discourse is often reproduced 
by institutions simply to justify their right to exist. And it certainly is a paradox. I wouldn’t want 
EastEast to become a similar institution that legitimizes itself with a certain “righteous” theory. 
 
LESIA: The question is, how do we avoid it? Is there a way to do it? In my view, it’s a matter of everyday 
tactics, it’s about the everyday sensitivity in what we are saying and what we are doing, rather than 
measuring our practice with broad-scale universalities.  
 
FURQAT: On the other hand, maybe institutions should be constantly legitimizing and explaining 
their existence. But that’s true, artificiality and alienation are sewed into any organization of labour, any 
bureaucratic structure. One has to seek balance between these different aspects.  
 
KIRILL: I guess, in our case, one of the things that prevents the ossification, is the heterogeneity of 
interests and occupations of each of the EastEast team members. In a certain way, it makes our work 
as an editorial board more complicated because it’s more difficult for us to formulate some common 
goals—which is something every organization needs. Yet on the other hand, such diversification, such 
non-singularity is helping us to avoid hiding behind a certain institutional façade. The heterogeneity of 
these interests, backgrounds, experiences, occupations, and even personality traits might be helping us 
to preserve certain gaps and ruptures that make EastEast something less prone to rigid identification.  
 
BEN: I would have it any other way, honestly. In addition to that, we get to know each through the 
material that we produce or support. 
 
LESIA: And it’s about creating new space really. I guess if it wasn’t for the pandemic, this project 





FURQAT: True, it’s just a very weird coincidence.  
 
NASTYA: As for me, I’m trying hard to stop being an “activist,” especially in the decolonial context, 
as well as get rid of the “white saviour complex.” I’m learning to let things happen on their own.  
 
FURQAT: It’s important to avoid generalizations. I guess the whole point of decolonial optics is to 
consider particularities, to look at particular situations, particular objects, particular people and places—
this still holds true. 
 
LESIA: In addition, it may imply losing the very position through which one generalises and judges 
things, learning to be a nobody. 
 
BEN: Which has its own set of complications, of course, as one could end up denying their “cultural 
history” and not coming to terms with the privilege one experiences. Bringing myself to zero might be 
a privilege in and of itself. The initial recognition of things you’ve picked along the way, of the 
judgements and assumptions that you have is what’s really important. 
 
LESIA: Absolutely. Being nobody implies, in the first place, learning to be somebody. We don’t have 
an option to not have an identity. It’s part of the system of causes and effects that we are all entrenched 
in: we also have responsibilities towards our ancestors and towards the places we occupy. When I’m 
talking about learning to be nobody, it’s not about erasing the materiality of your experience, but rather 
about erasing your judgement.  
 
FURQAT: It is a life-long process of education. It is useful to articulate what you are learning and 





2.2 The Eternal Empire: Decolonising Russia 
 
David Saveliev  
 
Introduction  
Healthy empires are all alike; every deteriorating empire is deteriorating in its own way. The British left 
their colonies almost entirely but maintained close cultural ties with many of them, the French were 
less willing to leave without a fight and are still eager to exert neocolonial control over Françafrique. 
The Russian Empire, on the other hand, retained most of its territory and is still managing to hold 
together, masquerading as a nation-state. Throughout this essay, I will showcase how to apply the 
imperial paradigm to modern Russia, but more importantly, I will show how Russia and Russians 
grapple with their imperial reality, especially how decolonisation works in Russia and its periphery. My 
goal is not to make moral judgements, but to showcase ongoing political and cultural processes.  
It might be odd for some to conceive of Russia as a living and breathing empire made in the image of 
old empires of the 18th century, but the reality is that Russia is best described through an imperial 
paradigm. A widely agreed-upon definition of an empire is a state that rules over distinct territories in 
a top-down manner.1 The controlled territories tend to far exceed the original state’s territory. An 
empire is different from a federation specifically due to the top-down approach — federative structures 
are more bottom-up, autonomous, republican.2 In the following paper I aim to demonstrate that 
Russian past and present fit the definition of an empire almost to a T. The largest part of the essay is 
dedicated to analysing Russian history through an imperial lense. This section is followed up with a 
relatively brief analysis of modern anti-imperial movements in Russia. 
 
Building the Third Rome: the development of Russian imperial identity throughout the X-XXI 
centuries  
Kyivan Rus’ and Muscovy, 900-1540s 
Russian history is often traced back to the Kyivan Rus’ — a loose confederation of principalities with 
its centre in Kyiv.3 Rus’ was not the autocratic empire that Russia would become, with several city-states 
practising forms of democracy, like the veche system in the northern Novgorod Republic.4 Rus' was 
significantly influenced by the Byzantine Empire, eventually adopting Christianity in 988. So, early in 




fascinated and enamoured of Constantinople that they called Tsargrad — the ruler city, the city of 
rulers.5 The concept of Tsargrad as the ideal of an empire and as Christian metropole is still so important 
in today’s Russia, a major Russian TV channel is named after it.6 
However, in 1237, Rus’ principalities learnt of the darker side of empires. The Russian city states were 
brutally crushed by Mongol invaders. Rus’ disunited princes were unable to stand to the war machine 
that was the Mongol Horde.7 With powerful city states defeated, the vacuum was filled by a little 
principality called Muscovy. It seemed that Muscovite rulers had learned the lessons of the past — they 
grew to be authoritarian and decisive.8 In 1380, Dimitri, the Prince of Moscow, defeated a Mongolian 
army at the battle of Kulikovo, marking the beginning of the end for Mongol rule over Eastern Europe.9 
In the following century, Muscovy proceeded to expand, annexing the Novgorod Republic and finally 
ending its vassalage to the Mongol Horde in 1480.  
The newly sovereign Muscovy was full of imperial ambition. It had accepted the now-infamous double-
headed eagle as its symbol, to display the Muscovite princes’ connection to the Byzantine Empire.10 
Shortly after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Muscovites came up with a motto that defined much 
of the following Russian history: “two Romes have fallen, the third is standing and there shall never be 
a fourth”.11 Muscovy was meant to be the third and final Rome, the ultimate imperial metropole. This 
became a geopolitical and religious idée fixe that is influential to this day.12 Muscovy expanded in all 
directions, battling and conquering its neighbours. In 1547 it was three times its previous size and 
rebranded as “Tsardom of Russia”. Muscovite princes now called themselves Tsars — a Russianized 
pronunciation of Caesar, another homage to imperial ambition.  
 
The Russian Tsardom, 1547-1700s 
The ambitious Tsardom found itself in a precarious position. It was situated on the European Plain, 
making it an easy target for large armies who would have no issues travelling across flatlands, just like 
the Golden Horde did. Moscow needed natural barriers to protect itself, and it went looking for them. 
By the 1700s, the Tsardom stretched all the way to the Sea of Japan in the east and to the Caspian Sea 
in the south, having conquered all of Siberia and then some. Siberia, an area of 13.1 million square 
kilometres, became Russia's treasure vault. Today it sustains the Russian economy with oil and gas just 
like in the old days it provided furs and gold.  
 
The Russian Empire, 1721-1917 
The appetites grew, and Russia began looking for easier maritime access to tap into the European trade 




defeating the then-superpower Sweden in a bid for the shores of the Baltic Sea. The empire became 
fully crystallized. In the following centuries of Romanov rule, Russia kept on expanding, enveloping 
entire nations along the way. Russian rulers built institutions of Russification — settling Russophone, 
orthodox peoples. In Eastern Ukraine, for instance, Imperial policies often explicitly aimed at destroying 
the non-russian schools and community centres. Many communities were labelled as inorodtsi (alien-
born), making it near impossible for them to enter governing structures. This is still relevant today, as 
Russia used Crimean descendants of Russian settlers as a pretext for annexation in 2014. The 
Russification of eastern Ukraine still bears fruit in Donbas, where it created an identity fracture and a 
motif for Russian imperial overreach.13  
 
The USSR, 1917-1991 
After the abdication of Nicholas II in March of 1917, Russia was proclaimed a republic. However, it 
quickly demonstrated that it will not rescind its imperial ambition. The provisional government of 
Kerensky, that is often framed as liberal and democratic, was adamant when it came to providing more 
autonomy for conquered nations. Any calls for a more federative approach were met with threats of 
violence and war.14 The Bolsheviks, who came to power in November of 1917, initially promised a less 
imperial approach to governance. Lenin and Trotsky thought beyond of boundaries of states or nations 
— they dreamt of a world revolution that seemed just behind the corner. While often dismissive of 
nationalist aspirations of colonized minorities, the Bolsheviks nevertheless instituted the process of 
korenizatsia (rooting) that enabled greater political and cultural autonomy for colonized peoples such 
as Komi or Tyva.15 Some minorities were even granted semi-autonomous republics, like the Republic 
of Sakha or the Republic of Dagestan. Most of these republics still exist de-jure as federal subjects of 
Russia. Culture flourished, and it may have seemed to some that the USSR is on its way of transforming 
the empire into a true federation.  
However, after Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin strengthened the imperial institutes, shutting down 
korenizatzia and imposing further Russification. Entire peoples were once again resettled and forbidden 
to speak their own language, like the Soviet Koreans or Crimean Tatars.16 Territories of the former 
Russian Empire — the Baltics and Poland — were reconquered. The Second World War only 
exacerbated Stalinist imperialism. In fact, the Crimean Tatars deportation happened under pretext of 
Tatar-German collaboration, since many ethnic minorities initially saw Germans as liberators from the 
Russian yoke. This changed later on — as a Ukrainian saying went “the Germans taught us something 
the commissars couldn’t: they taught us to love the Soviets.” However, the damage was already done 
and Stalin’s suspicions of ethnic minorities were only confirmed as the Red Army fought the Nazi 
auxiliary units sometimes entirely made up of Ukrainians and Balts. These units later transformed into 




The Internationale, that highlighted the globality of Bolshevism, used to be the soviet anthem since 
Leninist times. But by 1944, the Soviet national anthem crystallized the imperial idée fixe once again. 
The anthem now began with  
 
“Unbreakable union  
Of freeborn Republics 
Great Rus’ has welded  
Forever to stand!”  
 
A hereditary connection to the continuing imperial tradition of Russian tsars was highlighted. It is with 
the sounds of this anthem the Red Army conquered most of Eastern Europe, capturing land from Kyiv 
to Berlin. Throughout the Cold War, the USSR engaged in imperialism to counter the USA in their 
global superpower struggle. Stalin’s death didn’t change much. The USSR still fought to expand its 
sphere of influence all over the world, including the traditional imperial playgrounds of the Middle East 
and Africa -- most notably in Angola and Palestinian Territories.19 
 
Russian Federation: 1991-?  
When the USSR fell in 1991, it separated across the lines drawn by Soviet leaders. Russia, however, 
still retained most of the soviet land, being essentially shrank back to its 17th century borders — don’t 
feel bad for Russia, it is still by far the largest country on the planet. After the Soviet collapse, Russia 
couldn’t let now-independent states like Ukraine and Lithuania go. Russian policymakers termed them 
as “near abroad”, treating them as rightful Russian land.20 Why was the imperial mindset so persistent 
in Russian foreign policy thinking? I argue that the key answer lies in the material conditions of the 
Russian state. Unlike most European empires, Russia historically has been directly attached to its 
holdings. When the British left Kenya in 1963 there were no physical bridges connecting the two. On 
the contrary, Russia and its near-abroad is tied by myriads of infrastructural arteries that date back to 
imperial times. Anything from railway standards to gas pipes to nuclear stations’ fuel logistical chains 
in the former USSR comes from a unitary system that often-disregarded national borders.2122 Take, for 
instance, the electrical system of the former soviet states that is still essentially united for most CIS 





Almost a decade after the soviet collapse, Russia went on to invade and conquer territories of its 
neighbours who would want to escape its sphere of influence, Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). But 
it is important to note that even within Russia, Moscow finds itself in need to quell anti-colonial 
sentiments. Most notable here is Chechnya that fought two bloody wars in 1994-1996 and 1999-2000 
for its independence from Moscow. Moscow prevailed and after a great deal of atrocities on both sides, 
the rebellious republic was reintegrated into Russia. But Chechnya is far from being the only one. All 
around the Russian Federation, in Siberia, the Urals and the Caucasus, anti-colonial, separatist and 
regionalist movements have a long history, that I will touch upon in the second part of this essay. 
Russia has been an expansive autocratic empire since Muscovy’s rise — it ruthlessly conquered its 
neighbours while also having a fetish for imperial symbolism it inherited from the Byzantines. Over the 
course of its history, Russia became an inherently imperial entity that not only carried out imperial 
projects but made imperialism an integral part of its national identity. Even the Leninist international 
and somewhat anti-imperial project was eventually subdued in favour of a traditional imperial mindset. 
Russia had its own “manifest destiny” since the 1300s and it still hasn’t run out of destiny to manifest. 
Imperialism became a part of Russian identity, of Russian statehood. Imperialism is baked into Russia 
by the very physical infrastructure it inherited from the USSR and the historical Russian Empire. 
Russia, saddled by Moscow that has to draw resources from the vast lands acquired by conquest, is a 
federation in name only. Russia is, first and foremost, an empire.  
 
Decolonising Modern Russia  
The surface understanding of Russian history I laid out in the first chapter is important because the 
core-periphery relationship within the Russian Federation is built in an inherently imperial manner 
specifically due to Russia’s peculiar history. The European powers could distance from their old imperial 
possessions, the USA had all but annihilated the indigenous peoples and, in effect, started from scratch, 
etc. Moscow on the other hand, still exists in the same polity as peoples who are extremely distinct from 
Muscovite culture, and live within today’s Russia because centuries ago said Russia came to them and 
conquered their land -- in Sakha, Tyva, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kamchatka, the list goes on.  
 
Imperial infrastructure in contemporary Russia 
The legacy imperial infrastructure is twofold: physical and ideological. The physical infrastructure is 
baked within the Russian economy and the way of life. I’ve mentioned one example of this above — 
the soviet infrastructure that ties Russia with the now-independent post-soviet states. But consider 
Russian economy itself that today is heavily reliant on its natural resources, namely oil and gas. While 




energy sphere. Energy revenues account for more than 80% of Russian exports.25 The companies that 
export and develop the gargantuan Russian natural wealth have their offices in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. Their CEOs and top brass mostly come from the European part of Russia, its imperial 
core.26 No wonder — the Russian core is where top universities and top jobs are located. However, the 
gas and oil that companies like Gazprom and Rosneft exploit are not in the core of Russia. Take gas, 
Russia’s number one resource. The largest gas fields are in the imperial crown jewel — Siberia, situated 
in the autonomous republics that were mostly set up during korenizatsia. Yet the Nenets or the Sakha 
people get little to no revenue from resource exploitation, while corporate offices in the Russian core 
get the most capital.27 Consider the Republic of Sakha. An administrative unit roughly the size of India, 
Sakha is the starting point of the Power of Siberia pipeline, that transports natural gas from Sakha to 
China.28 The pipeline brings billions to Russia, yet Sakha remains one of the poorest regions in the 
country with infrastructure so deteriorated that its capital, Yakutsk, is cut off from the rest of Russia 
during summer: there are no bridges over the Lena River that blocks roads to the city. The infrastructure 
itself creates a core-periphery relationship between Moscow or St. Petersburg and the rest of Russia, 
making many in national republics feel like they are living in a colony.29 
The ideological infrastructure is represented mostly in the narrative pushed by the Kremlin, as well as 
adjacent groups like the church and oligarchs. Take the Russian school program that is often used to 
strangle education in local languages. For instance, in the Tatarstan Republic, Tatar language classes 
were made into de-facto extracurriculars after Vladimir Putin himself urged for the Republic’s official 
language to not be taught in school on a mandatory basis. Russian is, of course, a mandatory class, and 
all other subjects are taught in Russian.30 A similar encroachment on local languages is happening all 
over Russia and not just within the school system. Sometimes it leads to ironic moments. For instance, 
in 2021, an activist, arrested for his support of the opposition leader Alexey Navalny in the Komi 
Republic was able to flabbergast the entire court by refusing to speak Russian and demanding the 
proceedings to be held in Komi, a de-jure official language of the republic. The court did not have the 
capacity to do so and the activist was let go.31 But modern Russification is just one example. If we 
continue in Tatarstan we will find plenty of imperial ideological infrastructure. The capital of Tatarstan 
is Kazan, an ancient city that fell to Russia’s troops in 1552. The dominantly Muslim Tatars never fully 
accepted Moscow’s rule and various uprisings went on throughout the region’s history.32 The local Tatar 
communities were forcefully Christianized and Russified, but Kazan remains the hub of Russia’s Tatar 
and Muslim activism. The authorities, however, never stop trying to stake the imperial claim to the 
land: memorials to Russian tsars are often planned to be installed. However, they nearly always meet 
social backlash: memorials to Ivan the Terrible (the conqueror of Kazan) or Catherine the Great (one 
of the most enthusiastic Russifiers in history) never made it into Kazan.33 Another historically Tatar 
city, Astrakhan only recently managed to fight off plans to install an Ivan the Terrible statue.34 Ivan the 




during the Russian expansion eastward. In Cheboksary, the capital of the Chuvash Republic, an Ivan 
memorial was finally installed. However, the Chuvash were not enthusiastic about the brutal tsar either, 
as Chuvash lands were raided incessantly during the Russian conquest of Kazan. The statue had to be 
placed into a plastic casing to prevent vandalism.35  
The Russian Orthodox Church is yet another vehicle for cultural imperialism. According to Kamil 
Galeev, a Tatar researcher working at the Kennan Institute, the church’s role has not changed much 
since the days of the Tsardom of Russia — it is still a major force for religious Russification. According 
to Galeev, most top brass in Tatarstan, while ethnically Tatar, adopt Christianity in order to move up 
the career ladder in the state bureaucracy that is dominated by ethnic Russians and Orthodox Christians. 
The Orthodox Church builds churches all over Russia — even in dominantly Muslim regions, more 
shiny temples are being built.36 
Summing up, modern Russia is encased by the imperial legacies of its past that are too many to count 
— from the church, to economic infrastructure use to education — all is arranged to maintain Russia 
as an empire, masquerading as a nation-state.  
 
Decolonisation movements in modern Russia.  
Separatism 
The reaction to the imperial nature of the Russian state has created multiple movements that I broadly 
sort into a bipartisan taxonomy. I classify them as regionalism and separatism. Separatism is fairly 
straightforward. It is illegal to be a separatist in Russia, so separatist movements, when they emerge, 
take an extremely violent form. If in countries like the US, the Texas Nationalist Movement can even 
host its own website, Russian separatists are far more delegitimised, arguably forced to seek more violent 
ways of obtaining independence. The prime example here is, of course, Chechnya. The rebellious nation 
has long been a thorn in Russia’s side: majority-Muslim Caucasian tribes that Russia colonised 
throughout XVII and XVIII centuries never fully accepted Russian rule. Sporadic engagements 
continued throughout the centuries, and right after the soviet collapse, Chechnya burned in a separatist 
war. The Russian state’s approach to armed separatism in Chechnya has been twofold. On one hand, 
the Russian army shelled peaceful villages and massacred civilians.37 On the other hand, currently 
Chechnya is a de-facto semi-autonomous region. Ruled in a kind of a viceroyship by Ramzan Kadyrov, 
who fought against Russia in the First Chechen War, Chechnya has implemented a system of Sharia 
laws, as well as its own Chechen culture and bureaucracy that is nearly insular from “mainland” Russia.38  
It is important to note, for the sakes of highlighting the ephemerality of the Russian state, that at the 
times of the weakening of autocratic state institutions, Russian regions always sue for more sovereignty. 




Government on 1917, Perestroika and Yeltsinism of the 90s —- all saw robust separatist movements. 
Even in the late 90s, projects like the Urals Republic or a true autonomy of the Sakha Republic were 
taken seriously by many.  
 
Regionalism 
Regionalism is a fascinating and, arguably, uniquely Russian phenomenon. It is close to federalism in 
that its adepts don’t necessarily want for their regions to secede. Rather, they want a “Russia of hundred 
flags”, a true decentralised federation where economic and ideological infrastructures are not centered 
on the European core. Regionalism has been on the rise recently. In Lithuania, a traditional safe space 
for east European dissidents, the Regions Institute has been registered with an explicit purpose of 
eradicating Kremlin-centered approach to Russia studies.39 An example of regionalist protest would be 
the recent Khabarovsk protests — the largest Russian protest of the last years not associated with 
traditional opposition figures like Alexey Navalny. In Khabarovsk, the Kremlin attempted to remove 
the local governor, allegedly for his involvement in a murder committed in the 90s. The citizens of 
Khabarovsk, however, perceived this as the capital’s overreach against a member of a non-dominant 
party. The spontaneous protests raged on for months. Khabarovsk is mostly ethnically Russian. 
However, being geographically closer to Tokyo than to Moscow, Khabarovites have a distinct regional 
identity they don’t want to see threatened.40  
 
Conclusion  
Summing up, modern Russia has an imperial history like many other powerful states. However, it is 
distinct in that it managed to keep most of its empire and is still organised in an imperial manner. This 
created multiple reactions, importantly regionalism and separatism. As decolonisation entrenches in 
western discourse thanks to movements like Rhodes Must Fall and Black Lives Matter, it can be 
expected that the decolonisation movements in Russia will take more power and influence. Would that 
mean that Russia will have to plunge deeper in authoritarianism, strangling threatening regionalist 
movements in the grasp of a unitary state? Or will we see a “Russia of a thousand flags” where regions 
thrive in a federalist utopia? And if the federalist utopia would come about, would this mean an 
inevitable end to the “Russian state”? What would the reckoning with imperial past mean for Russian 
foreign policy? Would it be possible for Russian leaders in the distant future to consider reparations for 
Ukraine based on the centuries of imperial subjugation? Any of these possibilities could come about — 
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Whenever we speak about colonialism, the first association is with the classic European colonial powers. 
Huge empires stretched over thousands of miles, an island in Europe dominating thousands of people 
across the ocean, Spaniards discovering and conquering new faraway lands, turning them into “overseas 
territories”. However, to the East of the mighty colonial empires, one might find an even more 
tremendous one - Muscovy/Russia/Soviet Union, that covered 36 million square kilometres at its peak.1 
While the European colonial empires controlled lands overseas, the Russian Empire (and later the 
Soviet Union) stretched their influence through dry land (though given the advancements of maritime 
travel it was easier for the Europeans to reach their colonies located a lot further). Was Russia an empire 
from the beginning? Probably not, but then when did it become one? Can the Soviet Union be defined 
as an empire? And after the collapse of the Soviet Union did Russia inherit any of its imperial 
characteristics? And even more importantly, did it change its nature? In this essay, we will try to answer 
these questions by researching the development of the Russian imperial self, from the formation of the 
Russian Empire to the present-day imperial narratives in Russian politics.  
 
The Russian Empire 
When did Russia become an empire? The certain answer would be 1721, when Russia was officially 
proclaimed the Russian Empire in 1721 under Peter the Great. However, one might claim that 
Russian imperialism goes back to the baptism of the Kievan Rus’ in the 10th century – when it became 
closely linked to the Byzantine empire. Or one might refer to the fall of Kazan to Ivan the Terrible in 
1552, which brought thousands of Tatars, and Finno-Ugric people under Orthodox Slavic rule. But 
no matter what the exact date was, the concept of Empire has embedded itself in Russia’s self-
perception very early. Before officially becoming an empire, Russia started to view its imperial might 
and expansion as the basis of its existence and the pillar of the vertical of power.2  
One might wonder if there was a moment when the expansion would have been enough… But Russia 
continued growing. As Stephen Kotkin views it: “Whatever the original causes behind early Russian 
expansionism […] many in the country’s political class came to believe over time that only further 




believing that it was the way to forestall external attacks. And according to Maxim Khomyakov, the 
expansion of the Russian empire was indeed very much like the expansion of its Western counterparts, 
for it had the same traits: “the transfer of people; the concept of terra nullius; the idea of the continuing 
dependence of the new settlements upon the sending country; the discourse of civilization and 
modernization; definitions in tribal if not openly racial terms etc.”4. We will not go in depth discussing 
the imperial nature of the Russian empire. Let us just agree that the Russian Empire’s imperialist 
policies might be viewed as comparable to that of the Western colonial powers.  
 
An odd empire or self-colonisation 
Russia was an empire for many centuries. However, Russia was an odd empire. It contained a unique 
dualism of being a coloniser and colonised at the same time. Russia became an heir to the Byzantine 
Empire in 988 and an empire in its own right in 1721, but Russia itself became a colony a lot earlier. 
The very origin of Russia – the invitation of Riurik in the 9th century to rule over the Rus’ in order to 
unify the lands and stop the bloodshed among Russian princes - is indeed a “primordial impulse of self-
colonisation”5. Russia started with colonisation, but what’s astonishing - with a voluntary colonisation. 
Nevertheless, the true “birth” of Russia was the Petrine reforms. In the 18th century, Peter the Great 
decided to modernise Russia. Multiple reforms, ranging from the modernization of the army to 
industrialization and governmental reforms modelled after Europe, were aimed at “europeanising” 
Russia and eliminating its traditions, perceived as backwards by the monarch. Boris Groys viewed the 
Petrine reforms as the beginning of an authentic Russia since prior to them there was no Russia – Russia 
as we know it just did not exist.6 So, when said Russia finally emerged with the Petrine reforms, Russia 
emerged once again through colonisation. A new Russian self was created by giving up its past and its 
history, and smelting it from a European culture and history that did not belong to Russia: “when it is 
born into history, Russia historically is no more”.7  
On the one hand, Peter made Russia an empire – he was a great conqueror and coloniser that managed 
to take over many other states, confident in its messianism. However, on the other hand, the Petrine 
Reforms were an act of self-colonisation and “psychological destruction of the Russian people”.8 These 
reforms made Russia “backward” forever, however. Peter the Great had the Russian Empire embrace 
the idea of European civilization as a base and a template - he wanted Russia to be a European state. 
But the embodiment of this desire meant that Russia would be doomed to be a catching-up state 
learning from the advanced European states forever.9  
While the Russian Empire perceived itself as the West towards Asia, for the European Countries it was 
always the Orient. Madina Tlostanova very accurately defined this issue as a double self-identification. 




colony, as an empire and a periphery (to the West).10 The Russian Empire, whilst being an empire, 
colonising its neighbours, conquering peoples, was also a subaltern. Russia had its own colonial 
periphery and at the same time was the European periphery, part of the European colonial empire, 
though not colonised in the formal sense, thus becoming a subaltern.11 Peter’s reforms resulted in a 
relentless existential crisis for the Russian Empire and its successor, the Russian Federation.  
The most famous embodiment of this issue has been the never-ending argument between the 
Slavophiles and the Westernizers. The Slavophiles viewed Russia as a unique civilisation with its own 
unique way of developing, whereas Westernizers saw the country as part of Europe and believed that it 
should follow the European path of development. Interestingly, among Slavophiles, there were 
advocates of the “Asianist subtrend” that claimed that since Russia occupied a unique position between 
Europe and Asia, it had a greater right to rule over the peoples of Asia.12 They believed the Russian 
conquest of foreign peoples was not comparable to those of the Europeans, it was a better one, for the 
Russians were “gentle colonisers” with a consciousness of Asia as well as Europe trying to elevate Russia 
above the West.13 
Looking a bit ahead, let us mention that the Petrine reforms were one of the issues of Russia’s then 
international status and self-perception on the international arena as well. Russia viewed itself as equal 
to other European states, and claimed the same status, but for the European states it was a forever 
laggard.14 At the same time, Russia was a threat, a giant military power, a rival to the East, but still a 
barbarous giant that was never good enough for Europe.15 
 
The Soviet Union - an empire again  
The Russian Empire ended, but its core persisted. One might expect the Bolsheviks would have brought 
freedom, relief from the colonial tensions and burden. Lenin framed colonialism as the product of 
capitalism, and denounced the imperialistic colonial exploitation of ‘backward’ countries as well as the 
rivalry between capitalist empires competing over their newest colonies.16 The Soviet Union accepted 
the colonial nature of the Russian Empire, but the “new Soviet Union” was supposed to be if anything 
- an anti-colonial state. However, as Francine Hirsch puts it, “After attaining power, however, [the 
Bolsheviks] began to express concern that it would not be possible for Soviet Russia to survive without 
the cotton of Turkestan and the oil of the Caucasus”.17 
So, the Soviet relations between the periphery and the centre did resemble colonial ones. One might 
mention the expansive and aggressive Soviet policies in Central Asia in the 1920s: the Kokand 
Autonomy, the Emirate of Bukhara, the Khiva Khanate were conquered, the Soviets continued fighting 
with the opposition in the early 1920s and then implemented multiple repressions against local elites in 




region was, its fate was decided in the capital. Special ministries back in Moscow were supposed to take 
decisions alongside the ministries inside the republics (for instance, the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz). 
The centre indeed depended on the peripheries’ economies, markets and production; while the 
peripheries were less developed… At the same time, the centre suppressed the local cultures and 
implemented “Russification”.  
Nevertheless, when labelling the Soviet Union as a colonial empire, one should mention several specific 
traits. For example, Abashin claims that the fact that local elites played a significant role in the 
governance of the republics and constituted a significant part of the elites in the centre couldn’t have 
taken place in the “classical European empires”.18 Moreover, the peoples of the peripheries had officially 
enjoyed the same rights as the Russians. Universal social benefits were granted in all republics, and 
wages were relatively similar in all regions.   
 
Russian self in the international politics  
So, having said all that, let us try and answer a question: How is a state with a long history of 
imperialism, that happened to be one of the largest empires of the 19th century, and one of the two 
superpowers of the 20th, supposed to behave on the international stage? And when answering this 
question, keep in mind the duality of colony and metropole as an unalienable issue of the Russian 
identity.  
First of all, let us mention the apparent significance of the imperial self-image of Russia. Modern Russia 
still heavily relies on its self-perception as a great power, whose greatness comes from its past victories. 
However, Russia, in its own eyes, is still a great power, one that has an absolute right to behave like 
such. This projection of itself as a great power, along with a necessity to expand as a colonial empire, 
perfectly explains Russia’s current policies in its “Near Abroad” as well as its more far-reaching activities 
in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. At the same time, Russia views itself as a victim, entitled 
to safeguard its geopolitical sphere of influence against foreign encroachment, which it perceives, in 
turn, like aggression.19 
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a brief period when Russian foreign policy 
was dominated by liberal Westernist ideas, which portrayed Russia as a Western, capitalist-oriented 
state. At that time, Yeltsin claimed that Russia was no longer the main power centre of an enormous 
communist empire.20 So, it was Russia’s chance to be finally accepted in the ranks of the European 
nations it admired for so many years. To that end, Russia signed the Partnership and Cooperation with 
Europe in 1994 and joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the Partnership for 




However, when the first “confusion” and crisis in Russia passed, it became apparent that Russia and the 
European Union (EU) adhered to very different worldviews and understanding of Russia’s place in the 
new unipolar world. Given Russia’s history and heritage, it expected to be treated as an equal. Whereas 
the EU saw Russia only as one of the former Soviet states that had to change and adhere to the EU’s 
norms and values. As the 1999 Common Strategy of the EU on Russia stated “Russia’s return to its 
rightful place in the European family [...] on the foundation of shared values enshrined in the common 
heritage of European civilization” was anticipated by the EU. According to Morozov, from the Russian 
point of view, it was Europe’s refusal to accept Russia as it is, its constant desire to make Russia follow 
the European norms that made any rapprochement impossible.21 
In the 1990s, in Russia, advocates for the Western course and their rivals (including many partisans of 
a more nationalist stance) once again clashed in a debate over the future of the country. The outcome 
was the formulation of Russia’s core foreign policy principles, such as ‘Russia as a Great Power’. Russian 
politicians came to an agreement that Russia should focus on maintaining stability and protecting its 
interests, which laid not only in Russia itself, but within its “Near Abroad” as well.22 The term ‘Near 
Abroad’ itself mirrored the Russian worldview’s imperial heritage and its policies. Russia views the 
former Soviet republics through the lens of a “special history” that was supposed to guarantee “special 
relationship” with separate, but not foreign states. It was ultimately a bid to fit the familiar Soviet order 
into a new reality. Indeed, the legacy of Moscow’s control over the union republics could not vanish 
overnight. So quite quickly Russia returned to its familiar heritage of the empire – as a regional hegemon 
(or at least attempts to perform this role). The attempt to integrate with Europe was substituted by 
Moscow’s endeavour to concentrate and solidify its own influence over its neighbouring regions (for 
instance, through EEU).  
The EU kept building its policy towards Russia on normative aspects, while Russia, which managed to 
recover some of its economic might and accumulate enough power, embarked on a quest for even more 
ambitious goal – becoming one of the global hegemons. To be more precise, one could refer to the so-
called Primakov doctrine that established Russia (along with China and India) as one of the poles of 
power in a new multipolar world. However, at the same time, Russia kept developing its tangled 
relations with Europe. Even as late as 2020, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov announced that 
the EU ruined its relations with Russia, as Russia continues to draw on its position compared to Europe. 
Amid multiple ties and close partnership with China and broad activities in Middle East and Africa, 
the Russian worldview still stays eurocentric and strongly dependent on the West. Russia’s current 
foreign policy discourse is the perfect embodiment of this duality.23 Russia, while engaging in imperial 
pursuit in its “Near Abroad”, justifies this policy by accusing the West of colonialism and neo-
colonialism, and maintaining a consistent discourse of the importance of “decolonising the world order” 




results in the idea that any “political action is only seen as legitimate if it is directed against the West 
(or at least demonstrates Russia’s independence from the West)”.24 No matter how hard Russia tries to 
distance itself from Europe, integrating with China and other Asian countries, BRICS countries… it 
will not change the fact that it is still really closely connected to Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
After centuries of being an empire, it is not surprising that Russia continues to formulate its worldview 
and its policy in an “imperialistic” manner. Russia cannot imagine itself a “junior” partner in any 
relationship. Being an heir to one of the biggest empires and one of two super-powers, it is used to 
playing the leading roles. Russian current pursuit of the status of a great power perfectly fits in this logic. 
However, it would be a different story if the Russian Empire (and the Soviet Union), were simply 
colonial empires. Starting with the Petrine reforms, Russia emerged and existed, always positioning 
itself in relation to Europe. It is the duality of the Russian “self”, centuries of comparing itself to the 
Europe and constant “catching up” with its neighbours to the West that has tied Russian identity to 
Europe. One could state all the aforementioned explains Russian policy in the international arena, that 
continues to be dictated by the self-perception as an empire and a subaltern at the same time. We might 
risk and say that expecting the continuation of duality in Russian politics will persist. It is becoming 
more and more apparent that Russia will not adopt the Euro-Atlantic norms and principles and that, 
in contrast, it is drifting away from the European view of the world. However, while becoming more 
distant from Europe, Russia, at the same time, “stays’ at the same position of constant comparing itself 
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2.4 The Aryan Alliance? Nazi Eastern European Imperialism 





In an article entitled “The Sevenfold task of the Dutch Volk”, published on the 24th of January 1942 
edition of the Utrechtsch Nieuwsblad, a wartime censored paper for the metropoles of Utrecht and the 
surrounding region, Anton Mussert’s speech to the Dutch people is recited as a reference point for what 
had happened and what was to come under the Nazi leadership of Europe. Mussert, leader of the Nazi 
endorsed NSB, gave a speech on the 14th of December 1941, on the first anniversary of the movement 
becoming the state party, to his fellow party enthusiasts and to the wider citizens of the Netherlands. 
In this recounted speech, Mussert emphasised several intrinsic elements of the Dutch and their position 
and role in the New Order of Europe. Firstly, he emphasised the Dutch’s innate Germanic descendance 
as a stam (tribe), by stressing the need of an “active deliberate participation” amongst all Germanic 
people, to obtain the “complete justice” of their pioneering entrepreneurial spirit in the newly conquered 
Eastern European lands.1 Having alluded to the loss of Indonesia, “all overseas roads” were now closed 
in realising this Germanic greatness. Instead, the “physical, moral and spiritual elevation” and 
redemption of his people would have to come from the cooperative bonds which Germanic self-
consciousness and brotherhood had realised.2 For the war, as he had emphasised, was no “ordinary war”. 
It was not a dispute of one state’s quarrel with another or its assertion of dynastic claims. Rather, it was 
inherently a biological struggle. Or as he coined it, a “clash of two worlds” fighting against both the 
“imminent danger” of spiritual and physical racial degradation. Indeed, it was a fight against the forces 
of modernity, synonymous to the inherent properties of European decay, wishing to extinguish the 
“Jewish led” Anglo-Saxon “money forces” and Asian Bolshevism, which personified the ultimate 
antagonist to the return of Dutch purity of race and spirit.3 In this speech, Mussert pays homage to the 
multifaceted sources of his ideological authority. Subconsciously reiterating the very purpose of the 
Volk, which he and his contingents believed was finally metamorphosing into conscious manifestations 
across the spectre of Nazi controlled Europe. This publication, offers us a microcosmic insight of the 
macrocosmic trajectory intended for the Dutch Volk. Indeed, it marked a seeming return to Dutch 
greatness in Europe through this belief of revolutionary progress and leadership, by forming a racial 




‘Lands of the East’ and its unbound potentiality for reignited Germanic racial redemption, and, in turn, 
greatness.  
 
The topic of Nazi imperialism in Eastern Europe, as an inherent characteristic of the regime, has 
become of greater historiographical significance amongst a European scholarship in the last 30 years. 
Particularly prevalent is the German schools of thought, which have stressed the ideological and 
bureaucratic continuation of a Prussian Imperial geist which would succumb the very essence of Nazi 
thought and objectives to its prevalence.4 Moreover, wider scholarship has followed this trend of 
analysing Nazi Eastern European colonialism in light of the greater German and European preceding 
context of the Imperial age.5 Arguably, the current contributions of this revisionism owes its particular 
historic lens of analysis to Hannah Arendt’s 1953, The Origins of Totalitarianism, which popularised 
in its post-colonial thought the significance of an accumulated European ‘Imperial consciousness’ in 
understanding Nazi occupation. The precedence of this inherited ‘Imperial conscious’ spilt-over into 
the successor organs of former high-imperial bureaucracies, as well as the intellectual spaces of the 
nation in the developing conditions of the 20th century.6 Prior contributions such as Aimé Césaire’s 
1950 essay, Discourse on Colonialism, stressed that the uniqueness and shock factor of Nazi rule was 
that the “White man” became a subject of Imperial treatment previously reserved for the overseas 
indigenous people.7 Where Nazi Imperialism considerably differed from systemic overseas colonialism, 
was that the Nazi occupation was too short lived to leave ‘enduring cultural legacies’ and ‘structures of 
domination’, whereas in the post-colonial setting of former European colonies the contrary was 
observed.8 
Modern scholarship has stressed that newspapers can offer us an insight into these competing narratives 
of thought and its manifestation in the action undertaken by their ideologues. For as the lasting legacy 
of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, has left on newspaper scholarship; the paper press 
became throughout Europe, in the 19th and early 20th century, a means of promoting a common identity 
amongst a racially kindred people, becoming co-creators of their ‘imagined communities’.9 What was 
radically different, to the liberal bourgeois press, which pre-existed occupation, was that the Dutch press 
became in a sense one behemoth monotone expression of Nazi desires and strides in reaching those 
teleological objectives. As one can interpret from the works of Habermas, the public sphere of Dutch 
life became dominated, through these newspapers, by a radical ‘steered media’ of Nazi thought, 
attempting to condition the very debate and conscious collective goals of the Dutch.10 This correlated 
to the Nazi administrative belief that the function of the Dutch press was solely to ‘instruct’ and ‘guide’ 
the population as a “significant instrument of influence”, as Goebbels stated, in the hope of realising 





Controlling the Narrative 
As echoed by governor-general Seyss-Inquart the teleological objective of Dutch occupation was in 
realising an Aryan destiny and identity. A goal which lay not in Nazi coercion to this cause but rather 
in a ‘self-willing’ domestically cultivated Dutch cooperation.12 Ironically and contradicting this aim, in 
order for this will to be truly ingrained within the press, the Nazi occupants realised that their grip had 
to be strengthened in controlling the themes and messages which daily publications of newspapers 
possessed. 
For the Nazi administration the Dutch voluntary farmers were Aryan colonisers, realising the organic 
boundaries of their Aryan empire through their differing yet coherent activities to the cause. As reported 
by the Agrarisch Nieuwsblad on the 14th of April 1942 there was a duality of objectives at play. 13 The 
‘crusade’ East would both realise a Germanic destiny tying their bonds to their Aryan ‘brothers’, whilst 
also securing the “food position” and relieving the ‘landhunger’ for generations to come. 14 The latter 
appealed to an indigenous concern amongst both the populace and administrative echelons, hence a 
vital remaining reason for collaboration. The term “voedsel positie” (food position), became a 
reoccurring theme in newspaper articles around the summer of 1941 and well into 1942, to justify and 
glorify the role of the Dutch colonial farmer as a saving grace for the nation.15. Considering the 
intensification of British blockades as well as the devastating news of the loss of Indonesia, non-NS 
officials of government came to conclude, by December 1941, that colonialism on the terms of pure 
resource extraction was a necessity for the nation’s self-preservation.16  
Indeed, in the early years of occupation, there was a balance which presented itself between the secular 
obligation to the cause and the ideological motivators for colonisation. One article employed these 
inherited public anxieties of the Dutch. It illustrated the severity of the Dutch ‘landhunger’ by drawing 
upon the historic precedence of the population surplus of 100,000, as well as the migration of 40,000 
farmers from 1890 to 1905.17 However, as conflicts in the East began to escalate, the tone began to 
shift. For example, five days after the opening phases of operation Barbarossa, in late June of 1941, 
Seyss-Inquart addressed the Dutch people in a manner of prophecy. His speech, covered in a newspaper 
article called for “the Crusade against Bolshevism”, emphasising the need for “indivisible” and 
“unshakable” unity for the mission in creating a “community of grain” for Europe in the East.18 Fighting 
the decadency of “Judeo-Bolshevism” the Dutchmen would be rekindling a connection they had 
experienced for” 800 years” as “pioneers” within the region.19 The invasion of the USSR undoubtedly 
accelerated the debate and early successes catalysed the actualisation of the vision, as demonstrated by 
the successive establishment of CULANO (Commissie tot uitzending van landbouwers naar Oost-
Europa) a national-socialist agency tasked with the sending of Dutch settlers to Eastern Europe.20 
Candidates for this homesteading mission were required to undergo thorough vetting of their racial and 




inherently an ideological one. As the press began increasingly stressing the mission was a “return” to 
the East, marching and mimicking the “forefathers” and through their devotion launching a “Germanic 
counterattack” which from which the Germanic stams (tribes) had been displaced having settled in the 
11th and 12th centuries.22 From 1942 onwards, the glorification of these Dutch volunteers through 
ascribing them as the very embodiment of a Germanic intrinsic will of the volk, became the central 
theme in attempting to realise the full incorporation of the Dutch people into a kindred Aryan 
Brudervolk. Behind the soldiers of the voluntary SS legion the “second front” is being formulated, by 
the ushering in of new recruits, to “stand shoulder to shoulder” in effort to colonise the new territories.23 
An alliance of “gun and spade” marked the symbolic start towards the realisation of a Greater German 
Reich in the East, which the NSB and Nazi administration had stressed to the press had an innate 
Dutch ownership. This second front would entail assimilation of the area through the “youthful” 
colonialists embodying the very spirit of perceived ‘Dutchness’. For the men, this meant being the 
“disciplined father”, whilst for the women it meant being the “sympathetic mothers”; encouraging 
through the coupling of recruits the fruition of the very locus of society, the family. This spirit was 
captured through training these recruits to possess child-bearing and rearing properties.24 This narrative 
reflected its wider contemporary Nazi sentiments. For as Himmler had expressed in the summer of 
1942, the objective of these Eastern frontiers was for it “to dwell only with truly Germanic blood” and 
thus achieve true Germanic ownership.25 It was through this alliance of the Dutch soldier fighting the 
‘decadent’ Bolshevik hordes, whilst the farmer opened up a “second front” in purifying the newly 
incorporated lands with likewise their blood and labour that the administration could attempt to capture 
the prophesized Aryan Imperial mission in the East.26 By the last months of occupation, farmer and 
soldier became an interchangeable agent through the language deployed in newspapers. As 
demonstrated by an emergency appeal for frontline aid the volunteers were labelled under the collective 
term of “strijders” (fighters).27 Hence the fears of politicising the mission east had come true. From the 
spring of 1942, the publications surrounding Eastern colonialism had distinctly become dominated by 
the direct ideological discourse of the NSB and Nazi discourse. Having achieved monopole status, 
through their assurgency of presence and power over the press, they now had free reign to purge and 
coerce the press to their ideological intentions. Of the 710 daily and weekly papers which had been on 
the market in summer 1940, only 184 remained in existence by the summer of 1945.28 Hence, the non-
NS bureaucrats, who were unsympathetic towards the overtly racialist dimension of Germanisation, 
withdrew their support in the spring of 1942, realising the NOC and the Landdienst had become the 
project of the NSB and Nazi ideologues and administrators rather than still, in essence, being 






The ‘Pioneering’ Farmer, The ‘Retarded Slav’ and the promised East: Mysticism, Historicism and 
Orientalism in the Censored Press 
By 1942, the press had become the state apparatus tool in forwarding a historical ‘manifest destiny’ of 
an Aryan will. A sentiment which was not new to the Nazi administration but rather a self-admittingly 
embodiment of 19th and 20th century thought which was now finally at the forefront of their racial 
destiny. Nazi ideologues and their Imperial predecessors (as well as the wider pre-existing racial 
anthropological and eugenics academia in the Netherlands and Germany) all stressed the historical 
precedence of the Germanic past. For the past would realise and speculate the racial and spiritual 
trajectory of the Germanic volk’s resurgence in the unfolding developments of the 20th century.29 Indeed, 
the interwar years had seen the institutionalisation of German scholarship on Ost and Westforschung, 
through the administrative funding of research which stressed the intrinsic ‘Germanness’ in the eastern 
and western borders of its nation.30 As demonstrated by Ratzel’s coining of the word Lebensraum during 
the previous Imperial heights of the Prussian Empire (1901), the bureaucracy had already adapted an 
internal stance which saw the future of geopolitics as being shepherd by a Grossraume politik.31 This 
idea, which would later be endorsed in Hitler’s Mein Kampf and further political philosophy, created 
in practice the equivalent of a ‘German Monroe Doctrine’, which believed that nations would be 
organised in colossal spheres of influences.32 Indeed, the prevalence of a sentiment of a predetermined 
destiny for the Germanic people and Europe cannot be stressed enough in these writings. Sentiments 
which ascribed the pre-First World war Prussian state as a “mutilated torso”, part of a wider Germanic 
biological Reich, make up a collective tapestry of scholarly and bureaucratic debate which Nazi thought 
inherited.33 The framework of this thought reaffirms the claim that the senior Nazi ideologues and 
administrators were indeed, the “inheritors” of a colonial bureaucracy, which the Greater German Reich 
was keen to embody.34 After all, many early 20th century colonial figures became important in the politics 
of the Weimar Republic, with their rationalism succeeding their tenancy of office by being further 
developed and emphasised amongst the Nazi elites.35 No truer does this politicised sentiment resonate 
in the Netherlands than through such beliefs being manifested in the wartime organs of press 
censorship, which sported a hybrid input of both home-grown National-Socialism as well as the 
directives put forward by Berlin. From 1942 onwards these ideologues had free reign in realising these 
prophesized ideals through the narratives they ascribed the farmer and the East. They had the freedom 
to characterise the Dutch farmer as an agent which had embraced the spiritual and racial purification 
that the “German essence” had to offer.36  
Articles by native racial scientists, such as Dr. Johan Theunisz, began appearing, employing a historic 
presence of the Dutch as Eastern colonisers emphasising a ‘renewed’ spirit was taking form. The article 
drew upon a Dutch presence in the region from the Carolingian period to the dawn of the 20th century, 
emphasising the renewed presence was a prerequisite property of the Dutch and thus wider Germanic 




the favoured line of thought concerning Eastern settlement. It became the state doctrine, and, more 
significantly, the doctrine of the Aryan spirit in understanding the events which had occurred. Every 
other narrative was reduced to a secondary status. In the same spirit that the planned architectural 
remodelling of areas of Western Poland was meant to signify the arrival of the Teutonic Knights of the 
twentieth century, the volunteers of this crusade were the racial architects of reclamation.38 Several 
notable articles recited the poem “Naar Oostland”, a 12th to 13th century Flemish song recounting the 
emigration of Flemish farmers to parts of north Germany.39 The song became assimilated in the press 
to embody and idolise a Dutch colonial destiny of return to Eastern Europe despite this meaning being 
a fabrication of the original text. It had previously been used in an article concerning the experiences of 
Dutch labourers in Germany, but now this folklore song had been appropriated to the colonising 
project.40 Now, the text which translates to “To the East we want to go, over those green heaths, is a 
better place”, was proclaimed to have “revitalised meaning” in these times where the Dutch 
“entrepreneurial spirit” was once again in the region. 41  Even the leader of the NSB controlled 
Landdienst, Evert Jan Roskam, was glorified in papers as the very embodiment of a racially healthy 
stock of colonising Dutch farmers. One paper argued from the historic precedence that he was a 
descendant of the “free Saxon farmers” and thus his “patriotism and love for his country” came 
“naturally”.42 Other articles in 1942 began advertising exhibitions which promoted this historicism. 
Articles such as De Waag’s “Dutch East-colonisation”, in May 1942, advertised the exhibition 
Nederland-Danzig, which was being held at the university library of Utrecht, dedicating a two-page 
report on historic presence of the Dutch in the Oostland.43 It argued that the Dutch persistence in the 
region resonated with an innate “Dutch Entrepreneurial spirit” and “dare” which was now “again” being 
realised in the East. This dare would manifest itself into a permanent revolution of Germanic spirit 
with one article, earlier that month, stating these “fertile lands” would bear the “heirs” of the “sons and 
daughters” of the converted contingent.44 
The ideal of this Volkgemeinschaft carried a duality in its discourse and practice. On the one hand, it 
was about furthering the inclusion of the Germanic people through the promotion of the spirit 
manifesting itself across Aryan peoples and Europe. Whilst, simultaneously dispossessing and excluding 
those who stood in ideological contradiction to it. In this case it meant romanticising the newly 
incorporated lands and the colonising mission of the east, whilst demeaning the Slavic residents. Press 
stories of farmers’ experiences romanticised the “once again rediscovered East” for its “unbound 
potentiality” of individual and collectively Germanic redemption.45 This story, reported in De Algemeen 
Handelsblad, labelled as the least compromising paper towards the Nazi administration, shows the 
extent to which even the most resilient papers had been Nazified in embodying their ideological 
oration.46 Another publication interviewed the farmer leader, De Waard, about his experiences in the 
Ukraine. The article stated that he was “eager” to return East for the “vast spaces awaiting exploitation” 




“collective will” of all labour first, comparing it to the “golden calf” of the Old Testament.48 Indeed, like 
God’s punishment of the entire Jewish following for the work of a minority, the role of the farmer was 
to purify it completely. More pressing, this comparison was used to talk of “Judeo-Bolshevism” and the 
ideology of communism which had lurked in the East and the need for the Farmer to purge these lands 
of the pagan properties these people possessed. After all, the creator had “intentionally sculpted” the 
Dutch volk to civilise through the imperial projects before and, now, once again, the Aryan spirit had 
summoned them to the lands of Slavic decadence in the hope of making it their “Germanje”.49  
 
Fig 1. “Away with it through the Dutch Labour Front”. 
Since the heights of the Prussian Empire, the administration created an ‘organic frontier’ against the 
caricature of an Oriental East.50 The Nazis, extended these ideas to new heights marked by a semantic 
shift from “lands and peoples” to “spaces and races”.51 Dehumanisation became, as these newspapers 
demonstrate, an everyday social phenomenon, rooted in the ordinary social-cognitive processes which 
these articles beheld.52 When speaking of the mission in the east the people were demonised to further 
the legitimisation of the project not just in the realms of extraction. But, rather, to also serve as a 
necessary undertaking in ‘civilising’ these peoples to standards of occidental enlightenment. Articles 
began accrediting the Slav as being a “retarded” group of peoples who had not utilised the richness of 
their land and required Germanic encouragement to prosper.53 When the inevitable happened of young 
Dutch farmers finding Slavic girlfriends and brides in the East, one paper reaffirmed the belief saying 
a harmonious marital life was not possible with this other “achterlijk” race, stating abstinence was the 




reserved for non-occidental peoples was now being utilised for a new subaltern people, the Slav.55 As 
one article concerning the recruitment of ambulance operators on the eastern front stated: the war for 
Europe and the Germanic people was being fought against a “non-human” enemy which lurked there.56 
It was a racial self defence against an “Asiatic bolshevist” horde which embodied, if unacted upon, the 
death of European culture, traditions and race. The Orientalist nature of the project cannot be 
overlooked in the duality of the narratives it expressed and embodied. For the Nazi administration, had 
furthered the development of an academic tradition which incorporated a distinctive “ontological and 
epistemological” racial purpose for the Aryan by furthering their own racial domination through 
demonising the Slav whilst glorifying the opportunity the land possessed.57 The Farmer defied, for 
ideologues and administrators like Darré, everything which modernity stood for; the colonisation was 
about rekindling a Germanic “blood”, exclusively that blood, through the “soil” by revitalising peasantry 
homesteads in these newly acquired territories in the hope that ethnic salvation may be redeemed 
through this racial gentrification.58 It required complete Germanic isolationism from the inferiority of 
the indigenous peasants and this message was relayed home to the Dutch people through the 
homogenous tone of the newspapers. Based on the first impressions these sentiments left, the logic of 
this destruction and redevelopment chimed with an occidental pattern of past Imperial projects. The 
encouragement by Rosenberg to draw direct links to this, through advising colonial commissars to read 
Imperialist travelogues and establishing localised East European organs which embodied African 
techniques of colonial governance, made the project intrinsically a discourse born out of similar racialist 
dimensions of past global imperial rule.59  
 
Fig 2. Sunday Morning In Moscow: An anti-Slavic/Bolshevist poster depicting the ‘family Stalin’ 




The savagery of European colonialism, disguised with the pretence of having a “civilising” role was 
continued by Nazism by bringing this barbarism home to the continent of colonial powers.60 What was 
distinctly different was that this Nazi Imperial thought rejected the humanitarian mission and 
explanation which other colonial powers had ascribed their Imperialism to. Instead, teleological purpose 
of colonisation was redefined. As demonstrated by the mechanised murder of the Jews and Slavs of 
Eastern Europe, the only bonds that counted were not those which recognised a common humanity, 
but rather, one which recognised their own racial kinship as the necessary benefactor for the purification 
and salvation of their race.61 The practices of administration and the terminology utilised in the very 
discourse, which once was reserved for the non-occidental people, was now being administered towards 
the Slavic peoples of Eastern and Central Europe. No truer does this sentiment chime than in the 
newspapers of Holland, where the East and Slavic people were characterised by paradoxical qualities. 
The demands of war on Germany’s manpower alone made Dutch recruitment to this cause an 
ideologically fitting convenience for realising these visions after a Nazi victory.62 It would however never 
come and instead the Netherlands became subjected to intensifying resource extraction which 
squandered what was left of the illusionary vision that they were equal partners in a family of Germanic 
races.63 Instead, as argued by Ardent and Césaire, it required a Dutch exposure through their own 
subjugation to extraction to realise they too were ‘subalterns’ in a wider European Nazi Empire. It is 
argued that the Nazi occupation didn’t leave a lasting legacy on the Netherlands. However, as the 
following part will argue, it did leave a legacy amongst social commentators of a changing discourse 
concerning its colonies. Indeed, post-colonial attitudes were born not in a post-war setting but rather 
originated from the reactions to experiences from the Nazi administration’s colonial and occupational 
heights. The marginalised appeal and rhetoric of the NSB and Nazi discourse would not just alienate 
the wider Dutch readership from the mission in the East, but it would furthermore revaluate their own 
colonial position. 
 
Inheritors of the East? The Crisis of the East Indies and the rise of Post-colonialist thought in 
clandestine literature 
As echoed by Arendt, a Dutch will of possession of the East was not possible without an appeal to 
experiences and desires, and that required tapping into the domestic political needs and circumstances 
of the wartime Dutch people.64 Whilst the administration had already partly realised these 
circumstantial conditions of appeal, through their extensive rhetoric surrounding prospective food 
shortages, the loss of Indonesia was another fundamental worry ingrained in the Dutch past. As 
emphasised by Foray the Dutch were nostalgic, proud and self-righteous towards their East Indies.65 A 
feeling best captured by the dependency on this colony for domestic growth, with a GDP amounting 




nation at the time.66 By spring 1942, the Japanese occupation of the East Indies swept in new public 
emotions of unease and fear that the loss combined with the lack of Nazi guarantees of Indonesia would 
reduce the Kingdom of the Netherlands to a minor European power, living in the shadow of a global 
Empire.67 Long established fears and debates resurfaced to the front of a collective Dutch consciousness. 
One notable example was Sandberg’s 1914 pamphlet “India lost; disaster born”. Written by a former 
local colonial authority and active NSB member, it was republished by the NSB during the war’s 
Indonesian crisis.68  
However, in its present circumstances the Dutch were increasingly feeling an internalised colonisation 
in their own right. Being amongst the highest economically exploited nations in Western Europe ‘real 
national income’ had halved by 1944 from its original evaluations of pre-war (1938) figures. Moreover, 
by the autumn of 1943, labour drafts had mobilised a coerced workforce of over a quarter of a million 
men, around 3% of its total population with 44% of their entire economy mobilised for the war effort.69 
The Netherlands had become a ‘subaltern’ people with the woes of famine in 1944 Winter Hunger 
amplifying these feelings the readership of the censored press were in a state of complete 
disillusionment. The promised treatment which realised their Aryan status as Germanic partners of 
colonisation was by 1944 a clear façade victim to a down spiralling Nazi European Order as allied victory 
seemed imminent. Instead of encouraging the Dutch to Germanise, the loss of the East Indies had 
made the public more resentful towards the occupier.70 Creating a debate, amongst clandestine thinkers 
which began a cross-analysis of the developing colonial affairs. On one hand it was about reflecting 
‘inward’, for the need of either reform or complete emancipation of the Indonesian people, as well as 
drawing comparison to these realities in what was occurring ‘eastward’ in the incorporated lands.71 Now 
more than ever, having experienced the Nazi occupation and conditions of their rule the Dutch could 
appreciate “the Indonesian people’s drive for freedom” and thus the fundamental need for a redefined 
peacetime relationship.72 The clandestine writers were responding to the censored press’ use of the loss 
of Indonesia as a motivator for Eastern Colonialism. When the NOC was launched in the summer of 
1942, the narrative in newspapers stressed the potentiality of redemption for the Dutch through 
reclaiming their colonial tradition in the Oostland. Indeed, in their intentions Rost van Tonnigen had 
hope that the financial assets and benefactors, freed up by the loss of Indonesia, would begin imminently 
reinvesting in the successor colony of the east.73 Papers began hailing the NOC for its creation of “new 
possibilities” for the “entrepreneurial” Dutch people, which resided in the reclaimed and “purified” 
lands.74 Designated to Dutch settlement, it stressed that the Dutch would “continue to take its place 
under the sun” and demonstrate its “excellence” in its understanding of colonisation.75 Such sentiments 
of nationalist pride which colonialism brought predated Japanese invasion. However, the discourse had 
now shifted from the liberal tone of the ‘civilising’ mission which justified colonialism to an attitude 





The narrative had to be one which embodied the realisation of this Social Darwinian order, with the 
Slavic peoples of the East replacing the semanticist properties of the preceding “backward inferior 
savages” of the non-occident Indonesians. 76 Everyday experiences of Nazi occupation had revaluated 
and made the Dutch self-critical of their colonial past and futures. The clandestine press began styling 
itself as the ‘conscience of the nation’ and surpassed newspaper circulation by 1944.77 For instance, the 
1945 published Haaien voor Nabatoe (Sharks near Nabatu), distributed and published by the agents of 
the leading clandestine organ the Bezige Bij (Busy Bee), reflected a rising anticolonial sentiment to both 
overseas Imperialism and the continental formulation of it, through its manifestations in the Ostplan. 
The fictional story follows Lazard, a lawyer for a Dutch tin mining company operating on the fictional 
island, Nabatu, situated in the Dutch East Indies. Lazard soon becomes disillusioned being in the 
privileged position of being a conscious agent of the operation and mission statement of the companies 
operating there. As Lazard’s narration entailed, that the Dutch operators “we the whites”, were 
“strangers in this land” guilty of “depleting the soil” and “carrying off ore worth millions of guilders and 
leave the population behind, poorer than ever before”.78 Undoubtedly such narratives echoed the rising 
sentiments towards Nazi extraction of Dutch domestic product. Moreover, it reflected a clear criticism 
in the role the Dutch had played in its past overseas colonial ventures, and was now, being revisited and 
envisioned in the project of the ‘New East’. Another popular clandestine attitude, towards how these 
newspaper narratives of Germanic imperialism was received, is reflected in the poem Duitsche 
Beschaving (German Civilisation). It challenged the Blut und Boden sentiment, mocking the apparent 
ancient claims of a Germanic consciousness, stating that “Today, he still screams and he barks about 
soil and blood and race, and hereby shows that in the past his forefather was a howler” stressing that 
when ‘Dutchness’ was conceived the “Kraut was still in the trees hanging on paws and tails”.79 
Clandestine literature, from the spring of 1942 onwards, offer us a further insight into the resilient 
opposition to the Imperial project through their responses to the developments of the Indonesia crisis. 
The paper Vrij Nederland, began questioning and arguing that an army of a million “free Indonesian” 
people empowered by greater reforms towards self-determination would have put up greater resilience 
in the defence of their homeland.80 One article by De Waarheid in 1941, drew direct parallels to the 
Dutch concentration camp system present in Indonesia with what was unfolding in the East.81 The 
visible segregation and eventual roundup of Jews, paired with the public speculation of these deportees 
going to camps, made up a collective Dutch rumour mill to which these unfolding practices could be 
likened to their colonial past.82 
The imminent and eventual loss of Indonesia ought to be considered as a focal shift in two distinct 
ways. Firstly, in the immediate rhetoric it provided surrounding the vision of a pan-Aryan colonised 
Eastern Europe found in the censored papers. Whilst, secondly, shaping the very clandestine resistance 
literature and attitude which set a wartime tone and attitude for a liberated Dutch postcolonial attitude. 




conditions worsened, forming an undisputable case for the evils of Imperialism and reform through the 
varying experiences the Dutch people had undergone as subalterns themselves. The Nazi administration 
with the press as its organ paired the worsening of Dutch domestic economic conditions with the 
Indonesian crisis to create a formula of propaganda. This narrative rooted in a historicism of a past 
collective experience was paired with the current emotions of resource scarcity and hunger to promote 
the project of Eastern Imperialism. 
In the end, the German and NSB efforts to convert a liberal Netherlands into Aryan colonisers was met 
(on the whole) with waves of disinterest, alienation and disgust. As the living conditions became worse 
at home the racialist dimensions of kinship were a self-defeating prophecy. What these experiences did 
instead was begin an irreversible process of internal questioning of centuries-long Dutch Imperialism. 
Colonialism, and its physical and metaphysical dimensions ‘came home’, turning the descendants of 
colonisers into the colonised. This phenomenon is easily overshadowed by the government’s military 
response to Indonesia’s War for Independence, in the immediate post-war setting. Nevertheless, within 
the social peripheries of Dutch war-life the orientalist fetishism and fantasy (of Empire) became an 
increasingly shameful and regretful reality amongst the populace. From experiences such as this a new 
and globally rising consciousness was set in motion within Europe, a theory so powerful that it would 
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This essay is a recollection of episodes from my professional life spanning over a decade and various 
academic contexts, country-, discipline- and seniority-wise. While it is a story by an emigrant, it is not 
a story of emigration; that one would have had to be a book. Likewise, while it is my story, it is not a 
story about me. It is a story of subtle, nearly invisible, structures in academia and the heavy day-to-day 
burden of fending off assumed, imposed and self-imposed inferiority complexes: in relation to the 
“centre” one arrives at, in relation to the “periphery” one (never really) leaves behind, and, specifically 
in my case, coming from Ukraine, in relation to this “periphery’s” very right to be seen as a separate 
unit, a periphery of its own. Being an autoethnography, this essay addresses the political through the 
personal and treats emotion as an inherent element of any human interaction – also in academia.67 
 
July 2007 
I have obtained my Bachelor in Law degree at the end of June. Although for lawyers in Ukraine a 
Bachelor’s degree qualifies as “incomplete higher education” and mandates another full year of study, 
the system does allow for an interruption at this stage. My study mate and friend Tanya and I begin 
strategizing our “year abroad”. It cannot be a “year off” in the sense western students have it for various 
reasons, starting with the absence of the freedom of movement, so it has to be a formal study to justify 
a long-stay visa. We are looking at Master programs. As regular Ukrainians in financial terms, and non-
EU citizens on top of that, we cannot afford to pay western/non-EU citizen tuition fees or even 
demonstrate sufficient subsistence funds, so it has to be on an all-inclusive scholarship. We are looking 
at countries and universities that grant those. Even though we both speak decent German and I speak 
some Polish, English is by far our best-spoken foreign language (and we’ve already taken all tests 
necessary to prove that). We are looking at study programs in English. You might think the UK is on 
 
6 A longer version of this essay has been published previously as Burlyuk, O. (2019). Fending off a triple inferiority 
complex in academia: an autoethnography, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 28-50 (open access). 





the top of our list, but no: we dismiss the UK altogether because its visa regime is different from the 
rest of Europe, and we do not wish to be “stuck in the UK” unable to travel anywhere else, do we?! We 
are looking at Schengen-zone countries only. Finally, we fear that the Nordic countries might be too 
dark, too cold and too expensive, so these are also scrapped off the list. All things considered, we opt 
for the Netherlands. During the summer, we apply to a number of Dutch universities. 
 
September 2007 
I win a prestigious MATRA/MTEC scholarship of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and arrive 
in Maastricht to do a Master of Arts in European Studies (and Tanya heads to Rotterdam to do an 
LLM). 
I land in what to me resembles Pleasantville (I have seen the movie just a few months earlier): seemingly 
perfect, too good to be true, in dire need of “colour”. Just like the two main characters of Pleasantville, 
I feel trapped in a TV-show. And yet I know it is for real. When someone refers to a “bad 
neighbourhood of Maastricht”, I laugh hysterically. 
I also find myself immersed in a community of students who are on average 3-4-5 years older than me 
(now 21) and are only about to start thinking of who they “wish to become when they grow up”. Yet, I 
am told, Maastricht University is among the most competitive study environments in the Netherlands: 
because of all the Germans studying there. Having arrived from Ukraine, where life is a daily struggle 
for most people, having studied in the most competitive faculty of the most competitive university in 
the country, having worked part-time on top of that in a Kyiv office of an American law firm to be able 
to afford anything at all, I do not find the environment competitive or the studies tough. From where I 
stand, it is rather a holiday from real life. The apparent discrepancy in default opportunities and an 
omnipresent sense of entitlement are very disturbing and confronting to me. 
I also lose my name. First time, when most (if not all) people mispronounce “Olga” (“l” and “g” are both 
soft, not hard) and simply don’t get (and also mispronounce) the informal diminutive “Olya”. Second 
time, when I learn that the university accounts me by my student number and not by my name. Third 
time, when I comprehend that my patronymic (the part of one’s name that takes after one’s father’s 
name, e.g. I am Olga Volodymyrivna Burlyuk because my father is Volodymyr) is not taken up in any 
of the administration of me abroad because it does not feature in the transliterated bits of my passport, 
only in the Cyrillic bits. All in all, I experience a major shock to the system. By December, I descend 
into what might be my first ever depression. I have trouble falling asleep and occasionally wake up with 
sore muscles even though I don’t do any exercising. I am homesick, too. My close friend that year is 
Anita, a fellow student from Romania. We are each other’s in-house therapist and have long chats 





I join on a student trip from Maastricht to Prague and Dresden. Somewhere on a German autobahn, it 
hits me that the general sentiment in the bus (packed mostly by Dutch and German students) is that 
we are going to “the wild east”. I experience cognitive dissonance: in Ukraine, a trip to Prague is 
definitely, most certainly a trip to the civilised west. “If Prague is the wild east, where does that leave 
Ukraine and what does that make of me?” I wonder.  
In Prague, we are brought to the Museum of Communism. “What a waste of time and opportunity!”, 
I lament. “I don’t need to be shown communist artefacts, most certainly not when I am in beautiful 
Prague!!!” But I presume it constitutes an important educational component of this study trip to the 
wild east, once communist. The museum displays “occupant” artefacts alongside their “dissident” 
counterparts: books, manifestos, posters, clothes, flags, banners – what not. The atmosphere is 
gruesome as well as entertaining. It is my first ever encounter with the official condemnation of 
communism. I try to imagine a museum like this in Ukraine, but I can’t. Ukraine at the time is 
ambivalent on what to make of its communist past (it still is today, although less so); condemnation is 
already among the options, but not yet mainstream. After the museum, the group continues on the 
outdoor part of the “communism tour”. I sneak out, together with Tanya and Oksana (a Ukrainian and 
a Russian girl), and go visit St. Vitus Cathedral instead.  
We continue to Dresden. As we tour the city, I am hit by a deep sense of having arrived… home. I 
know it is a foreign city I have never been to before, but it feels so familiar. As we walk around Dresden 
on our excursion, I feel euphoric and somehow lighter. I register the obvious resemblances with 
Ukrainian cities – socialist architecture along broad streets and boulevards (because they can be broad 
because they are new because the old have been destroyed during the war) – but I know that’s not it. I 
try, again and again, to pinpoint what gives me a strong sense of home, scanning every detail in the 
surroundings: people’s faces and their clothes, street, road and commercial signs, urban planning, 
construction materials used and what not. Eventually, I come to realize that it is… the grass! Not the 
all-same-colour-same-height-same-density (one may say flawless, I would say sterile) “lawn-grass” you 
find in the “west”, but the “wild grass”, with little flowers and weeds growing through it, you find in the 
“east”. I am amused by this observation: how sweet that a warm feeling of homecoming can arise from 
a simple, meek thing like grass!  
 
August 2009 
Now that I have been granted a PhD scholarship by the University of Kent at Brussels, I need to climb 
an even bigger mountain: Belgian long-stay visa. For this, I have to undergo a general medical 




in Kyiv to write – by hand – an essay on “What I plan to do in Belgium and what I will do in case things 
go sour” (the assignment is announced to me there and then). I am allowed three hours to write my 
essay. “This trumps even the Americans!”, I have a flashback in amazement: two years earlier, an officer 
at the American consulate asked our Jessup team to recite our case pleadings on the spot, right there at 
the visa application window, in order to prove that we were indeed going to the international rounds of 
an international law moot court competition. I am appalled at the visa application procedure. The lawyer 
in me wonders if it is legal (especially the part where my medical records are effectively passed on from 
one third party to another in a sealed envelope without me knowing what’s inside – maybe nothing at 
all?!..). I feel reduced to a human-like creature that poses a threat to a civilised, disease-free people. I 
am outraged and powerless at the same time – scared that I may be denied that visa, will arrive in 
Belgium late or not at all, will lose my scholarship and not be able to pursue a PhD; I do not feel in a 
position to challenge the system. 
I do get a visa, after one month of agony of uncertainty and a tight two hours before my flight to 
Brussels, which is just enough for me to rush to the airport and catch my plane (yes, I show up at the 
Consulate on the day of my flight with a fully-packed suitcase, in case that visa does come through). 
 
June 2010 
I discover a funding scheme by one of Soros foundations: a supplement scholarship for doctoral students 
with minimal main funding. It is open to a list of nationalities; Ukraine is one of them. As I prepare my 
application, I repeatedly ask myself whether I shall inform Bojan, a Serbian fellow-PhD student, of this 
opportunity or not (I know that Serbia is among the eligible countries). I realize that the odds of two 
applicants from one institution getting funded are slim to none, so it would be the two of us being 
weighed off against each other if we stand out in the crowd to begin with. And “us” is “our stories” – 
so, before I know it, I find myself measuring our personal stories against the criteria “sad” and 
“touching”. I conclude, rational that I am that his is a sadder one: the breakup of Yugoslavia was more 
dramatic than the breakup of the Soviet Union, and whatever deprivations I suffered in Ukraine in the 
1990s and struggles I had in the 2000s pale in comparison. It is obvious that if I want to increase my 
chances, I shall not bring Bojan into this. 
I don’t tell anyone about my dilemma, not even my husband: deep down, I am ashamed of even thinking 
along these lines, let alone the possibility of acting upon them. After a few days of inner torment, I 
decide to tell Bojan: for the sake of fair play among us “the underprivileged” and because I too think 
that, as the one with a sadder story, he deserves to get it. It is a win-win for me, I conclude after all: if 




funding opportunity and make it my business to keep him to submission deadlines (I know he is not 
good at keeping deadlines).  
He gets it. I don’t.  
 
November 2010 
I am in Ukraine to do fieldwork for my PhD, running the winter streets of Kyiv from one interview to 
another. I meet the director of one of the leading Ukrainian think-tanks, a (then) highly reputable 
senior (and elder) female policy analyst. I walk into her office and present myself as a Ukrainian 
researcher currently doing a PhD on the EU rule of law promotion in Ukraine at the University of Kent. 
She turns around and says, melodramatically: “All these scholarships! They tell us it is ‘for the good of 
Ukraine’, ‘for Ukraine’s development’, but that is simply nonsense. Where are you and where is 
Ukraine?! In my opinion, all these scholarships are a great waste!” She concludes her passage with an 
irritated sigh and a dismissive waving of her hand. I am caught totally off-guard by this remark and feel 
my body shrink. Shocked by her attitude and open resentment for what she thinks I might – and, 
ironically, I don’t! – represent, I stand silent for a moment. “It is not a nationality-based scholarship 
that I’ve got, you know. It is a university fund thing, and it is granted on the basis of merit through an 
open competition. And I am doing research on Ukraine, you see, so it is for Ukraine’s benefit, too”, I 
mumble quickly in my defence as I redeem my senses. I regret the defensive response I gave her that 
same instance (and I still do today). I stand (yes, I am still standing) disconcerted. I try to brush off the 
guilt feeling she has just shoved all over me and focus on what it is I came for: the interview.  
We proceed with the conversation as if nothing happened. 
 
September 2012 
I attend the 42nd annual conference of the Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies 
(UACES) in Passau, Germany. A senior German professor of international relations, an older man I 
have never met before, is a discussant on my panel. I attend welcome drinks on the opening night and 
– coincidentally – meet the professor. We chat, and he asks me to tell him a bit about my background. 
I tell him that I am from Ukraine, that I studied law at the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla 
Academy”, and that I went to do a Master in European Studies at Maastricht University after that. He 
interrupts me right there with a joyous exclamation, “I knew it! I knew it! You must have studied abroad! 
I saw from your name that you probably come from the east. But when I read your paper, so well-
written and well-structured, I knew immediately that you must have studied abroad!” He is all smiling. 




to read and write. The jovial look on his face tells me that he means it as a sincere compliment, so I 
quickly thank him for his appreciation of my paper. And yet I feel like I have just been compared to a 




I collect my PhD diploma at the graduation ceremony of the University of Kent in the majestic, 
grandiose Canterbury Cathedral. My husband films bits and pieces with his phone to turn into a video 
clip and show to my family later: there is no way any of them would have been granted a UK visa to 
attend the graduation in person (I barely got mine!), so there’s only us two here.  
 
October 2014 
The janitor comes to clean my office in Ghent University (I work there as a postdoctoral assistant since 
July). He notices a small Ukrainian flag hanging off my bookshelf and asks in his broken Dutch, 
pointing to the flag, “Are you from Ukraine?” – “Yes”, I reply in my broken Dutch. – “Oh, I am so sorry 
for what is going on in your country. I am from Kosovo. I can relate to your experience. I can feel your 
pain.” I am deeply touched by his words and become all emotional, smiling back politely and thanking 
him. As he walks out again, my eyes fill up with tears. Now that I hear these simple words of compassion 
from him, I realize that he is the first one in my workplace to utter them. 
 
February 2016 
My two good friends and colleagues from Ukraine, Natalka and Katya, and I decide to co-edit a special 
issue on civil society in Ukraine post-Euromaidan. It will be a side-project for all three of us: Natalka 
works full-time for an international organization; Katya works full-time for a Ukrainian think tank; and 
while I do work full-time at a university, civil society in Ukraine is not my primary research area. It will 
also be practically challenging, as we are based in three different cities and have no budget whatsoever 
for this. But we are so drawn by the idea and so committed to the “no one but us” slogan of the Maidan 
that we decide to do it. 
We have selected contributions through an open call for papers and are in one of our multi-sited Skype 
conferences discussing the potential outlet. We agree right away that we do not want a journal with 
“soviet”, “communist”, “Eurasia” or anything with a third world flavour to it in the title. As a result, we 




topic. We then agree that it would be best – indeed necessary – for our special issue to be published 
open access: that way, also scholars in Ukraine and other countries in the region (who have little to no 
access to international academic journals) can read it. We cross off a few more potential outlets of our 
list. We also want it to be published as soon as it is ready, not wait in a publication queue for years, so 
we drop a few more journals with long waiting times. I don’t remember which one of us proposed Kyiv-
Mohyla Law and Politics Journal first, but we all love the idea right away. We get all excited at the idea 
of investing in Ukrainian academia and promoting a new journal of our alma mater at the same time! 
We are well aware that publishing in this journal will not score us any “hard points” in western academic 
metrics, which disregard pretty much everything that is not an article in an impact-factor journal. But 
we don’t care: we have a bigger cause and longer-term goal in sight.  
We fear we may lose some of the authors because the journal does not rank; and we do. 
 
July 2017 
I go to China to teach a two-weeks course in the University Immersion Program at Sichuan University 
in Chengdu. This is my first trip “to the east of Moscow”, so I am very curious and excited. To prepare 
for what is coming, I have long talks with my colleagues who taught at this summer school in the past 
and attend a training session “Dealing with China” (or something along those lines) offered at Ghent 
University. I am ready. Bring it on! 
As I arrive in Chengdu and begin interacting with the Chinese hosts, it strikes me that – from their 
point of view – I have arrived from the west. To them, I am a “western professor”. “Now, this is 
something new!”, I think to myself. I am so used to being the one from the east that I feel slightly 
misplaced and uncomfortable in this new status. I don’t know what I was thinking before coming here, 
but I was not thinking of that.  
On the second day, I meet Bonnie, my assistant for the coming two weeks. This is the first time she is 
“assisting a foreign professor” (which, I sense from her intonation, is an honourable task). She is truly 
fantastic. Without Bonnie, I would have been totally and utterly socially paralyzed, so I am very glad to 
have her on stand-by. And yet, I cannot help feeling some emotional discomfort about the whole set-
up: how can I be having a Bonnie when I am a Bonnie?. I look at Bonnie and I see myself ten years 
prior: a student in Kyiv, grateful for every and any opportunity to speak English to a rare guest-from-
the-west (a native-speaker as a bonus), curious, eager and enthusiastic, proud to show off the good sides 
of my country and struggling to conceal, justify or at least explain the not-so-good ones. I see someone 
who feels lesser and inferior by default, regardless of whether she is treated as such, before she is treated 




I am black-listed, I discover months later, for having touched upon politically sensitive issues in my 
classes, although we have been explicitly advised against doing so in the welcome session. Officially, my 
“please don’t send her again” verdict was due to “poor student evaluations”, which, my students told me 
via email, they had never been asked to fill in. As I take my eyes off the computer screen and look 
through the window behind it, I bet you, I see the “invisible hand of the Communist Party”, which I 
could sense with my every cell every minute of my stay in China, show me a middle finger. 
 
November 2017 
I give a guest lecture on the conflict in Ukraine to a group of Master students at the Free University of 
Brussels. This is not my first lecture on the subject. Equipped with my previous experiences, I open the 
lecture with the following statement: “I am a young Ukrainian woman talking about root causes of the 
war in Ukraine. I know you will dismiss everything I say in the next two hours on accounts of age, 
nationality and gender. Who am I as a young person to talk about tectonic shifts in international 
relations? Who am I as a Ukrainian to know and say anything ‘objective’ and ‘authoritative’ about 
Ukraine? Who am I as a woman to talk about war?” This opening has a stunning effect on my audience.  
 
January 2018 
It is a late evening at our research group’s annual midweek research seminar. The day sessions are over, 
the dinner is finished, and I am chatting about this and that with two colleagues of mine. Out of 
nowhere, the conversation turns to the question of Ukrainian language, and one of them authoritatively 
says, “Ukrainian is to Russian what West Flemish is to Dutch”. I freeze for a moment with a glass of 
red wine centimeters away from my mouth (I was about to take a sip), dumbfounded by the sudden 
statement. I have been asked the question “Is Ukrainian different from Russian?” about a million times, 
in all possible and impossible settings, and I have learned to take that one with a poker face; but this is 
a new low. I consider asking her what makes her think so. I consider countering her answer with one 
of my standard responses formulated over the years. For example, that Ukrainian and Russian 
technically (if you consider vocabulary, phonology, morphology, syntax and other elements of grammar) 
have less in common than do Italian and French or Italian and Spanish. Or that Ukrainian and Russian 
have less in common with each other than they have with Polish (and that Ukrainian is actually closest 
to Belarusian). Or that, ironically, although Russian is the most widely known Slavic language, it is 
actually least Slavic of the Slavic languages due to strong historic influences of the Finno-Ugric and the 
Tatar-Mongolian peoples and languages (and later Western European ones, too). Or that Ukrainian 
has 12 official dialects (and many unofficial ones), and we all know from linguistics that dialects do not 




there are about twice as many people speaking Ukrainian today than there are people speaking Dutch 
(even combined with Flemish and West Flemish, yes). I have many more sets of arguments up my 
sleeve. No, Ukrainian is not to Russian what West Flemish is to Dutch. Ukrainian is to Russian what 
Dutch is to German. But I don’t wish to engage in this conversation. I have had it so many times. It is 
always the same, always predictable. I could not be bothered, not tonight. 
I un-freeze, take that sip of red wine, gaze away and say absolutely n-o-t-h-i-n-g. Ironically, we are in 




Together with Gergana, we are working on a project on unintended consequences of EU external 
action. We have assembled a great team of scholars to investigate unintended consequences of EU 
external policies in their respective areas of expertise and are now preparing for the author workshop 
and two panels at an international conference after that to discuss the results.  
Every time I tell someone about the project, I get to hear, “Oh, so you must be writing about the EU 
and the Euromaidan?!” I have to explain then that I am not, in fact: the theoretical/conceptual part, 
which Gergana and I are in charge of, concerns EU external action in general, not EU policy towards 
the European Neighbourhood or Ukraine in particular. At first, I link this common perception to my 
research profile, which, indeed, has a prominent Ukraine-component. As the question pops up again 
and again, however, I begin to wonder to what extent it reflects an assumption, seemingly held by so 
many fellow researchers, that I am somehow confined to the study of Ukraine, can and shall only 
generate country-specific knowledge, relevant (only) for those involved. I have always worked on 
Ukraine by choice, out of genuine curiosity and a strange sense of mission, and I was largely blind to 
the extent to which I was playing into a stereotype. It was not until I clearly stepped out of the box – 
also by choice, out of curiosity and a sense of mission (frustrated with the way we study EU engagement 
in third states, I decided to try and improve that at least a tad) – that I realized I was in one. 
I grow so conscious of this implicit assumption that each time I hear the question anew, I fire back, 
“Oh, it has nothing to do with Ukraine!” (in a friendly, not angry tone). 
 
April 2018 
I am accepted as a visiting scholar at the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. I learn the 
news late on a Friday night. I am very tired, so I don’t trust my own reading of the email and ask my 




that this is indeed a positive response. I am ecstatic. It is a dream come true. As we celebrate, my 
husband tells me that I spoke of going to Harvard at our first date 12 years ago. Apparently, I said, “I 
don’t know when and in what capacity but I am going to Harvard.” I have no recollection of saying this 
whatsoever, but I readily believe him I did.  
In the weeks that follow, I am careful not to look too happy around my colleagues at Ghent for fear 
they may think I am celebrating the going away part, which is not the case. I struggle to explain to them 
what Harvard’s symbolic value is to me. I consider saying it as it is: that the path to Harvard from where 
I come from, which is considered periphery by Ukrainians themselves, is much longer than from 
wherever it is that they come from (and I don’t mean this in geographic terms). But I don’t. Who am I 
to judge the length of their path? I only know the length of mine. 
 
June 2018 
The 2018 FIFA World Cup is hosted by Russia. Like many Ukrainians, I boycott the event in solidarity 
with the dozens of Ukrainians held as political prisoners in Russian jails and in condemnation of Russia’s 
conduct in Ukraine and pretty much everywhere else in the world. In contrast, my all-Belgian colleagues 
are following the World Cup closely: Belgium has qualified for the tournament (which is a rare thing!) 
and has a good chance of doing remarkably well (which is equally rare!). I find this an alienating 
situation for me, exhausting emotionally and intellectually. A part of me contemplates sending out an 
email shaming my colleagues and calling upon them to “come to senses” and boycott the event that 
gives Russia’s horrible regime international legitimization. We are a bunch of international relations 
and development scholars! Shouldn’t we be taking a stand on something like this?! Another part of me 
begs me to “come to senses”, calm down and accept the fact that my battle is not their battle and my 
pain is not their pain. “Who am I to poison their truly unique moment of Belgian national unity and 
pride?”, I challenge myself.  
Football is all our exceptionally euphoric group talks about during lunches and coffee breaks. I chew my 
food and sip my drink quietly, holding it up once again, so as not to spoil everyone’s fun. 
 
September 2018 
I am in a research seminar on critical ethnography at Ghent University. We are asked to formulate a 
dilemma related to our research and positioning. I formulate mine: “What am I: a Ukrainian scholar 
working in the west, or a western scholar coming from Ukraine, or a westernized Ukrainian scholar, or 




than done”, I say to myself as I nod back to the group. By the end of the seminar, I decide to write an 
autoethnography on this. 
A non-ethnographer that I am, I do not have a diary to turn to. And yet, once I sit down and create a 
Word document, once “the gates are lifted”, crystal-clear memories flood my mind, and I write, write, 
write. Somewhat to my own surprise, I remember episodes, dates, places, names, quotes like it all 
happened yesterday. Ideas of memories and episodes to include pop up in my mind one after another, 
also when I am busy with something mundane – so I regularly have to stop whatever it is I am doing 
and rush to my desk to note it down. The few people who know I am working on this warn me that it 
will be a painful and traumatic process; so, I observe myself attentively. I make a pact with myself: if it 
is too hurtful or makes me feel bitter, if I notice that I write in frustration, in anger, to spite – I 
immediately stop. But no, it is not painful, and I do not feel heavy, or empty, or bitter. Quite to the 
contrary: I feel lighter with every word I write. It is actually great fun, perhaps the most fun I have ever 
had writing (at least, professionally). What a load I have been carrying and what a timely idea to off-
load it!  
I finish the first draft of this article in less than two weeks, working on it on the margins of my regular 











The nature of such historical events as signing the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, organising the Berlin 
Conference in 1885 or concluding agreements between Great Britain and Russia at the end of the 19th 
century over Afghanistan seems pretty analogous. All of them assumed arbitrary division of remote 
lands between great powers seeking access to free natural resources and unlimited labour force. Today, 
the academic environment tends to be quite consistent when it comes to acknowledging the mission of 
“civilised” Europe to “uncivilised” Africa or Asia to be nothing else but imposition of own cultural norms 
and violent subjugation of indigenous populations that consequently led to their enslavement and 
exploitation. Everything seemed to be neatly inscribed into the ideology of imperialism. 
Some scholars would define the rivalry between tsarist Russia and Great Britain over the control of 
Central Asia as the “Great Game”. In order to avoid direct confrontation between these two powers a 
series of agreements and minor protocols were signed in 1873, 1885 and 1895 (Baumann, 1993). They 
assumed the territory of Afghanistan to serve as a buffer zone, recognising territories located to the 
north to become an exclusive sphere of Russian influence, analogically, the area of nowadays Pakistan 
and India to be conferred under British administration. This resembles a classical scenario of colonial 
diplomacy known in Europe for decades, not to say centuries. 
Nonetheless, there is a very interesting phenomenon to notice. The framing of the British conquest of 
Indian and Pakistani territories in terms of colonialism remains rather obvious in contemporary English 
historiography whereas there is a small revisionist minority of historians and politicians who would still 
endeavour to undermine these claims advocating the missionary purposes of the conquests. On the 
contrary, modern Russian historiography reacts quite allergically when someone inscribes tsarist 
conquest or Soviet control of Central Asia into the set of colonial practices. There are a lot of reasons 
contributing to the emergence of blurred or hybrid concepts of colonialism within Russian context. One 
of them is the Leninist ideological redefinition of imperialist colonialism that was unequivocally 
condemned and rejected from the Soviet political agenda. Additionally, western historiography became 
even more ambiguous during the post-1945 period when Moscow’s policy towards other Soviet 
republics, socialist satellites and allied regimes was indicated for utilising imperialist and colonial 




As a result, we can observe a plethora of contradicting interpretations of the Soviet presence in Central 
Asia today. It has direct repercussions on defining intergovernmental relations between Moscow and 
Central Asian republics evincing with ambiguous Russian claim to treat the region in terms of exclusive 
sphere of its socio-political and economic influences. In the following paragraphs, I will try to shed 
some light on the shape and extents of the hybrid interpretation of Russian/Soviet colonialism towards 
Central Asia by referring to the aspects serving as subsequent sections of the paper. These include: 
Russian perception of geopolitical space, contextualisation of tsarist conquests, nature of Soviet 
administration and contemporary challenges. 
 
Russian perception of geopolitical space 
In this part, I would like to mention two very significant aspects of the specificity of the Russian 
perception of geopolitical space since they might explain a unique understanding of colonialism that 
deviates from interpretations offered by western models. The first concept refers to the words of a tsarist 
historian, Sergey Solovyov, who claimed that Russia is a “country that colonises itself” (Morozov, 2015). 
A sort of inspiration for making this unprecedented statement can be found in Prussian policies towards 
its eastern territories populated by Slavs and Balts. To put it shortly, Germans needed a stable frontier 
separating them from Russia that was to be established by a massive purchase of land from indigenous 
peasants, cultural Germanisation and imposed resettlements (Koehl, 1953). It was defined in terms of 
an “internal colonisation” and differed slightly from the Solovyov’s reflexive interpretation of Russian 
colonialism but can give a general idea of a process that does not have to be necessarily directed at 
overseas areas. 
Moving forward, the reflexivity of Russian colonialism refers to the obliteration of classical 
categorisation into subject and object of colonial process defined in terms of the centre colonising its 
outskirts. According to Solovyov, Russia was defined by its extensive territory whose stability stemmed 
not only from peaceful borderlands but also the core that had to be constantly resettled and recolonised. 
By applying these ideas to the ancient history of Russia, he claimed that the first state structures lacked 
a centralised decision-making place and were marked by relentless dichotomies between Kiev and 
Novgorod or Moscow and Petersburg (Etkind, 2015). 
Another historian, Afanasy Shchapov, continued Solovyov’s discourse on Russian self-colonialism by 
adding that the main determinants of the directions of territorial expansion were defined by physical 
geography and ecology. Precisely speaking, the hunt for such essential survival products as fish and fur 
as well as the exploration of potentially arable land that entailed a rising phenomenon of deforestation 
were key elements that guided Russian settlers. Quite importantly for the whole analysis, Shchapov 




Vasily Klyuchevsky, a significant figure representing subsequent generation of late 19th century tsarist 
historians, attempted to readjust Solovyov’s and Shchapov’s interpretation of the Russian self-
colonialism to the context of his era marked by the conquest of steppe and mountainous areas in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. By referring to decentralisation and ecological preconditions, Klyuchevsky 
argued that Russian expansionism was defined by the shapelessness of space and a consequent tendency 
to semi-settledness (Klyuchevsky, 1956). 
How do all of these concepts relate to the topic of Central Asia? First of all, the reflexive nature of 
territorial development of the Russian state embraces the Central Asian steppe as a logically subsequent 
piece of land to be incorporated and settled for the sake of establishing a peaceful and stable borderland 
area that potentially offered new natural resources. Empirically speaking, the establishment of the line 
of strongholds between Orenburg and Omsk that enabled the gradual colonisation of modern northern 
Kazakhstan in the 18th century was as natural as the subjugation of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand 
Khanates in the 19th century. 
Secondly, since these conquests are perceived as a common evolution of the Russian state they are 
uncritically approved by contemporary Russian historiography. The source of further discrepancies with 
British or French schools of post-colonialism is entailed with later Leninist interpretation of subjugation 
of Central Asia which completely jettisoned the idea of self-colonialism, identifying anything colonial 
with the imperialist and capitalist west. Hence, this is the reason today’s Russian historians avoid 
inscribing conquest of Central Asia into colonialism at any cost. 
Another conceptual ambiguity around colonialism in Central Asia is entailed with the idea of 
Eurasianism. Geographically speaking, the definition of Eurasia is quite simple, defined in terms of a 
physical unity of both European and Asian continents. More significant for this work is the socio-
political explanation, firstly formulated within Russian émigré communities after the October 
Revolution by such intellectuals as Nikolai Trubetzkoy and preached until today by many nationalist 
circles including Aleksandr Dugin’s. In simple words, Eurasianism assumes the existence of a separate 
socio-political sphere serving as a counterbalance towards both Western European civilisation as well 
as Eastern Asia (understood asChina or Japan). In terms of territory, it usually refers to the post-Soviet 
space; however, its borders are rather malleable and might include other countries (Bassin, 2003). 
The definition of a Eurasian geopolitical space as a united and single sphere of common cultural norms 
and values gives many implications to the relations between Russia and Central Asia. Firstly, by 
referring to the abovementioned shapelessness and semi-settledness it assumes a shared cultural 
community constituted by Russian and Central Asian nomadic nations. Secondly, the continental 
nature of the Eurasian space stands in opposition to the island mentality embodied by the Atlantic 
western sphere, as well as the East Asian sphere, concentrated around the Pacific Ocean. Thirdly, ethnic 




Orthodoxy and the union of Slavic, Turkic and Finnic tribes. In short, discourses on classically 
conceptualised colonialism fails to really fit into the context of Eurasia as the whole space is defined as 
single and united. 
 
Tsarist conquests of Central Asia 
There are a lot of unanswered questions and dilemmas regarding Russian conquest of Central Asia. 
Was the “Great Game” an actual rivalry between contrary Russo-British interests where both powers 
struggled to take control over Central Asia and India? Were the escapades of military and intelligence 
emissaries crossing the unassailable peaks of the Pamir Mountains dictated by the desire of colonising 
large swaths of desolate steppe and inarable highlands? 
The Leninist interpretation of the Russian conquests of Central Asia in the second half of the 19th 
century offers a quite simple and logical account that falls into capitalist and imperialist explanation. 
Economic crisis induced by the so-called cotton hunger caused by the American Civil War exerted a 
huge pressure on Moscow’s manufacturers to find a new source of cheap raw materials and the market 
to sell their products. With such interpretations, Soviet historiography explained the reasons for the 
conquest of Tashkent in 1865 that paved the way to subjugating fertile soils in the surrounding area 
and taking control over vast cotton plants along the Syr-Darya river. If so, what was the reason for 
conquering the Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand in subsequent years whose economic benefit 
of being subordinated to Moscow was highly disproportionate to the expenditures spent on demanding 
military operations? 
Bearing in mind the assumption that one of the greatest demonstrations of power in the end of the 19th 
century was the amount of controlled territory, the struggle for the status of becoming the largest global 
empire between Russia and Great Britain seems to be a more persuasive argument to claim why both 
countries devoted so many resources to control economically useless provinces. Were the Russian 
conquests of Central Asia then actual colonialist practices? Academic literature on this topic remains 
quite polarised and fluctuates between two extremes, the first offering the missionary framing of Russian 
as newcomers bringing civilisation, development and stability, the second advocating for a heroic 
combat of indigenous communities who struggled to preserve their own cultural autonomy. 
As suggested in the article published by Alexander Morrison, the story of establishment of the so-called 
tsarist Turkestan on the provinces of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand is made up from a set of ideologically 
and pragmatically inconsistent microhistories (Morrison, 2014). One the one hand, before the ultimate 
military conquest, some of these areas had already become economically dependent on Russian 
merchantry, which was brought about by internal insurgencies and crises. Therefore, some of the local 




stability and economic development and thus supported the tsarist army during the invasions. On the 
other hand, one cannot forget about the many attempts of resistance that led to bloody massacres as the 
one in Gök Tepe in 1881 when thousands of Turkmen soldiers and civilians were killed by the tsarist 
army (Derekov, 2015). 
 
Central Asia under Soviet administration 
The first years of Soviet administration in Central Asia seemed to put an end to tsarist imperial policies. 
Conceptually speaking, Leninism, at least in theory, attempted to offer a structure of an equal and 
cohesive multicultural society. In opposition to western capitalist powers, the Soviet system sought to 
showcase an alternative reality where living under the same governmental roof did not necessarily lead 
to ethnic segregation and exploitation of peripheries by the core. 
This was to be achieved by a twofold mechanism. In terms of ideology, Moscow promoted proletarian 
internationalism where the interest of the working class would prevail over racism and nationalism. This 
was mainly aimed at eliminating potential hostile sentiment stemming from Islamic and Turkic 
populations towards the Russians, still remembering violent tsarist conquests of sovereign Khanates. In 
terms of administration, Soviets promoted revitalisation and modernisation of national identities 
claiming reconstruction of culturally “backwards” communities whose “backwardness” was a result of 
tsarist imperialism. Hence, a federalist state model had been introduced where every socialist Soviet and 
autonomous republic was represented in the central government. Moreover, popularisation of national 
awareness was to be implemented by promotion of local languages, massive construction of educational 
systems or eradication of illiteracy. 
The results of these policies were rather far from idealised strategies aimed at eliminating discriminative 
and exploitative colonialism (Myer, 2003). There is a plethora of various socio-political empirical 
instances to portray this. Firstly, instances of ethnic mixing such a as mixed marriages were extremely 
rare, whereas communities of local populations and newcomers seemed to function as parallel social 
realities. Secondly, these divisions were demonstrated in many Central Asian urban spaces as European 
newcomers in such cities as Tashkent usually settled in modernist quarters whereas Turkic communities 
remained in their traditional mahallas. Thirdly, there was a very visible phenomenon of ethnic 
stratification of labour where Russians controlled the majority of administrative positions leaving the 
hardest physical jobs to the locals. This tendency was only strengthened during the Second World War 
when a plethora of factories along with their workforce were moved from the western borderlands 
occupied by Nazi Germany to Central Asia, which only deepened the sense of alienation. Fourthly, 
massive collectivisation of agriculture was very often opposed by the indigenous nomad tribes which 




Asia was made up of a majority of Russian soldiers. The sense of occupation was only increased when 
the Kazakh steppe was chosen as the main localisation of nuclear testing which led to a disastrous 
contamination of the natural environment and irradiation of many local communities. Sixthly, 
administrative disintegration of Turkestan into Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Turkmen republics 
together with promotion of distinctive cultures and languages was aimed at weakening the potential 
movement of pan-Turkism perceived as a threat to Soviet territorial integrity, and thus Moscow’s 
internal security. Seventhly, ideological eradication of religion from the Soviet political agenda 
materialised in the elimination of many vernacular cultural traditions being deeply ingrained in local 
Islam. Therefore, persecuting confessions of faith led to implicit imposition of Russian and western 
normative structure. Eighthly, Central Asian societies also experienced cultural Russification since 
Soviet arts and popular culture including cinematography or theatre, were produced and transmitted 
from Russian cultural centres. Finally, Central Asia was also a subject of linguistic Russification in 
manifold terms. This included not only the implementation of the compulsory teaching of Russian 
which became the exclusive lingua franca in administrative, military or cultural matters but also the 
introduction of Russian vocabulary in local Turkic languages affected by comprehensive standardisation 
practices. 
The combination of above mentioned empirical political, economic and cultural arguments clearly 
demonstrates that Moscow implicitly used internal Russian hegemony veiled under Soviet state 
structure and communist ideology to conduct a multifaceted colonisation of Central Asia. Some would 
argue against claiming that ethnic separation was a norm for multicultural societies or that colonialism 
practiced in British or French terms was much more invasive and violent. Therefore, it is presumably 
the most accurate to define Soviet practices of colonisation in Central Asia as a hybrid mechanism 
conducted tacitly, in some parts probably inadvertently. 
 
Contemporary challenges of Post-Colonial Post-Soviet Central Asia 
As I have already mentioned in the text, modern Russian historiography decided to uphold the Leninist 
stance that rejected the assumption of Central Asia being colonised. By accusing the western powers of 
utilising neo-colonial practices in their frameworks of foreign policy directed at African and Asian 
countries, Moscow attempts to delegitimise projects like the EU’s neighbourhood policies, military 
interventions and state-building strategies. At the same time, acknowledging that Soviet or Russian 
control of Central Asia falls into the category of classical colonialism would strongly delegitimise 
Moscow’s geopolitical projects, especially the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) or the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Many scholars mention these organisations in terms of 
cumbersome imitation of western institutions like the EU or NATO, undermining the alleged 




these arguments are saturated with a post-Cold War bias suggesting establishment of EAEU or CSTO 
to prolong the post-colonial post-Soviet control of Central Asia or Russian immediate neighbourhood 
since the original idea of restoring the Eurasian unified order was firstly formulated by Nursultan 
Nazarbayev in 1994 (Tarr, 2016). Nevertheless, it is true that Russia remains the key decisive power, 
reaping a majority of the benefits, while other members are left without viable alternatives. 
Analogically to the instrumentalisation of the myth of the “Great Game” in the 19th century, some 
theorists tend to ascribe the sense of rivalry over post-colonial Central Asia to be recolonised by aspiring 
China and the west, to some extent also potentially Turkey and Iran, in the wake of Russian faltering 
influence. Whereas it is true that Central Asia became recently the subject of increased economic and 
political interest from the side of various foreign powers, it would be, at least for the time being, an 
exaggeration to claim that such powers compete with each other to dominate the region. First of all, 
Chinese economic investments are quite complementary with Russia preserving its security interests 
(Melnykovska, Plamper & Schweickert, 2012). Secondly, Central Asia does not seem to be a priority 
in foreign policy agendas of the EU or US whereas Turkish and Iranian economic capacities are too 
weak to challenge Russian or Chinese position in the area. 
 
Conclusion 
In this work, I tried to evaluate the applicability of tsarist conquest and Soviet control of Central Asia 
to the colonial narratives. Whereas many historical events can serve as accurate arguments to claim that 
Central Asia was colonised by tsarist Russia and Soviet Union, the picture is more complex in 
comparative perspective as it does not correspond to the classical examples of British or French 
colonisation of Africa and Asia. There is a probability that in case other powers would show more 
interest in restraining or challenging Russian political and economic role in Central Asia in the future, 
the post-colonial narrative of Moscow exploiting the region with the use of institutional instruments of 
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I was once leaving my Saint Petersburg apartment and, as often, shut the door behind me without 
double-closing it. We were living on the third floor of an old house facing the Griboyedov canal, in a 
very quiet neighbourhood by the Admiralty Shipyards. As I crossed the Rimsky-Korsakov Prospect to 
get to the bus stop, I noticed someone had texted our housemates group chat. One of my roommates 
had written “Guys, lock the door behind you when you leave. You’re not in Europe anymore.”  
 
Doors and windows 
In the years 2014 and 2015, I lived and studied in Russia, before moving (shortly) to Ukraine. It was 
the first time I had set foot in Russia, and discovered the country for myself. I walked into it trying my 
best to keep my apprehensions at bay – as it felt both like an unknown place and unspecifically familiar. 
Many families have strange legends about their origins, and my mother’s was just “we came from the 
East”. I thus went to Russia feeling almost as if I was reconnecting with some nebulous familial past.  
For most of the time I spent in Russia, I was a student at the Saint Petersburg State University’s School 
of International Relations. My campus was situated within the exuberant Smolny Convent. Like some 
other universities in Russia’s main cities, it was a rare island of relative intellectual freedom within the 
country’s public discourse, though located not that far away from the European University at Saint 
Petersburg. The latter has been regularly submitted to pressure by government officials and was even 
forced to close down for a short time in 2008.1 
In Smolny, it was interesting hearing Russian academics tackling international relations from their 
perspective – and articulating their relationship to Europe. “Here in Saint Petersburg, we say that Peter 
the Great opened a window on Europe, but just a window, not a door!” said one of my professors. “The 
Tatar Yoke made Russia lag behind Europe for 200 “years,” said another. Another one of them asked 
us to resolve the disputes between Slavophiles and Westernists, in a paper on the topic of “is Russia a 
European or Eurasian country?”, essentially asking us to settle a 300-year-old controversy in 300 words 




The question of Russia’s identity was presented as both tragic and too large to be comprehended fully 
by the rational mind. And Russia’s relation to Europe was framed from a position of paradoxical 
subalternity. What was once the world’s largest European empire had also been long considered a 
backwater periphery by its Western counterparts. The racist caricature of the Russians as an Eastern 
horde had been in parts internalised, but also reclaimed and reappropriated.  
My response to the assignment was a practical one, inspired by a concept I had gathered from one of 
my sociology courses: Russia had a salient identity. Just like people have a registry of identities they 
switch between, like masks, according to the situation, Russia too was both European and Eurasian 
according to its interests and the wider context.  
Starting with Peter, the Russian Empire had historically shown itself keen to contend with other 
European powers and thus presented himself as an equal to them. This inclination then somehow 
shifted under reactionary emperor Alexander III. The Soviet era had been a complex one with Russia 
adopting both stances alternatively. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had to reinvent itself 
once again. The crumbling of the Soviet Empire was pinned on its overextension in supporting the 
Third World, which was now seen with enmity. Russia turned to the West and to the Transatlantic 
international structures, hoping to “rejoin” Europe. Following the ultimate failure of Boris Yeltsin's 
presidency and the crises in the Balkans among others... Russia broke away again. Under the Putin era, 
Eurasianism, an ideology championed by some more reactionary Slavophiles, would make a comeback, 
and be consecrated by the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (formally) in January 2015.  
This crude overview is easily refined by resorting to some of the concepts scholars from the Russian 
Federation use themselves to frame that reality - the most apt being Madina Tlostanova’s Janus-faced 
Empire.2 Like the two-faced Roman deity of war and peace, Russia has two faces: the one it shows the 
West and the one it shows the East. To the West it showed a mask sculpted by its inferiority complex 
and the unflattering portrait imposed upon a peripheric Russia through the Eurocentric hegemony of 
its European counterparts. To the East, confronting the conquered peoples of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, further in the Orient, Russia could wear the mask of a European power, bringing with it 
Europeanness and modernity. Indeed, to the Kazakh or the Chinese what were the Russians if not 
Europeans?  
Europeanness was thus viewed alternatively as a colonising force coming from the West to reshape 
Russia in the likeness of Western Europe at the price of its soul, and as a civilising force to be wielded 
against the colonised people of the Empire – and later the Soviet Union. In both cases, Europeanness 







This almost tragic relation to Europeanness, was profoundly contrasted with what I saw in Central 
Europe. I never really did use the term “Central Europe” before living there. To a Westerner like me, 
who only properly discovered the region on the eve of the 2004 Enlargement, Central Europe meant 
the Rhineland, and anything east of Berlin was Eastern Europe. 
From what I had gathered, the term, though way older and prominently used in reference to the 
Hapsburg Empire, had been reignited and reclaimed in the anti-Soviet movements of the 1980s – 
especially in Milan Kundera’s 1984 essay, The Tragedy of Central Europe. It reaffirmed the profound 
Europeanness of Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary, and framed Soviet occupation as an unwilling 
divorce from their true place of belonging.3 
When the People’s Democracies came to an end in 1989 and Central European countries made their 
decisions to join the Euro-Atlantic international structures clear, the consensus was that they had found 
their way back to Europe. It was as their history had been put on hold for 45 years and they were finally 
getting welcomed back into the European fold. While, to Russians, Europeanness was a colonising 
force alienating them from their identity, to the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks and Balts... 
Europeanness was a force for emancipation from the Soviet yoke, an almost decolonising tool that allow 
them to recover their true identity an renew with their national sovereignty. This impulsion crystallised 
chiefly with the formation of the Visegrád Group in 1991, which furthered their integration to the 
European Union and still acts as a potent advocacy group within the European institutions. 
The idea of Central Europe was not only pertinent from a geographical perspective (who would still 
lump Russia and Poland within a same nebulous “Eastern Europe” anymore?) it also reveals a distinct 
way of being European. It is a reclamation, a rejection of being considered a periphery. After all, 
anything can feel like the centre depending on where you are standing. Poland has as much a claim to 
being the centre of the continent as Germany does. 
It also purports that Europe’s true north is not to its West. It can be on a playful note, such as Vilnius’ 
local tourism board’s decision to market the city as “the G-spot of Europe” since 2018.4 It can also turn 
into a claim to be Europe’s true civilisational centre. The illiberal turn taken by Fidesz’ Hungary or PiS’ 
Poland has seen those forces and their allies champion a rather traditionalist interpretation of what it 
means to be European. Liberal commentators in the West sometimes pin this resurgent nationalism on 
atavisms and essentialisms, rather than try to understand it in the particular environment of Central 
Europe – an ecosystem at times scarce in alternatives. In post-socialist countries where leftist traditions 
are often viewed with distrust, reactionaries have more room to manoeuvre around liberals, whose 




Inversely, reactionaries do understand the importance of regulating the ecosystem that allowed them to 
prosper. In recent years, liberal institutions in Central Europe have been hindered by the powers that 
be – the most famous example of that trend being the case of the Central European University. The 
institution, founded in 1991 in Budapest by Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros as part of 
his efforts to diffuse liberal ideas in the ex-Eastern Bloc, was relocated to Vienna in 2019, following 
new regulations introduced by the Hungarian government in 2017. Interestingly enough, a brand-new 
private university is set to open in 2021 in Warsaw, the Collegium Intermarium. Taking its name from 
an old geopolitical project championed by Polish nationalists, the institution will be aiming at providing 
elite learning to the future reactionary elite of Central Europe. The institution appears to be an 
endeavour of Ordo Iuris, a fundamentalist Catholic NGO, hard at work in Poland and lending its 
weight to numerous conservative bills, particularly on the issue of abortion.5 Ordo Iuris might also 
appear to have played a role in the establishment of Poland’s infamous “LGBT-free zones”. It is also 
noteworthy that the Polish capital is already home to two liberal private universities of reputation, the 
new Varsovian institution intends to compete with: the Collegium Civitas and the College of Europe. 
This venture echoes like a miniature of the wider project of developing and solidifying an alternative 
hegemony to Western European liberalism in Central Europe. Ironically, this project is true to both 
Kundera’s vision of a recentred Central Europe free from a simple East-West dichotomy, and somewhat 
in tune with 21st-century Russian nationalism, which also espouses and champions traditionalist values 
in contrast to the liberal West. 
 
Neu-Berlins and Borderlands  
The idea of Europeanness is a contested one, but rarely is it as contested as it is within those countries 
that are, in popular imagination, stuck between “Europe’s” neighbourhoods and Russia’s Near Abroad. 
The European identity of societies from the Bug River to the Caucasus has become fodder for culture 
wars not unlike those found in the West. 
Like to Russia, Europeanness is to those countries a salient identity. In Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova, 
Europeanness has been mobilised by the ruling classes as a way to counterweight Russia’s influence, 
whose encroachment within the region’s many “grey zones” (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
Donbas...) has been of concern. Others, like in Armenia, Azerbaijan or Belarus, have been walking a 
fine line between two informal blocs visibly at odds. During my first visit to Kyiv on the anniversary of 
the Maidan Revolution, I was in awe at the number of EU flags floating in the centre of the Ukrainian 
capital. The Ministry of Foreign affairs itself was adorned with huge European banners. The apparently 




was promptly resolved when Little Green Men, operatives acting on the behest of the Russian executive, 
spearheaded the invasion of Crimea and the Donbas. 
But one would miss the forest for the trees by only looking at it at the foreign policy level. Within 
Eastern European societies, Europeanness has been appropriated by traditionally liberal groups and 
activists, associated with progressiveness, and opposed to anything tied to Russia. The “Europe” that is 
mobilised is a nebulous and essentialised idea to be opposed to backwardness or Russian influence.6 Or, 
as one Azerbaijani activist once told me: “By Europe, we do not mean a concrete country like Germany 
or the Netherlands, but rather a symbol, a set of good ideas.” 
Several cities across Eastern Europe have been undergoing makeovers in recent years, to better inhabit 
what they perceive is European urbanity – embracing the idea of pedestrian zones and swelling with 
hipster cafés. The change might be warranted, as Soviet cities were organised differently for a different 
purpose. I have seen both Tbilisi and Kyiv being called “the New-Berlin" (a shorthand for cool cities) 
for their bustling contemporary culture and art scenes or their busy electronic music venues. But again, 
so have been Belgrade, Warsaw, Budapest and half the Baltic capitals.7 Oddly, this display of urban 
Europeanness marking a secession from Russia’s hegemonic model has not spared Moscow itself. The 
Russian capital has been subject to some extensive urban transformation projects in the late 2010s, 
especially prior to the 2018 World Cup. Those peaked in 2016, on the night of February 8 to 9, during 
what was dubbed “The Night of the Long Shovels” when dozens of kiosks and makeshifts shops were 
destroyed. Said kiosks had appeared in the crisis-stricken 1990s, in space left empty by Soviet planners, 
around metro stations or large avenues, and were usually installed without a permit. When I returned 
to Moscow before the pandemic, after leaving it years prior, I felt like walking into a different city. 
Culture wars around Europeanness have solidified around several issues, but none so virulently as 
anything related to LGBTQI+ matters. Often, in the absence of more substantial material reforms, the 
organisation of a successful Pride marches has been held as a powerful signal of progress. For example, 
the Tbilisi Pride week organised in the Georgian capital, has been touted as a clear sign of the Caucasian 
country’s stern European path. The three attempted Tbilisi Pride marches have however been outright 
attacked by Orthodox, far-right activists and clergy in 2013, 2019 and 2021. The clashes have been 
largely portrayed as a confrontation between pro-European liberals and pro-Russian reactionaries. 
Despite some frequent Russian sympathies however, many of said reactionaries were Georgian 
nationalists before anything else, and usually opposed to Russia, a former colonial overlord that occupies 
a fifth of Georgia’s territory. Georgian ultraconservatives often rather take their inspirations from far-
right and Christian nationalist Western movements like the Italian Lega or the German Alternative für 
Deutschland.8 They have also, however, fully co-opted the concept of Gayropa, a derogative term 
pioneered by Russian conservatives to deride Western Europe’s perceived queer-friendly attitudes, that 




The ambiguity of Europeanness in the Caucasus, and the way it finds its place into identity binaries is 
not new. The cliché but classic novel Ali and Nino9, telling the epic love story between a young Azeri 
aristocrat and a Russianised Georgian princess against the background of the Great War and a 
crumbling of the Russian Empire, is an early illustration of how easily identities can crystallise in 
borderlands. Neither settling well in Tbilisi, a city that is too essentially European and progressive for 
Ali, nor in Persia, a land that is too conservative for the modern women that is Nino, the couple find 
their way back to their home city of Baku – the perfect balance between West and East, Europe and 
Asia. Seen from the banks of the Caspian Sea, the relative “periphery” that is Georgia seemed like 
Western Europe, while Baku was at the centre of a new spectrum.  
It is worth pointing that the novel ends with the fall of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, one of 
the republics that emerged from the disintegration of the Tsarist Empire. It was a progressive, western-
oriented state, and also the first in the Muslim world to grant women the right to vote in 1918. Like its 
neighbour the (Menshevik) Democratic Republic of Georgia, it is often touted as a first experiment in 
state sovereignty and ideal to strive towards, as well as a proof of today’s Azerbaijan or Georgia’s valid 
claims to modernity, and sometimes to Europeanness - though their current politics have very little in 
common with early-20th century social-democracy. 
 
Europa across the waves 
In the euro-optimist years of the late 1990s and early 2000s, I was taught that Europe got its name from 
the Phoenician princess of the eponymous Greek myth. I was also told the story of Europa taken away 
from Tyre to Crete, across the waves, by a bull-shaped Zeus, denoted Europe’s ties to the East. 
Depending on who told the story, it could have been a rather Eurocentric way of appropriating the 
legacy of Levantine civilisations and make Europe their true successor (rather than their actual 
descendants), or inversely, highlighting Europe’s voyaging and multifocal nature, its history of diversity 
and migrations. 
The ambivalent symbol of Europa on the bull has been adorning European institutions’ buildings for 
years. And the Council of Europe has been using it since at least the 1950s. The likeness of the 
Levantine princess can also be found on the current Europa series of euro banknotes. A modern abstract 
fountain sculpture by Belgian sculptor Olivier Strebelle named the Abduction of Europa also stands in 
the middle of the Square of Europe in Moscow, between Kievsky station and the Moskva. And despite 
Russia’s complicated relationship to Europeanness, it doesn’t feel out of place. After all, one of the most 
beautiful pieces of art inspired by the myth is Russian artist Valentin Serov’s 1910 painting The 




Europeanness too is an ambivalent concept. It is a contentious term both between states and within 
them. It is a floating signifier, around which often crystallise the many contradictions of the continent. 
It's been both decried as a colonising force and wielded as one by Russia, as well as held by some as a 
vehicle for self-determination in ex-Soviet satellites and former Tsarist imperial peripheries. In what it 
says and what it doesn’t, it reveals the in-betweens and the fault lines of European identity. It also shows 
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Part III. A Dialogue of the Second and 
Third Worlds 
 
In the Summer of 1935, a young and penniless Aimé Césaire, missing his homeland – the French island 
of Martinique, was feeling homesick. One of his friends, a Croatian student named Petar Guberina, 
offered the future founder of the négritude to take him with him to Yougoslavia for the holidays. 
Initially feeling like a fish out of water, Césaire was welcome by Guberina’s entire family and taken on 
a tour of the Dalmatian coast, whose beauty astonished him and reminded him of the Caribbeans. As 
he started to feel at home, he pointed to a particularly beautiful island and asked his friend its name. 
“Martiniska” answered Petar. Both Césaire’s home and the Dalmatian island got their name from Saint-
Martin. He joked “I haven’t had enough money to be able to set foot in Martinique in five years, but 
now I have come back to Martiniska in Yugoslavia!” The Martinican writer would then start writing 
his masterwork Cahier d’un retour au pays natal (Notebook of a Return to My Native Land). 
In this last part, we set out to confront both the “Western” and “Eastern” decolonial traditions, have 
them dialogue and come to a head – find out where their differences lie. Is it reductive to consider 
decolonialism in the East an academic venture, compared to a more grassroots trend in movements 
linked to the Global South? 
We also explore the rich and complex history of Socialist and Third World cooperation in the fight 
against imperialism, as this dialogue is far from new. Is this common history ground for coalition and 
mutual understanding? After all, British industrial capitalism, wasn’t only fuelled by the cotton 
harvested with African slave labour on stolen Native American land and the riches of the Indian 







3.1 The Non-Aligned Movement, the Soviet Union and 





The Cold War period saw the African continent liberating itself from the shackles of colonialism and 
taking matters into its own hands. Decolonisation was a crucial factor that ensured the emergence of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an ambitious political group encompassing Third World 
countries in search of an alternative to the bipolar international system springing up after World War 
Two. Many of its aims, especially those related to colonialism, were shared by one of the two 
superpowers, i.e. the Soviet Union which was at the time a key actor in providing assistance to newly-
independent African states. Indeed, some members of the NAM had close ties with the USSR and its 
allies. This behaviour arguably undermined the principle of non-alignment. In this chapter, the ways in 
which both the NAM and the Soviet Union contributed to the process of decolonisation during the 
Cold War will be compared and contrasted. It will start with an overview of how decolonisation and 
certain independent African countries, notably Egypt, played a part in the emergence of the Non-
Aligned Movement. This will be followed by a section on the USSR’s ideological standpoint on 
colonialism and the concept of non-alignment, before proceeding onto an examination of how the two 
entities in question dealt with decolonisation. The chapter will conclude with a case study of Namibia 
that will be used to establish how the aims and behaviours of the NAM and the Soviet Union 
overlapped.  
 
How decolonisation fostered the Non-Aligned Movement 
By the time the Second World War ended in 1945 most of Africa remained under European colonial 
rule. However, the tide was already turning against colonialism due to three reasons. Firstly, the major 
imperial powers, like Belgium, Britain, France and Italy, were not so strong anymore.1 These countries 
were socially and economically exhausted by armed conflicts and their citizens had started to question 
their importance on the world stage.2 Secondly, the rising super-powers, the United States and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), who had never occupied any land in Africa, were 




had fought for independence from Britain. Colonialism also entailed less freedom and free trade which 
Americans value. At the same time, numerous white Americans did not think that non-whites could 
govern themselves if they were not aided by those of European origin. As the Cold War unfolded, 
Washington became concerned that postcolonial rulers would join the Soviet camp. In fact, the USSR 
supported the liberation movements in African colonies and some of these radicalised following the 
Soviet example.4 Thirdly, during the wars that involved certain parts of the world up until that point, 
many Africans learnt about the Western way of life as students or as soldiers. African men and women 
who went to Western universities discussed ideas of free choice and democratic government when 
World War Two was being fought in defence of these principles.  In August 1941, the Atlantic Charter 
was issued by the US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the UK prime minister Winston 
Churchill declaring that every nation had the right “to choose the form of government under which 
they lived”.5 Churchill wanted to exclude the British empire from the Charter, but was overridden by 
Roosevelt. Educated Africans who read the document were encouraged to think of their own countries 
and it soon became clear to them that colonial rule had to be opposed after they returned home. These 
factors resulted in the unscrambling of Africa, as a contrast to the scramble of the 19th century when 
the continent was divided among the European powers. In 1945, only four African countries were 
independent (Egypt, Liberia, Ethiopia and the Union of South Africa), but by 1976 the number rose 
to 47.6 It cannot be denied therefore that the start of the Cold War happened in parallel with the process 
of decolonisation for various reasons which forced Western European countries to relinquish control 
over their respective empires, leading to the formation of new states in the Caribbean, Latin America, 
Asia and Africa.7  
So, it was the post-1945 period that saw the emergence of non-alignment as an alternative to the bipolar 
Cold War division and the growing likelihood of a new global, probably nuclear, conflict. It was 
pioneered independently by three national leaders–India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz 
Tito and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. These three men conceived the idea of non-alignment partially 
because of the political circumstances they faced. As early as 1946 Nehru asserted that his country 
should not be involved in the disputes of other states. In his view, alignment with any power bloc was 
wrong since it would inevitably result in hostilities. Tito pursued non-alignment after Yugoslavia was 
expelled from the Soviet camp in 1948. Later in 1951, fearing a Soviet invasion, he announced that his 
country would side with the US-sponsored North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in case of 
another world war and even signed an arms agreement with the United States. After the death of the 
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953, the USSR tried to normalise its relations with Yugoslavia. However, 
Tito was unwilling to return to the socialist bloc and instead followed policies that would guarantee a 
high level of independence from the two superpowers by formalising rapports with Asian and African 
decolonising countries. Egypt went on the path to non-alignment after 1952, when Nasser seized 




Western-supported, anti-Soviet alliance in the Middle East. Nasser rejected this on the grounds that it 
would be just a different form of occupation after 70 years of British control. Consequently, as an 
outcome of talks with Nehru and Tito, Nasser espoused non-alignment during the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, an event that laid the foundations for the Non-Aligned Movement.8 
The birth of the Non-Aligned Movement  
In April 1955, the Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia. Its participants 
comprised around 340 delegates from twenty-nine countries and colonies with diverging political and 
economic viewpoints and cultural backgrounds who gathered to agree on a common position within 
global politics. All of them highlighted their rejection of imperialism, colonialism, racism and 
apartheid.9 The African delegations represented Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana, Libya, Sudan and Egypt 
whose leader Nasser was often described as the ‘Spirit of Bandung’ and thus he turned into “a symbol 
for Afro-Asian solidarity.”10 Not only did these African representatives become part of what was 
regarded as the “core group of the future third world coalition”, they also provided an important input 
to the principles of non-alignment by making independence one of its main attributes.11 In fact, the 
Bandung Principles that were issued when the Conference was over, reflected fundamental tenets like 
respect for human rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of African and Asian countries, 
independence, equality, non-interference in domestic affairs, peaceful resolution of conflicts and the 
promotion of mutual interests and cooperation. Obviously, some of these concerns were shared by the 
newly sovereign or decolonised Asian and African states. Most of the countries that performed a 
significant role in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement were former colonies, such as India, 
Indonesia, and Egypt. Hence, “they were avowedly anti-colonial and had an interest in freeing the rest 
of the Third World from colonial rule.”12 Whilst making a clear link between Nazism and colonialism, 
the Bandung Conference also announced its backing for the rights of the people of Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia to practice self-determination, thus expressing the spirit of rebellion against European 
rule.13 It can be said that it was during this event that the Afro-Asian countries began the anti-colonial 
Third World movement, which later became known as non-alignment. For Africans, the Bandung 
Conference was influential since it generated the essential conditions for hastening the fight for freedom 
from foreign domination and imparted the required leadership and guidance to the increasing awareness 
of Africa’s part in international politics.14  
Later in 1961 at a summit in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, the Non-Aligned Movement was formally 
established. During this event, the role of Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime minister of the newly 
independent Ghana, was crucial as he insisted on “the importance of African perspectives.”15 After his 
country achieved full sovereignty in 1957, he took the initiative of adopting non-alignment as a foreign 
policy approach. During a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, in New York, USA, in 1958 he 




alignment so as to spare the continent from “devastating violence.”16 In the same year Nkrumah 
organised the first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) in the Ghanaian capital Accra 
which was attended by the then self-governing African countries (with the exception of South Africa): 
Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Egypt. All the participants understood that 
they needed a common foreign policy line that would help the African continent play a pivotal part in 
global affairs. Moreover, they were aware of the implications of the bipolar international system and the 
enmity between the two opposing blocs (Western versus Soviet) and accordingly agreed to pursue non-
alignment and subscribe to the Bandung Principles. So the Accra Conference produced a collective 
stance among the participants in which any action that might undermine their interests and freedom 
should be avoided. At the 1961 Belgrade Conference there were 25 participants, of whom 11 were 
African. Although by then there were 27 independent African countries, only a few attended the event 
due to the turmoil caused by the Congo crisis and the Algerian War of Independence.17  
The African governments who took part in the Belgrade Conference did so for a number of motives. 
Firstly, they saw the meeting as an opportunity to exhibit themselves as rulers and maintain their 
legitimacy in relation to their populations and other countries. Secondly, every non-aligned state had 
an interest in ensuring that the US and the USSR acknowledged the legitimacy of their position within 
the Cold War regardless of the reservations held by both superpowers. Lastly, a small group of 
governments, including Nasser’s Egypt, believed that organising such a gathering would reinforce their 
claims to both regional and international leadership.18 The African delegations made their mark during 
the Belgrade Conference by appealing for action against imperial and colonial rule, which they 
considered to be the greatest threat to their sovereignty. African speakers placed emphasis on 
Portuguese colonialism in southern Africa, British and Dutch refusal to relinquish their colonies, the 
oppression of blacks in South Africa and French violence against the Algerian independence movement 
and against Tunisia over Bizerte. In the closing declaration of the Belgrade Conference the participants 
highlighted that the end of any manifestation of colonial domination was a precondition for peaceful 
co-existence among the peoples of the world.19 Although they recognised that imperialism was in 
decline, the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement feared that the collapse of colonialism would bring 
about new conflicts. The countries that joined the Movement were conscious that they had to work 
together and manage the process of decolonisation, otherwise the superpowers would try to take 
advantage as demonstrated by the 1960-61 Congo crisis.20 Overall, African states ensured that the 
struggle against colonialism was one of the principal themes of the NAM for its whole existence. As 
explained above, non-alignment was a response to the aspiration of African countries to protect their 
independence. This concept was added to the ideology of the NAM by African statesmen, particularly 






The Soviet Union’s viewpoint on colonialism and non-alignment 
Although the NAM and the Soviet Union were two completely different entities, they shared some 
similarities especially with regards to the fight against colonialism. The Soviet view of colonialism was 
based on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism as developed by Vladimir Ilych Lenin, the first leader of the 
USSR. His revolutionary outlook on national self-determination, which he saw as the right to form an 
independent state, was not restricted to European countries, but also included their colonies. In his 
perspective, “socialists must not only demand the unconditional and immediate liberation of the 
colonies”, they should also support “the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois‑democratic 
movements for national liberation in these countries and assist their uprising ‑ or revolutionary war, in 
the event of one ‑ against the imperialist powers that oppress them.”22 Soviet support for the self-
determination of colonised peoples as a government policy was evident during the tenure of Lenin and 
his successor Stalin. After World War Two Marxism continued to influence the minds of the emerging 
Third World leaders, many of whom had attended Western universities. Others, like Vietnam’s Ho 
Chi Minh, received training in Moscow and would adapt Marxism-Leninism to their country’s unique 
circumstances. The USSR’s backing of self-determination in the colonies was appealing to these figures, 
even if some had disputes with the Soviet leadership over certain ideological and policy aspects. 
Nonetheless, Lenin and Stalin’s scathing criticisms of colonialism explain why several Third World 
figures aligned with the Soviet Union to counter Western imperialism during the Cold War period. 
Moreover, Marxist ideology captivated Third World nationalists since it provided a theoretical 
framework for comprehending and fighting imperialism.23 This political thought made sense to the 
leaders and intellectuals of developing countries because in Lenin’s dialectical perspective any 
endeavours by colonies to be truly independent and have control over their economies would be opposed 
by Western imperialist powers whose economic system relies on cheap resources and new investment 
outlets to survive. The struggle between “increasingly radical Third World leaders or popular 
movements and the West would culminate in Western interventions which would rally the people to 
“liberation”, lead to expropriation of Western investments, and then impel “liberated” nations along the 
path into the socialist community.”24  
By the time Stalin died in 1953, the focal point of the Cold War moved to the postcolonial sphere and 
thus the Soviet Union increased its efforts to portray itself as an anti-imperialist force and to employ 
the issue of colonialism to strengthen its foreign policy. Under the leadership of Stalin’s successor Nikita 
Khrushchev, the USSR actively strove to revitalise its influence in postcolonial countries. It started by 
reactivating its Marxist internationalism and trying to use its leverage through a network of communist 
and socialist parties and organisations. It also attempted to win the hearts of postcolonial governments 
by offering political and economic help. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and the Bandung 
Conference, the Soviets revised their ideological worldview which divided the world into two camps, 




communist-led countries in the same zone in contrast to the capitalist states. So the Soviet leadership 
now had an ideological basis for their closeness to decolonising countries. Throughout the late 1950s, 
the USSR gave military and financial support to governments that were regarded as amicable and as 
regional leaders, such as Nasser’s Egypt and Patrice Lumumba’s Congo. It even favoured the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1960.25 Therefore, by the early 1960s, Soviet strategists determined that the Third 
World was “an arena of crucial significance.”26 Khrushchev concluded that the swift decolonisation 
process had prompted an opportunity in which the “transition to socialism” could be promoted 
elsewhere in a manner that can “help secure the historical foundations of the Soviet state.”27 
With regard to the Non-Aligned Movement, the Soviet doctrinal stance considered it to be an element 
of the social development of the Third World, a symbol of the national liberation movement’s struggle 
against colonialism. Despite the NAM’s rejection of the bipolar order, Soviet officials viewed it as part 
of the global confrontation between Marxism and capitalism. From the late 1950s onwards, Soviet 
authorities supported Third World neutralism because they expected to benefit strategically from such 
an approach. By 1963, Moscow supposed that the foreign policy aims of the neutralists were equivalent 
to those of the socialist camp since the two groups of states jointly condemned colonialism and their 
concurrent attitude towards the removal of foreign military bases. Soviet diplomats later conceded that 
the policies linked to non-alignment pursued by Third World countries held “common ground with 
various Soviet objectives.”28 The growing significance of the NAM was positively acknowledged in the 
1970s by Soviet foreign policy experts and politicians. For instance, in 1976, the USSR’s leader Leonid 
Brezhnev declared that postcolonial states were able to defy “imperialist tyranny” and that their 
“substantial contribution to the peace and security of the world’s peoples may well be even greater in 
future.”29 Just like during the interwar period, the Soviet Union tried to widen its influence in Africa 
and Asia by championing anticolonial and postcolonial coalitions, such as the NAM.30 This was evident 
in the Soviet treaties signed with Third World states which committed the USSR to uphold and 
encourage non-alignment, seen as “an important factor for peace”, while its treaty partners conveyed 
their agreement with the Soviet Union’s policy of reinforcing “the friendship and cooperation with all 
nations”.31 Apart from stressing the importance of issues dear to the USSR like the struggle against 
racism, imperialism and neo-colonialism, which are mentioned in the treaties with African countries, 
these agreements also required the Third World signatory to abide by “an active and assertive policy of 
non-alignment” and to have a track record of ending colonialism and opposing “the traditional Western 
monopoly of economic power and political and military domination.”32 Hence the Soviet Union 
recognised the vital role the NAM played in the decolonisation process. Like the USA, it presumed 
that the non-aligned countries “could meaningfully support or impede the policies of Moscow or 





The Non-aligned and Soviet approaches to African decolonisation 
Because the NAM started as an anti-colonialist group, “the testing of this movement’s principles was 
therefore much more promising on the African Continent”.34 By the time of the 1961 Belgrade 
Conference every African state had announced non-alignment as the basis of their foreign policies, 
although this commitment differed from country to country.35 The subsequent summit held in Lusaka, 
Zambia in 1970 was a major step in the struggle against colonialism and racism.36 The majority of 
participants (62 percent) were African, including the representatives of five African liberation 
movements. Apart from apartheid in South Africa and decolonisation, primary African concerns were 
prioritised during the conference, resulting in the decision to give greater and more effective material 
support to liberation movement via the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), a group which made 
non-alignment one of its core principles.37 In the 1980s, the NAM’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonial 
tendencies gained special significance again. The conferences held during this decade focused on the 
fight against colonialism and South African apartheid to a strikingly higher degree than before, mainly 
as a way of overcoming disagreements between members.38 The eighth NAM Summit held in Harare, 
Zimbabwe, in 1986 was dominated by African issues. In particular Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwean 
prime minister, highlighted the topic of sanctions against South Africa.39 The non-aligned states chose 
to concretise their solidarity with oppressed South Africans by establishing the Action For Resisting 
Invasion, Colonialism in Africa (AFRICA) Fund.40 This fund, into which 280 million dollars was paid, 
was supposed to aid the countries bordering South Africa in their fight against it.41 In 1989, 54 states 
and “several international organisations had pledged 476 million dollars in cash, kind and technical 
assistance to the Fund” and 40 percent of this promised amount was realised that year.42  
Despite the continued emphasis on defeating colonialism, in the 1980s some Asian NAM members, 
together with Yugoslavia, criticised the movement for stressing topics that were not in touch with the 
times. They claimed that colonial ways of thinking and behaving no longer affected international 
political debates and that other issues, such as the environment, deserved more focus.43 Nevertheless, 
due to the NAM’s sustained attempts, numerous Third World countries declared independence from 
colonial rule. The movement is also worthy of praise for playing a part in ending the apartheid system 
in South Africa which was achieved partly by the NAM’s pressure on the Western patrons of 
segregation and partly by its uncompromising support for those who wanted self-determination.44  
For most of the Cold War, Soviet leaders thought that their country’s track record of anti-colonialism 
and economic growth would entice Third World governments searching for alternatives to capitalism 
and partnerships with Western powers. They also presumed that as proletarian forces gained 
momentum, bourgeois nationalists might ally with them and turn anti-imperialist revolts into anti-
capitalist ones. Hence, the USSR formed ties with numerous postcolonial states, like Nasser’s Egypt 




leaders regarded the Soviet Union as “a beacon of progress, an alternative to the much-hated former 
colonial powers and their capitalist ways.”46 During the Khrushchev leadership, the allure of the Soviet 
way of modernisation in African states reached its zenith.47 The Soviet Union’s support for national 
liberation movements also resulted in its intervention during the Congo crisis. The Congolese leader 
Lumumba accepted help from the USSR, receiving Soviet trucks, aircraft and helicopters that boosted 
the Congolese army’s fight against the Western-backed Katanga secessionists. Although Lumumba’s 
subsequent murder was a damaging blow for Moscow, Khrushchev’s military assistance to the Congo 
and his criticism of the UN’s role in the crisis “challenged the West and appealed to the Third World 
with a clear, anti-imperial stance.”48  
In the mid-1960s the USSR had to alter its strategy vis-à-vis Africa since many postcolonial countries 
preferred to follow independent paths. Nkrumah’s Ghana never transitioned to Marxist socialism and 
suffered a military coup that ended years of Soviet capital and political investment, while Nasser’s Egypt 
maintained its non-aligned stance and persecuted Egyptian communists. Soviet strategists realised that 
the transition towards socialism was more complicated than Khrushchev predicted. Nonetheless, the 
USSR under Brezhnev continued its engagement with the Third World, but directed its support to 
Marxist-Leninist movements and placed emphasis on “vanguard parties” moving revolutions forward 
and safeguarding them from imperialism.49 Apart from ideological considerations and the desire to test 
its military power-projection capabilities, Moscow intervened in Africa because of solicitations from 
African leaders. In fact, after failing to get aid from the Western powers, African nationalists saw the 
Soviet Union as the sole force that could help them attain their political and social objectives. The 
Kremlin, therefore, did not wish to miss a chance to influence decolonisation in Africa.50 This led to 
growing Soviet economic and military assistance to southern African countries and Ethiopia during the 
1970s.51  Overall, both the NAM and the USSR shared the same aims vis-à-vis decolonisation and 
supported African liberation movements. The main difference is that the Soviet Union tried to expand 
its influence in the continent and was able to provide financial and military aid to potential allies, while 
the NAM remained a coalition of postcolonial states focused on fighting colonialism via diplomacy and 
fundraising. However, the main weakness of the NAM was that numerous members, including many 
African countries, were non-aligned in theory, but in practice they had close ties with either the US or 
the Soviet Union.52  
 
The case of Namibia  
A pivotal example of how the NAM and the USSR concurred with regards to decolonisation is the 
story of how Namibia gained its independence.  Formerly known as South West Africa, this country 
used to be a German colony, but after World War One it was occupied by South Africa. Although after 




to abandon the territory and so in 1966 the UN declared the South African rule illegal and recognised 
the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) as the only representative of the Namibian 
population. This organisation soon started an armed struggle against the South Africans.53 Sam 
Nujoma, the founding leader of SWAPO, sought international support for his campaign via the 
NAM.54 He participated regularly in the movement’s meetings from 1961 onwards. In 1973, the NAM 
acknowledged SWAPO as the legitimate mouthpiece of the Namibian people and in 1978 the 
organisation officially joined the movement.55 Over time, the NAM became one of the most important 
supporters of Namibian liberation. It gave SWAPO moral backing and financial help, promoted and 
defended Namibian interests at an international level and applied pressure on the UN to ensure that 
South Africa’s paramilitary forces withdrew from Namibia. Although critics regarded the NAM’s 
declarations simply as “pious homilies”, Namibians saw the movement’s patronage as “a profound source 
of inspiration”.56 
When it comes to the USSR, its ways of supporting SWAPO resembled those mentioned in the 
previous section. After 1979 it sent military advisers to Angola who gave training to the Namibian 
liberation movements. Moreover, Soviet bloc countries provided SWAPO with weapons for its fight 
against South Africa.57 Simultaneously, “SWAPO developed close ties with the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, and Nujoma frequently visited Moscow”.58 By 1988, all sides in the Namibian conflict 
began peace negotiations. The Soviet Union and the NAM tried to ensure “a process whereby SWAPO 
would have more control over the terms of independence”.59 Nevertheless, it was Soviet encouragement 
for a deal that led to the December 1988 Angola/Namibia Accords, whose implementation was jointly 
supervised by the USSR and the US.60 This agreement paved the way for South Africa’s withdrawal, 
the first free Namibian elections in 1989, won by SWAPO, and the achievement of Namibia’s 
independence in 1990.61 In short, both the NAM and the Soviet Union desired Namibian self-
determination due to their respective anti-colonial standpoints. While the methods by which they 
aimed to reach this goal were slightly divergent, the two entities contributed meaningfully to the 
campaign for Namibia’s freedom.  
 
Conclusion 
The decolonisation process in Africa would probably not have been the same if it were not for the 
involvement of the NAM and the USSR. Postcolonial states, mainly from Africa, were partly 
responsible for the formation of the movement and for emphasising issues related to colonialism 
throughout the Cold War period. Despite its weaknesses, the NAM represented a platform where 
newly-independent African countries could voice their concerns and cooperate on matters of mutual 
interest. The Soviet Union had ideological reasons for opposing colonialism in Africa and in the rest of 




with the US, geopolitical motives also spurred the USSR to expand its sphere of influence in the 
continent by offering economic and military help to friendly governments and groups fighting for 
national liberation. The modalities in which the aims and policies of the NAM and the Soviet Union 
coincided were clear in the example of Namibia. Both entities backed SWAPO either via advocacy and 
funds or with the delivery of arms and military training. Their respective actions guaranteed the 
legitimacy of the Namibian rebels in the eyes of the international community and allowed Namibia to 
achieve full sovereignty. By stressing how much the NAM and the USSR had in common in relation 
to this issue, this chapter sought to contribute to the study of decolonisation in Africa. It also provides 
an insight that is essential for understanding the legacy of the two entities which still define 
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3.2 Yugoslavia's place in the Sun? Modernist architecture and 
economic relations with non-aligned countries 
 
Davide Denti & Dino Huseljic 
 
With the foundation of the non-aligned movement, Yugoslavia gained not only a diplomatic network 
of political support, but also new economic opportunities. In Africa and the Middle East, for over thirty 
years, Yugoslavia exported architectural modernism as a concrete symbol of achieved decolonisation. 
Conglomerates such as Energoprojekt played a key role in building palaces, convention centres, airports, 
ministries, universities, post offices, hotels and residential districts across capital cities in Africa and the 
Middle East. Yet, this attempt at a different and post-colonial relation between a European country 
and newly independent nations did not escape from the global exploitative political economy of 
North/South relations, as illustrated by trade and financial patterns. Not unlike Yugoslavia’s domestic 
spomeniks, its modernist architectural legacy remains as a reminder of a country that was stamped out 
of existence in the 1990s.  
When Tito, Nehru and Nasser met in Bandung in 1955 to establish the movement of non-aligned 
countries, Yugoslavia gained more than a network of political support, but also new economic 
opportunities. One of the strengths of Yugoslav exports to newly independent countries was 
architecture. In Africa and the Middle East, for over thirty years, Yugoslav architects built palaces, 
convention centres, airports, ministries, universities, post offices, hotels and residential districts, leaving 
a concrete legacy in the sign of Yugoslav modernism. 
 
The birth of the Non-Aligned Movement 
Yugoslav architecture in Africa was the exterior representation and the final point of an ambitious 
project stemming from the country’s post-World War II isolation. After the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, 
when parting ways with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia faced major economic difficulties due to trade 
dependencies and high military spending (Banac 1988: 131). Tito had to ask for economic assistance 
from the United States, which came for the first time in 1949 and then on a larger scale in 1950-1953 
(Lees 1978). However, this was only a temporary solution for the Yugoslav leader, who aimed to be less 




A new opportunity for Yugoslavia came from the international conference held in 1955 in the 
Indonesian city of Bandung, the first large-scale gathering of newly independent African and Asian 
countries, representing up to 54% of the world’s population (Warnapala 2005). The meeting, aimed at 
establishing new economic and political ties, ended with a strong condemnation of colonialism and 
imperialism, censoring both the West and the Soviet Union and laid the ground for an innovative 
foreign policy, rejecting alignment with either bloc. 
Yugoslavia recognized the chance and got involved in the process. In 1956, in the Brijuni islands, Tito 
signed a declaration together with India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Egypt’s president 
Gamal Abdel Nasser that certified the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement, based on the principles 
agreed upon in Bandung. This was only the first step in a political project in which Yugoslavia would 
play a key role: the first conference would be held in Belgrade in 1961. 
Unlike in the first and second bloc, Belgrade’s economic and political power among the non-aligned 
nations was sufficient to play an important role and to create new international relations in which the 
country would not be overwhelmed by the partners’ strength. In addition, being one of the key nations 
in the Non-Aligned Movement contributed to Yugoslavia’s geopolitical importance. In this way, Tito 
got involved in the struggle for liberation and equality of the decolonizing states, and found a platform 
from which to criticize and differentiate himself from the Soviet and American spheres of influence 
(Farmer 2020), avoiding the dangerous isolation towards which the country had been sliding. 
 
Economic relations: new markets and the Yugoslav-African trade  
The Non-Aligned Movement also aimed to foster cultural and economic relations among its members, 
and Belgrade made an effort to turn the claims of friendship and anticolonialism into practice. 1,600 
Yugoslav workers were sent to Africa and Asia to build up local industry through programs of technical 
assistance, as Yugoslav Life reported in 1962, while nearly 1,000 students from developing countries 
were studying in Yugoslavia in the same year (Farmer 2020). Yet, cultural ties never really took off, as 
the Yugoslavs kept looking with irony at the exotic kings and leaders that were welcomed in style from 
time to time in Belgrade.1  
 
1 In the 1980s, Elvis J. Kurtović, a rock singer from Sarajevo, dedicated an ironic song to the last emperor 
of Ethiopia, Hailé Selassié, who had visited Belgrade in 1964. In the lyrics, Hailé Selassié was defined 
as the “emperor of Africa and Asia” and as “a wonderful man, loved by everyone, wise as Gandhi, 




Economic ties, instead, were carefully cultivated. Even though Tito’s propaganda emphasized 
Yugoslavia’s moral effort in the fight against colonialism, linking the support to the newly decolonized 
countries with their own struggle against foreign occupation during the World War II (Lazić 2020), 
Yugoslavia had a lot to take advantage of, starting from trade. 
An article in the June 1963 issue of Yugoslav Life listed the goods that were exchanged: “Finished 
products are dominant on the list of Yugoslav exports. Machines and vehicles, for example, account for 
54 percent of all exports. From Africa, Yugoslavia imports raw materials and some industrial products: 
cotton, phosphates, minerals, coffee cocoa, bananas, and more recently products of the textile and 
chemical industries” (Farmer 2020). The patterns of trade between Yugoslavia and the newly 
independent countries were thus not unlike those of other western countries, including former colonial 
powers. 
In the early 1960s, Yugoslavia struggled with a congested domestic market in which “too many 
enterprises competed for too few export markets” (Wilson 1979). This had led to an increase of living 
costs, but the “economic ties with the nonaligned countries had the potential to solve Yugoslavia’s 
difficulties in providing its citizens with a good standard of living” (Niebuhr, 2011; Finucane 2014). 
Yugoslavia also offered major credits on favourable terms that could compete with the offers made by 
the two blocs and could also influence the politics of the new allies (Rubinstein 1970). As Niebuhr 
(2011, 151) pointed out, “Tito believed that economics had the power to influence political change. [...] 
He encouraged the Third World leaders not only to adopt Yugoslav products but also to accept Titoism 
as a credible ideology worthy of imitation”. 
Yugoslavia established new ties also through the sale of weapons to revolutionary independence 
movements such as Algeria’s Front de Liberation National (FLN). Yugoslavia’s engagement in favour 
of the FLN increased its credibility and standing in the Global South, painting the country as a 
supporter of African nations in the fight for freedom (Lazić 2020). Stevan Labudović, “Tito’s 
cameraman”, joined the FLN for three years in 1959-1962, chronicling the independence war against 
France and becoming a national hero in Algeria.2 
There was an ideological base in the Yugoslav sympathy for these movements, as Tito himself stated in 
a 1964 interview for the Borba magazine: “the Yugoslav peoples sympathized with the Algerian 
liberation struggle because they, in their recent past, had to go through an equivalent ordeal in their 
fight for national liberation and independence” (Lazić 2020, 6). Rubinstein similarly notes that “through 
the FLN, the Yugoslav leaders vicariously recaptured their finest hours” (Rubinstein 1970). Yugoslavia 
even hosted the FLN’s unrecognised football selection at a friendly match in March 1961, which helped 
 




raise international awareness about Algeria’s anticolonial struggle; the Algerian team heavily defeated 
Yugoslavia for 6:1 (Alegi 2010).  
On the other hand, not everything was just about solidarity and ideology. Yugoslavia had already 
entered the Third World arms market in the early 1950s, when Belgrade signed arms trade agreements 
with Burma and Egypt (Čavoški 2010; Lazić 2020). The company that was in charge of the arms trade 
was Jugoimport. Founded in 1949, it began exporting Yugoslav arms in 1953 and was soon involved in 
the building of military infrastructure abroad (Lazić 2020). 
This arms trade helped developing countries, but Yugoslavia also made profits: it could resell obsolete 
weapons and find new export markets for its own military industries, while cashing-in highly valued 
foreign currency and expanding avenues for further trade and economic relations. (Lazić 2020, 3) 
Ideological, political and economic factors thus all contributed to Yugoslavia’s new foreign policy. New 
ties helped Belgrade to avoid a dangerous isolation and dependence from either Cold War bloc, while 
also supporting countries which were breaking away from colonial powers. Tito kept talking about these 
new international relations in terms of friendship and common anticolonial values: “The policy of 
nonalignment is the expression of historical continuity of the Yugoslav revolution” (Politika, 
27.11.1976).  
Not all of the claims about anti-imperialism and solidarity were false, but Yugoslav economic profits 
were also undeniable. Belgrade sometimes applied the same methods as colonial powers. For some 
countries, the choice of non-alignment allowed them a greater degree of leverage, as Yugoslavia did not 
have the means to influence their domestic politics and external relations as the USA or USSR (or other 
European former colonial powers) could do. Yet, Yugoslavia’s relations with the new countries of Africa 
and Asia also carried an exploitative dimension, as illustrated by trade and investment patterns. 
 
Yugoslav architecture in Africa 
As early as the late 1950s, Yugoslav, Polish and Soviet construction companies began to compete in the 
rush for African markets. In the following 30 years, numerous modernist buildings saw the light in the 
new capitals of Africa and Asia. As the architectural historian Łukasz Stanek notes in the book 
Architecture in Global Socialism (2020), “the Soviet Union focused more on large infrastructure 
projects: dams, embankments, ports; Yugoslavia was more oriented towards urban projects”. Civilian 
architecture soon became a signature Yugoslav export to Africa and Asia, with a key role played by the 
Energoprojekt conglomerate (Sekulić 2015). For many newly independent countries, Yugoslav 





Already in the 1950s, Yugoslav artists sculpted monuments in Ethiopia, including the Yekatit 12 
memorial obelisk (Antun Augustinčić and Frano Kršinić, 1955) and in the 1960s they built Addis 
Ababa’s central post office (Ivan Štraus and Zdravko Kovačević, 1964) and Duke of Harar memorial 
hospital (1964-1973). In Ghana, Miro Marasović and Niksa Ciko worked with local and international 
architects in Kumasi's KNUST university complex (1963-1968).  
In the 1970s Energoprojekt embarked in multiple real estate works in Zambia, Uganda and Nigeria, 
including Lusaka's Mulungushi Conference Center (1970) and Findeco House (Dušan Milenković and 
Branimir Ganović, 1971-1974). In Uganda, they built Entebbe Airport (Aleksandar Keković, 1973) 
and Kampala International Conference Center (1975). In Nigeria, realisations included the Lagos 
Trade Fair (Zoran Bojović, 1974-1977) and the Kano State Ministries Complex (Milica Šterić and 
Zoran Bojović, 1978). 
Among the finest realisations was the Palais des Conférences in Libreville, Gabon (Mario Jobst, 1972), 
with decorations by Miodrag Živković. The most imposing was surely the Congress Center and 
Sheraton Hotel in Harare, Zimbabwe (Dragoljub and Ljiljana Bakić, 1980-1986). 
During the same period, in the Middle East, Yugoslav architects worked on Baghdad's Babylon Hotel 
(Edvard Ravnikar, 1982) and Al Khulafa residential complex (Zoran and Ljiljana Bojović, 1984), as 
well as on the Bayan Palace Conference Centre in Kuwait City (Stojan Maksimović, 1980-1986) 
 
Yugoslav monuments and buildings in Ethiopia and Ghana in the 1950s and 1960s 
Yugoslavia’s search for new allies pre-dates the launch of the Non-Aligned Movement. Already in July 
1954, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie paid an official visit to Yugoslavia - the first visit by a foreign 
head of state after Belgrade’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. Likely not by chance, the visit 
coincided with a period of Italian-Yugoslav tensions over the fate of Trieste - Italy being also the former 
colonial power in Ethiopia. During the week-long visit, Haile Selassie met with renowned Croatian 
sculptor Antun Augustinčić, to whom he commissioned a statue of his late father Ras Makonnen 
(Orlović 2012: 160). Augustinčić delivered such a statue for Harar in 1959, together with another 
Monument to the Ethiopian Partisan for the town of Hollet. Earlier on, ahead of the visit of Tito to 
Addis Ababa on 14 December 1955, Antun Augustinčić and Frano Kršinić completed the bas-reliefs 
for a memorial obelisk erected in Yekatit 12 Square to commemorate the massacre perpetrated by Italian 
colonial forces in 1937. As noted by Videkanić (2020), Augustinčić drew from his works on the partisan 
struggle in Yugoslavia, including for what concerns the imagery of Italian fascists and their civilian 





The warm Yugoslav-Ethiopian relations also led to architectural projects: among them, the Central 
Post Office of Addis Ababa, built in 1964 in the International Style upon design of Yugoslav architects 
Ivan Štraus and Zdravko Kovačević. The complex includes “two detached long thin 8-story tall 
modernist buildings (45m & 65m long by 15m wide) oriented perpendicular to each other” (Niebyl 
2020), and remains in use. The Duke of Harar Memorial Hospital in Addis Ababa (today Black Lion 
Hospital) was also built by the Yugoslav firm Unioninženjering. Works on  the massive 8-story, 155m 
long, 535-bed modernist hospital complex began in 1964 and ended only in 1973. The result was “the 
largest, technically advanced and most renowned medical facility in Ethiopia” (Niebyl 2020). The year 
after, in 1974, Haile Selassie’s regime was overthrown by a Soviet-backed military coup. 
Ghana’s post-independence government intended to expand the new Kwame Nkrumah University of 
Science and Technology (KNUST). Yugoslav architects Miro Marasović and Niksa Ciko worked 
together with Ghanaian and international architects such as John Owusu-Addo, B. Kalogjera and 
K.M.G. Kirkbride to build five new campus buildings between 1963 and 1968, including the Vice-
Chancellor's Lodge, Unity Hall, Africa Hall, the Senior Staff Club and the College of Architecture. 
According to Stanek (2020), these buildings in an adapted International Style were received in Ghana 
as a clear break from the architectural heritage of British colonialism: “Their work was part of an intense 
collaboration between Ghanaian architects, engineers, and construction companies and their 
counterparts from socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia during the first decade after Ghana’s 
independence.” As noted by Niebyl (2020), the Senior Staff Club reminds of Vjenceslav Richter’s 
Yugoslav Pavilion at the 1958 World Expo in Brussels, while the Vice-Chancellor's Lodge recalls the 
Bauhaus design.  
 
 Energoprojekt’s works in Zambia, Uganda, and Nigeria in the 1970s 
The new international relations favoured the opening of new markets abroad and gave a decisive boost 
to the growth of a then young public company from Belgrade that was set to become one of the most 
important in Yugoslavia’s history, Energoprojekt. Founded in 1951, due to the scarcity of big projects 
on the domestic market in the 1960s the company was somehow forced to seek work abroad (Tagliabue 
1983) and the new international environment was luckily set to satisfy its needs. Primarily involved in 
architectural projects, Energoprojekt was also a sort of Yugoslav Trojan horse used to penetrate the new 
markets. The Belgrade-based company used to win tenders in the newly independent countries also 
thanks to Yugoslavia’s soft power and political support. Throughout the 1970s, Energoprojekt 
completed multiple real estate projects across Zambia, Uganda and Nigeria.  
One of the earliest projects, the Mulungushi Conference Center in Lusaka, Zambia, was the result of 




In Zambia, Energoprojekt was the only European company operating on the market, easily winning 
every tender. Following a plea for help to Belgrade by Zambian President Kenneth D. Kaunda, 
Energoprojekt engineers were quickly dispatched on site, and the design proceeded in parallel to 
construction works. Within four months, an event centre for 4,000 persons and 65 villas for high-level 
attendees were built. The venue cost Zambia three to four times the normal price due to the short 
timeframe of its realization (Tagliabue 1983). The complex remains in use to date (Niebyl 2020).  
In 1972-1973, Energoprojekt also built the Entebbe Airport, upon design by Yugoslav Montenegrin 
architect Aleksandar Keković (Niebyl 2020). The airport was the site of Operation Entebbe on 4 July 
1976, when Israeli commandoes rescued a hijacked El-Al flight, and was damaged in the Ugandan-
Tanzanian war in 1979. 
Also in the early 1970s, Yugoslav architects Dušan Milenković and Branimir Ganović designed in 
Lusaka what remains today the tallest skyscraper of Zambia, Findeco House, named after the State 
Finance and Development Corporation, which controlled the export of copper. Its 90 meters of height 
and 23 floors “are cantilevered off of a central pillar, giving the structure a gravity defying appearance” 
(Niebyl 2020). Upon its completion in 1974, the global price of copper fell, leaving Findeco bankrupt 
and Zambia in a long-term recession. The building still operates as an office and retail space. Nearby, 
a second white skyscraper (Zanaco Bank headquarters) was also a project of Yugoslav engineers and 
architects. 
The following year, in 1975, Energoprojekt inaugurated the Kampala International Conference Center 
in Uganda. Built to host the 13th summit of the Organization of African Unity, the complex has a 
unique hexagonal shape and is “clad in decorative aluminum panel not only for their attractive 
appearance, but also to protect the building from the intense tropical sunlight” (Niebyl 2020). Uganda’s 
dictator Idi Amin used it for his own wedding, as well as infamously as a place of torture for political 
opponents. It remains in public use to this date. 
In 1974-1977, Energoprojekt also erected the Lagos Trade Fair, upon the design of a team led by 
Belgrade architect Zoran Bojović. With 40,000 square meters, it was deemed the largest marketplace 
in sub-saharan Africa. The project was based on research on vernacular housing in the Kano region. 
According to Niebyl (2020), “the spatial planning of the complex is characterized by its circular flow of 
connectivity and accessibility between exhibition halls, which was a layout Bojović formulated after 
being inspired by the results he saw from a field research exercise in rural Nigeria where he asked young 
village children to draw maps of their small communities.” The buildings feature a “playfully ambitious 
design which invokes a wistful future-oriented design of angular and geometric styles.” The complex 
has become dilapidated over time, and in the 2010s it used to host the largest marketplace of used car 




Another of Energoprojekt’s ventures in Nigeria concerned the 1978 State Ministries Complex for the 
Nigerian state of Kano, designed by Milica Šterić and Zoran Bojović. The complex made use of local 
techniques to respond to the sun and the heat, including a bright white colour and lattice screens over 
south-facing windows. The use of prefabricated standardized sections allowed construction to proceed 
at rapid speed. Bojović also claimed that the shape of the building was inspired by stacked bags of 
peanuts, Kano’s main export product (Niebyl 2020). 
The Palais des Conférences in Libreville, Gabon 
In the former French colony of Gabon, the tender awarded to Energoprojekt for the construction of 
the Palais des Conférences in Libreville - considered one of the most luxurious buildings in all of Africa 
at the time - took on the political significance of a definitive emancipation from the colonial masters 
and from the ties of Françafrique: “The fact that we were there was the sign that they broke away” 
(Georgievski, 2020), as later recalled by Belgrade architect Mario Jobst (also the author of the Dejtonka 
service station and of the YU Business Center in Novi Beograd) who worked on the interiors of the 
building. Jobst, who had started working for Energoprojekt in 1972, was still a young architect when 
he found himself working on the site of the future 12,000-square-meter building that was to host the 
14th session of the Organization for African Unity. “It was heroic work, and very expensive.” All the 
materials were of Yugoslav origin, including the dark brown Brač marble to tile the floors (Georgievski, 
2020).  
The complex was finely decorated. Yugoslav sculptor Miodrag Živković, author of the spomenik of 
Tjentište dedicated to the battle of Sutjeska and of the monument to the martyr students of Šumarice, 
was commissioned to create a decorative sculpture for the opulent lobby. “I designed a clearite sculpture, 
African Sun. That block of 7-8 meters and I took an airplane and we flew together to Africa”, recalled 
the elderly sculptor (Georgievski, 2020). The Conference Palace was razed to the ground in 2014, to 
be replaced by a new presidential complex.  
 
Yugoslav architectural projects in Baghdad and Kuwait City 
The engagement of Yugoslav architects in Middle Eastern countries started in the late 1960s, when 
Zdravko Bregovac and Vjenceslav Richter won the competition for the design of the new building of 
the National Museum of Aleppo, Syria (Munivrana and Meštrić 2017: 90).  
In the late 1970s, Yugoslav Slovenian architect Edvard Ravnikar had designed plans for a ziqqurat-
shaped beach resort to be built by the firm Lovćen Inženjering in Budva, Montenegro. When the plans 
fell through, the design was adapted for a concession for a luxury hotel in Baghdad, Iraq (Kulić 2014). 




by Indian architect Sunita Kohli, and soon became a local landmark. It remains in operation, despite 
multiple car bomb attacks in the 2010s (Niebyl 2020). 
In the same years, Zoran and Ljiljana Bojović designed for Energoprojekt the 1984 Al Khulafa 
residential buildings in Baghdad. Niebyl (2020) notes the overt modernist style of the complex, with its 
two 11-storey towers, as well as the critical regionalist elements, which make reference to the traditional 
Iraqi architecture, such as “the window screens across the broad faces of the building, along with the 
arch-shaped windows along the top edge of the structure.” Dwarfing the tiny old Al Khulafa mosque, 
the two bright white towers have soon become a local landmark. 
In 1979, architect Stojan Maksimović inaugurated Belgrade’s Sava Center, which became world-
renowned. The following year, Kuwait’s government (also a member of the Non-Aligned Movement) 
invited Maksimović to present projects for the new conference centre of Kuwait City, slated to host the 
5th Conference of the Arab League in 1986. Maksimović’s plan won the competition and work started 
soon after. The final result however differed widely from the plans, and the complex was damaged 
during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Repaired, it continues to operate to date as Bayan Palace 
Conference Center (Niebyl 2020). 
 
The Congress Center and Sheraton Hotel in Harare, Zimbabwe 
Energoprojekt scored its final home run in Zimbabwe, with the largest project in the history of the 
company. Only a few months had passed since Tito’s death, when Belgrade architects Dragoljub and 
Ljiljana Bakić were entrusted with the construction of the Congress Center and Sheraton Hotel in 
Harare, in the recently independent former Southern Rhodesia, led by Robert Mugabe. As Dragoljub 
Bakić pointed out, “with the country’s independence, a new market was open for Energoprojekt and 
only two months after we were already there” (Georgievski 2020).  
Bakić landed in Harare in August 1980, with a scale model of the complex. The competition to build 
the new venue was strong, with British companies strongly rooted in the former colony. The death of 
Yugoslav high official Stevan Doronjski offered a chance: Bakić took the Zimbabwean foreign minister 
aside when he came to sign the condolence book at the Yugoslav embassy, and showed him the model 
of the building. The minister told Bakić to show up at the prime minister’s office. There Mugabe, who 
dreamed of hosting a summit of the non-aligned movement, told Bakić the day after that he wanted 
the building, “but twice as big”. Bakić was given 10 days to adapt the design for a 5,000-seat conference 
hall. “I told Ljiljana to come to Zimbabwe immediately, and we worked on the project at the hotel, on 
the breakfast tables.” (Georgievski, 2020). 
In those days Slobodan Milošević, then general manager of Beobanka, was staying in the same hotel. 




interested in the architectural endeavour too. “He came by in the evening to see how we were going 
ahead with the project, returning from safaris”, Bakić recalls. The reason was simple: “He saw an 
opportunity for our economy, because all the materials were imported from Yugoslavia. Our country 
lent credits with which they had to buy our products for those buildings. That is why Milošević was 
interested” (Georgievski, 2020). 
The project was accepted, and Mugabe’s dream came true: in 1986 Harare hosted the 8th summit of 
non-aligned countries at the Sheraton. According to Niebyl (2020), “its merged double-tower form 
(67m tall and 18 stories high) is characterized by its smooth golden shape, curved beveled summit and 
huge glass walls on its board faces, features which give the facade a sleek and almost futuristic modern 
appearance.” The building continues to operate as a conference centre and hotel, the only 5-star and 
the largest hotel in Zimbabwe, with close to 400 rooms. 
 
Conclusions: Yugoslav modernism and the persistence of African ties 
Yugoslavia’s turn towards relations with the newly independent countries in Africa and Asia was an 
attempt to turn a weakness - international isolation following the 1948 Tito-Stalin split - into a new 
strength. The co-leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement allowed Belgrade to develop an 
international network of political support, as well as to obtain new export markets for its products, from 
weapons to civilian architecture. For many newly independent countries, Yugoslav modernism took on 
the political significance of a definitive emancipation from the colonial masters. Political linkages and 
ideological affinities - as well as immediate presence on the ground - also helped Yugoslav architectural 
firms in winning tenders for large-scale real estate projects. The modernist buildings that still dot the 
landscape of multiple African capitals (palaces, convention centres, airports, ministries, universities, post 
offices, hotels and residential districts) stand as a concrete legacy of this attempt to create a different 
and post-colonial relation between a European country and newly independent nations. It was an 
attempt that, despite all rhetoric and good intentions, did not escape from the exploitative political 
economy of North/South relations. Flagship architectural projects in (often autocratic) African and 
Middle Eastern countries came along with trade and loans patterns in establishing financial flows 
towards Yugoslavia, as best illustrated in the case of Zimbabwe’s Harare Sheraton Hotel. Not unlike 
Yugoslavia’s domestic monuments (known as spomenik, see Niebyl 2018), its modernist architectural 
legacy remains as a reminder of a country that was stamped out of existence in the 1990s.  
Yugoslav endeavours in Africa also contributed to the formation of a new generation of cadres that put 
economic profit first, leaving ideology aside, and that took over the country in the 1980s and the 1990s 
during its wartime dissolution and market transition (Lazić 2020). Some of these economic ties even 




remained active in the impoverished successor states, even winning tenders in African countries in the 
most recent decades. Energoinvest has had better days but the company was involved in 2015 in the 
construction of an electrical substation in Algeria. Two years later, it won a 53 million dollars 
procurement in Tanzania for the construction of substations in cooperation with the Indian EMC. On 
the other hand, despite facing several problems in the last decade, Belgrade-based Energoprojekt won 
two tenders in Uganda and Rwanda in 2016 (eKapija 2016; Sarajevo Times 2017). The current political 
leaderships of Serbia and of Bosnia Herzegovina have also tried to replicate, in small, Tito’s non-
alignment policy by establishing multiple relations with the main regional and global players including 
the European Union, United States, Russia, China and Turkey - with limited success. Yugoslavia’s 
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3.3 Finding your way back - A discussion with Madina 
Tlostanova 
 
Laura Luciani & Valentin Luntumbue 
Pr. Madina Tlostanova (Linköping University) is a professor of postcolonial feminism and one of the 
foundational figures of the decolonial movement in academia. Her research focuses on both the post-
Socialist word and the Global South, and she has been involved in countless projects related to 
decolonising the arts and the university across the world. She accepted to sit with us for an interview.  
Both in the West and in the East, decolonial discourse has been gaining steam in the last decade, 
though it seems that this is restrained to Academia. So, our opening question would be: what are 
in your view, the differences between decolonisation in Central and Eastern Europe and 
decolonisation in the West and the Global South. Do you think they differ or converge on some 
points? 
First, not sure what you mean by decolonisation. For me, coming from decoloniality, I do not like terms 
like decolonisation, because they are from a different paradigm. I’ve been working as part of an 
international community for more than 20 years now and for us decolonisation has ended. You can talk 
about it as a thing of the past, which was important between the ‘50s up to the late ‘80s, or to the crack 
in the ‘90s, when the socialist systems collapsed. Then a shift happens and that’s why Aníbal Quijano, 
a prominent figure of decoloniality, comes up with the idea of colonialidad, instead of colonialism. As 
Catherine Walsh and Walter Mignolo tell in their latest book on decoloniality1, it became clear that 
the state cannot be democratised and decolonised: that shows a sense of defeat, the realisation that all 
these postcolonial nationalisms and efforts to build countries in this anticolonial manner did not work. 
And the socialist utopia, the last utopia of humankind in the 20th century, of equality and social justice 
also collapsed. In that very dark moment, they come with this idea of shifting the focus from the actual 
political struggles of decolonisation to decoloniality, as a more epistemic thing. From more political 
struggles to the ways of changing the mind with which people think, perceive the world and their 
corporeality. And that shift was very important to me. I work in academia and I hate academia, but 
since this is my way of connecting with reality and changing something in that reality, this kind of 
epistemic rather than political activism suits me. Although I am constantly thinking about how to 
change this and how to bridge this gap between academic and real activism – the people who are 




why there are internal conflicts in Latin America and the Andean countries, between social movements 
who actually do decoloniality in their everyday struggles and those who sit in universities and write 
about it. Even if we try to be nice and inclusive and try not to bow to them, to work with them, listen 
to them and be humble, still being in a neoliberal university forces you to do certain things that are not 
good if you try to decolonise. 
Decoloniality has become in the last 6-7 years a fashionable term, a new fad, and I find it really 
unfortunate. 20 years ago, when I was writing about it in Russia, everybody was dismissing it. I 
remember a dissertation about multiculturalism, and all these colleagues who had never heard the word 
would make fun of me saying “what do you mean multikulti, is it about multiki [cartoons]?”. It was 
horrible. Then all of a sudden after I go to Sweden, and I have been living here for almost 6 years now, 
there is this kind of renaissance. People start writing, “we would like to do a conference, and decolonise 
this and that, decolonise university and museums”. But when I start reading all of this scripture, I see 
very often they do not have a clue what is the genealogy of decolonial struggles, how it connects with 
very crucial historical events, like the Bandung conference. They just hijacked the term, ran away with 
it, and use it in a problematic way. Often what they mean is deconstruction or critical thinking, but they 
say ‘decolonise’ rather than criticise or problematise. In reality it has nothing to do with the struggle, 
with the ‘colonial wound’ as we would say in the decolonial movement. For us the most important thing 
is where are you speaking from, what is your positionality. And I don’t mean that only people of colour 
can talk about it. The point is that if you are a privileged white European, you have to think about this 
positionality in a critical way and connect it with coloniality, this darker side of modernity, and see how 
you are implied in that. And nobody speaks in that sense, it’s always “coloniser or colonised”, reductive 
dualities when the matter is very intersectional, changing and relational. In some ways we are in a better 
position, in others we are worse off, but this all has to be part of your discourse. 
It is interesting you asked about the differences, as I don’t find many between Sweden and Russia. In 
Russia, it is suddenly very fashionable to write about decoloniality. But when I see who writes about it 
I am often speechless, because I don’t see how some of those people have the moral right to do that. 
The same goes for Sweden. They get a huge grant to open some centre for the study of colonial or 
postcolonial whatever, but then you see that it consists of white Swedes, who conduct the historical 
study of colonialism and don’t see the problem. They don’t understand the gist of decoloniality. First 
of all, it begs the question of the master’s tools, and not dismantling the master’s house, to paraphrase 
Audre Lorde. I think that is important. In Russia, it is a bit twisted: there is a lot of discourse that wants 
to sound critical but in reality is very supportive of Putin’s regime, and they hijack the colonial argument 
to criticise the West, which I find very problematic. Many of my decolonial colleagues do not get it, we 
argue a lot. For them, it has to be first against the United States, for me it is not enough, it is more 




Trump, a failed state, and some smaller but vicious regime under which many people suffer. I mean, 
who cares under which regime you are colonised? 
Maybe if we speak of these so-called post-Soviet countries that are not European, this for me could be 
a genuine source of decoloniality, not brought by books. Mignolo says it also emerges through 
sensibility, feelings, the parents... This is something they started reflecting upon 30 years ago and now 
comes this younger generation that is not brainwashed anymore into believing they were liberated by 
the Soviet regime, and also is very disillusioned with the West, neoliberalism and what happened in the 
last 30 years. They are capable of formulating it themselves, which is more important than trying to 
take some concepts and apply them to your experience.  
Indeed, anticolonial or decolonial discourses are being appropriated by a lot of right-wing 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe to position themselves against the West, EU or US 
hegemony, and strengthen at the same time their authoritarian agendas. Do you see any way out 
of this co-optation? 
Unfortunately, there is no way, we don’t own what we write. People can take ideas and run away; nobody 
has any guarantee against that. We can continue writing, organising events and talking with people, but 
it’s more important to make something tangible. That’s why I’m interested in these communities of 
change, that can actually do things, better the social, cultural, economic life of communities. Especially 
now that global problems step in, like climate change, migrations caused by politics but also by said 
climate change... and there are a lot of things people could do instead of writing books. 
Academia works in a way that reinforces this gap between itself and real life, and all disciplines are built 
on this growing gap. Academic disciplines only write about themselves and deal with their own 
problems, rather than trying to face real problems and real people. I find it fascinating that in Latin 
America this gap between academia and social movements is not as tangible. Of course, there are some 
people who are in academia and are comfortable there. But it is somehow leaking and it is easier to find 
cases where activists are also academics, very successful ones, and their being activists is not criticised 
but actually valued. There are cases like that in Latin America, and I know that in Africa too. 
How should we reconcile those two slopes of decoloniality? Let us say one is epistemology and the 
other one is material conditions. Should we all be Zapatistas or Sem Terra ? Is that a model? 
No, but that is the problem, you can’t be that. In Latin America, it can happen. That is another critique 
of mine I have been writing a lot about lately, and trying to confront other decolonialists. It is easier if 
you have kept your connection with your indigeneity, you can always go back to that, not in the sense 
of time but of reviving these aesthetics and reconnecting with this existence. But what are others, who 




from the Caucasus… but I don’t have many connections to my indigeneity, I am too modernised. I 
didn’t have the chance to study my language when I was a child because of forced russification. I was 
brought up mainly on Western culture and I am an English Major. Even Russian literature is foreign 
to me, I know American literature better. 
How do you find your way back to your culture? I’m very interested and I learnt a lot about my culture, 
but I am not affectively connected. I can understand it rationally, but I cannot connect. There are more 
and more people like that: this is how coloniality works, it changes your brain and messes with your 
ontology and with your corporeality. For example, I love the works of Rolando Vazquez, a Mexican 
theorist living in the Netherlands, but for Rolando this is easy. He still has this connection to his 
ancestors in Mexico, other people do not. It would be wonderful if we could all be Zapatistas, but 
unfortunately, we have to find more complicated ways and entry points. I am also against these kinds 
of authentic communities: when I say communities of change, I mean indigenous communities, but 
also very mixed communities. Designers, scholars, activists, from all over the world who would gather 
together to solve concrete problems in some concrete place. It doesn’t mean that only people who have 
been born here are allowed. No, this is what allows this neo-colonial or postcolonial nationalism to set 
in.  
What you find in many Central and Eastern European countries is very similar. They will tell you there 
was never colonialism here, “we never colonized nor were colonised”, but if you look historically, it was 
just a different kind of empire that colonised them: the Ottoman, the Russian, the Habsburg Empire... 
It’s just not overseas colonisation. Despite that, it is very similar, and to explore that historical 
resentment they use postcolonial theories. They feel like newly colonised populations that were accepted 
to be Europeans, but on which terms? They realise now that they are constantly in this position of poor 
relatives and second-rate Europeans, who always have to out-West the West and prove they are more 
democratic than the West. And that also causes resentment. If you go to these countries, you see so 
many people emigrating, and it’s especially true of Latvia or Estonia. A huge percentage of the 
population is abroad looking for better opportunities. This is not a happy feeling: either staying home 
being independent but feeling colonised, or being forced to always compete, race and catch-up with 
somebody. But that is the logic of modernity.  
Talking about the North Caucasus, to what extent is the decolonial discourse articulated there 
nowadays? How does it relate to the colonial crimes committed by the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet empire, like ethnic cleansing, mass deportations, genocide? 
As you know, the North Caucasus is still a colony, right? They are watched by a big brother three times 
stricter than in Russia proper. Things you would be okay saying in Moscow are not okay to say or write 




are arrested, detained and taken to courts. Recently there was the case of Martin Kochesoko, an activist 
defender of language rights, not as political as can be. But he was called an extremist, they planted drugs 
on him and put him in prison. People fight, there are a lot of protests and nothing happens, because 
the way law enforcement act there in the Caucasus is very different than in Russia. They are still treated 
as a colony. This reminds me of the history of the long Russian colonisation of the Caucasus – that 
followed more than 100 years of war on the Caucasians – and the way people were treated then. But 
people in the last several years are changing, they are looking at their history of coloniality as an imperial 
one. Now I find some people from the younger generation, researchers and others who use these 
concepts in their discourse, but previously it was unimaginable. When I first started writing about it, 
people didn’t protest but just dismissed it saying they never were a colony: “you cannot compare us with 
Africa or India”. There was this feeling of being free and culturally independent. Part of the Soviet 
brainwashing was also persuading people they were liberated, while in fact they were recolonised. In 
North Caucasia as well as Central Asia and the South Caucasus, there was a very short period of time 
when these countries became independent from the Tsarist Empire in the early 20th century. They 
wanted to have their own state, but then the Bolsheviks came and you know how it all ended. Part of 
the Bolsheviks’ story was to say that they liberated them and gave them all their rights. But they 
continued the tradition of the Tsarist Empire in the region. 
That lasted for a long time, but now it is changing because there is a new generation of people who 
think critically, very often know foreign languages, and read a lot of foreign texts. Before, they could 
only read texts in Russian – and you know what kind of texts they were. Russia is also one of these 
empires which suffers from colonial amnesia and refuses to see itself in the role of the coloniser. Plus, 
as I said it is very hard to imagine serious organised social movements, because when such a movement 
emerges, people will be killed and be detained. A lot of activism happens outside and not in Russia 
proper, like in the diasporas. The North Caucasus has huge diasporas around the world. My people, 
the Circassians, are one of the world’s most diasporic people. When you tell people about the Circassian 
genocide, they don’t know that today most Circassians do not live in the Caucasus, but in Syria, in 
Turkey, in the Middle East, but also in Europe and in the US. There are several millions Circassians 
living all around the world, and only half a million living in Russia in this artificially created republic. 
But this story is unknown. 
About the diasporas: when we went to Abkhazia, we were surprised to see a lot of Turkish products 
in shops. We realised that Turkey was one of the only countries that actually trades with the so-
called republic of Abkhazia. Despite decades of Turkification, the Circassian Abkhaz community 
in Turkey has been emigrating back to Abkhazia since the end of the 20th century. Do you think 




course, the case of Abkhazia is complicated, but can the diaspora play a role in the autonomy 
struggles in some of the regions of the North Caucasus? 
It is a complicated issue, because there are so many different political interests that clash here. All of 
these diasporas live in different specific countries, they all have citizenships of different countries, and 
they have different relationships with those countries. That’s why they have to keep a balance. This urge 
and activism to support independence movements manifested several times in recent years, but the 
question is: do they really want independence, and how? This is an ideal situation that every colonial 
struggle wants in the end, but if you look at the Caucasus and try to imagine what kind of future they 
could have, then it becomes a problem. They are still surrounded by great powers, just as 200 or 300 
years ago, it’s like being pawns in the crisscross of several power games. That’s what the Caucasus has 
been for centuries. They had to play against Russia, against Turkey, against Iran, and now it’s the EU 
as well. It is a nightmare, I’m not sure at this point many people want independence. They realise it 
would be very hard for them to survive being independent in the present conditions. Although I do 
think that, if we imagine an ideal future, the Caucasus as a region should be independent. Not divided 
by ethnicities in smaller states however, the nation-state is a very outdated concept. Historically, the 
Caucasus was this entity which did not have a state but it had a certain kind of pan-Caucasian identity, 
that a lot of people argue against today, but I think it does exist. It’s not linguistic, sometimes in the 
Caucasus they speak different languages from village to village, but they are all multilingual. There is a 
cultural affinity, an affinity for ancient sources and a common folklore. All of that still somehow exists, 
but is being destroyed with these artificial divisions that become ontologised. People start believing after 
a while that “we are different because there’s a border between us” but in reality they are not. I don’t 
really think these small ethnic denominations have a future. The history of many of these nations shows 
that. I am familiar with diasporic groups living in other countries and they changed their tactics. At 
some point they were very strict about authenticity and the purity of their blood, and refused to mix 
with other people. But then they realised it is not possible in today’s world nor good for them to keep 
on thinking like this. This is still important to them, but we know what it leads to, this extreme 
nationalism. Look at many postcolonial countries; look at India for instance and the kind of regimes we 
find there today. 
Many of these nations have been there for thousands of years. They are indigenous peoples. And it 
shapes people. You can find it in the way people connect to the land. Once I was reading a very 
interesting text by a Balkar poet – Balkars were one of the ethnicities that were deported by Stalin to 
Central Asia. The Balkars live very high in the mountains, at altitudes not many people can survive. 
The types of houses they build, the way they connect with reality is shaped by this fact. So, this poet 
was born in exile, in Central Asia, and then Stalin died and his parents took him back when he was 




their motherland” because those two landscapes were so drastically different. In Central Asia they lived 
in this flat steppe. Old mountain people were going out looking for some stone and saying “o blessed 
stone, you remind me of my mountains”. And then he comes back, well not back, but to the Caucasus, 
and he sees this vertical landscape. An entire world organised according to the mountains and their 
verticality, rather than flatness. It’s a completely different way of looking at things. This is something 
that probably connects all people of the Caucasus, irrespective of their religion. And you can see how 
it’s expressed in everyday things, even in how we make up metaphors – which would be very different 
from Russians or Central Asians. For me that is something that we have to think about. 
Academics like Viacheslav Morozov have been talking about Russia as a subaltern empire 2 for a 
few years now. Some have been getting flak from Caucasian colleagues saying “it doesn’t matter if 
you are colonised by a subaltern empire, you are still getting colonised”. It gave way to lively 
exchanges. Where do you stand in that debate? 
First of all, I have been using the term “subaltern empire” since 2000, much before Morozov wrote 
anything, but that’s fine. I also push this further. I say Russia is a “Janus-faced” empire, which is even 
worse. It’s not just subaltern, it has two faces: one looking to the West, one looking to the East. For me 
this is the gist of the imperial difference. It’s an empire with an inferiority complex, who desperately 
wanted to be in the first league but never could. It is subaltern in that it doesn’t have its own system of 
values. It is not colonised in the literal sense but culturally, systematically. It was doomed to be 
peripheral or semi-peripheral and in that sense Morozov is right, but we look at it differently because I 
look at it from a colonised position and he looks at it from an imperial position. He uses this indirectly 
to justify what happens with Russia, which I don’t like. I think it’s even worse when this subaltern 
empire, that is itself looking in a western direction, realises that it doesn’t have a place there and at the 
same time goes to its own colonies and acts in a nasty way, mimicking the real colonisers. Because that’s 
what it did, if you look at the policies of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus, in Central Asia and 
previously in Siberia, we see it’s a mixture of British and French colonialisms with other things added 
in.  
And exactly, it doesn’t matter who was the coloniser, if the coloniser also felt colonised. For example, 
take Dostoievski in the 1880s, who was writing in his writer’s diary about the colonisation of Central 
Asia: “In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, in Asia we shall go as masters.” This is this double-
face: “I felt like I didn’t belong in Europe, but now in Central Asia, I become the coloniser”. This is 
also true about the Caucasus, although it happened a little bit earlier. When colonising the Caucasus, 
the Russians were using the rationale of the Wild West, and it was very similar to what happened with 
Amerindians in the future United States. At first, they divided the Caucasians into reservations you 
were not allowed to leave. You were given specific documents. All these places that exist now in the 




places that were connected with traditional memories destroyed. New villages were built in reservations 
where they would be watched. Similar things continued during the Soviet regime. I remember my father 
telling me that during WW2 and immediately after it in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, 
his family was the only Kabardin family living in this main street, and in his class, he was the only 
Kabardin. So, the capital of this presumably national republic was supposed to be free of indigenous 
people. They had to live in the villages while the Russians lived in the city. The same was true of my 
mom who went to school in the centre of Tashkent, Uzbekistan. There were three Uzbek girls in her 
class, the rest were not. They always looked at us as if we were some savages, we mostly sat separately. 
There was segregation also. You have to be careful with Morozov, his is a very good book. The question 
for me is where does he stand exactly in that argument. But especially problematic for me is Etkind’s 
book3, about internal colonisation, it is so racist if you ask me. 
On internal colonisation: in later years and especially last summer, when the governor the 
Khabarovsky Krai was arrested, people in the Russian Far East started to echo some decolonial 
talking points, saying that these peripheral regions are colonies, all their resources are shipped away 
to Moscow and they don’t get anything in return. Do you think that this framing is legitimate, 
considering this internal colonisation, but also the fact that the Russians now saying these things 
are themselves settlers? 
They are legitimate in the sense that this is what is happening. It’s not really connected with ethnicity 
anymore, rather than with the bad functioning of the Russian state and the way it pumps resources. But 
I am not sure they should use “colonisation”, “colonialism” in this case. For me it is something different, 
and at the same time if we look at this region, not only in Khabarovsky Krai, but also in Siberia, in the 
Altai, there are indigenous movements that are against this extractivism. They are against extractivism 
not just in economic terms, but also regarding their knowledge, the destruction of their languages, of 
their habitat… and that for me makes more sense, when it comes to connecting it to the decolonial 
movement and decoloniality. There is an intricate connection, a link between the land (land as 
pedagogy, land as a way of looking at things) and its people, that the modern industrial state is 
destroying. So that makes sense.  
But regarding this regionalist political movement, I think it is more a complete failure on the part of 
the state. It is a national reality that in the regions people are unhappy with this extractivism, but I 
wouldn’t connect it to such different agendas. The whole argument of internal colonisation, why did I 
say it was racist? Because it is based on a human taxonomy that was created in the 16th century and that 
dismisses huge populations from being human, it dismisses their lives. That happened with African 
slavery, with the indigenous people of the so-called New World, and it happened with Circassians. And 
the same happened in Etkind’s book. It is okay to speak about this peasant population, but he is not 




of the population was simply killed? When the Russian Empire started its march to Siberia, the majority 
of the indigenous peoples were destroyed or forcefully assimilated. Today they have Russian names and 
don’t know themselves who they were – that’s the saddest thing. They can’t go back, even if they wanted 
to. They have nowhere to go back to. There are no traces left of their ancestral memories, because 
whoever could tell them anything died already, and the Soviet regime was very important in that sense, 
it was stricter than other regimes. You can often see this apathy, that sense of not believing in the future. 
I think that internal colonisation is a very problematic concept. 
A question related to your work as a feminist scholar. You argued in a book 4 that most gender and 
feminist activists in post-socialist Eurasia agreed to apply Western feminist paradigms to the local 
material, without taking into account the particular socialist experience. Do you think that the 
precariousness of gender activism in the region we witness today is still linked to this tension 
between the coloniality, the gender paradigms coming from the West and the legacy of the 
communist past? Are feminist movements trying to overcome this and articulate a different gender 
discourse? 
There is no general rule here. In some countries in Eastern Europe, you find very interesting, powerful 
movements. Depending on what kind of situation they had under socialism they have different views 
on that. For instance, countries of former Yugoslavia had a much more positive experience of socialism, 
and are sometimes nostalgic of that time, which I can understand because their socialism was very 
different from the Soviet one. They had dialogues with Western feminist in the late 60s’ and ‘70s, and 
already then they were showing them that “our agenda is different, we have many rights that you are 
just dreaming about, that we were given long ago. We don’t have to be identical with you, we have a 
different agenda”.  
If we look at Russia, there is a great gap there between the actual movements and academic feminists, 
which I find uninteresting. The few who are still working in two-three institutes are critical, but their 
critique is very conventional, they are very Western in the tools they use. But the movements are great: 
there is a younger generation of women, people of different genders, non-binary. These are grassroots 
movements, very rarely connected to academic schools of thought, and they do their own educational 
initiatives. It’s amazing that so many people are coming to these lectures, they are asking questions, 
they’re interested in changing something. And they are also very active politically, they go out and 
protest, they help women, they organise against violence. This is something which could not have been 
imagined 10 years ago. It’s even more interesting in Central Asian countries, with whom I collaborate 
now through art initiatives, and there too they discuss decoloniality in gender terms. There is a strong 
connection between feminism and decoloniality. Most of the artists are women, and they do amazing 




We just finished writing a book, a collection about postcolonial and post-socialist feminist dialogues… 
or lack thereof.5 We were struggling with that book with my two colleagues, Suruchi Thapar-Björkert 
who is originally from India but works here in Uppsala University, and Redi Koobak, who is originally 
from Estonia and now is a post-doc in Bergen, Norway. We started with a conference more than 6 
years ago and we wanted to invite people from the Global South and former socialist countries. Eastern 
Europeans were eager to apply postcolonial terms to their critique and see their positionality through 
this lens. But very few people from the Global South were willing to come. We were really puzzled with 
that at first. We thought it was due to a lack of knowledge about socialism… but the few feminists from 
the Global South were very socialist, they believed in socialism as an ideal structure of society. For them 
it was a shock to see post-socialist women criticising what they had, saying “we had our own way, but 
we are not defending it. We don’t want to be seen as products of belated western thinking, and we don’t 
want to be homogenised with the global South because our experience was different”. There was this 
puzzlement and only when doing this book we started finding more authors from, or connected with, 
the global South. We also have two wonderful young authors from China, although feminists from 
China usually don’t take part in these discussions. First because they still have socialism, so they don’t 
speak about post-socialism. But at the same time, in China too they had this influx of Western NGOs 
and Western understandings of gender studies. At first, they were very attracted to it, but then they 
realised that they were orientalised: they were seen either as heroes, Mulan warriors, or they were seen 
as victims of oppression. And there was nothing else. This is how Western feminism interprets this 
difference, let’s say.  
Socialist women were responsible for a certain set of issues in global feminism, as Jennifer Suchland 
writes: they were responsible for eternal peace in the world. Women from the Global South were 
responsible for racial, religious, ethnic, cultural difference - this is how the division of labour worked. 
And women from the North spoke about theoretical issues, equality, democratic forms of governance. 
But when it all collapsed the socialist feminists were left with no agenda, and they could not join any of 
these groups. And then there is this awakening: “we need to revisit our own history ourselves; we don’t 
want somebody from the West to come and tell us what happened to us”. We have to really think hard 
about it, and not to romanticise this past: especially in the Soviet Union, it was very bad, and especially 
in the Soviet colonies, how the “women question” was solved. 
Circling back to the beginning of your last answer, what do you think the space for cooperation is 
between people who fall into decoloniality in the broad sense in Central-Eastern Europe and the 
same decolonial people from ‘Third World’ countries and diasporas? Is there space for cooperation? 
And also, is it possible to be decolonial without being anti-capitalist?  
I think there should be a space because there is so much in common. These are two different angles of 




majority of us are postcolonial or post-socialist… or both, like me for instance. We cannot erase our 
history or pretend it’s not there, and not take into account these horizontal links. It has to be horizontal 
and transversal, not somebody from the West who comes and says “this is a theory” and then you apply 
it to your reality. It’s much more interesting what we come up with if we have a dialogue among 
ourselves without the Western medium. That’s why there’s more and more projects like that now and 
I think they are super interesting. The problem is that some of them are very descriptive and very 
historical. I don’t like when people just say “oh you know in the Soviet Union there was this 
organisation, Friendship between Asian and African countries and the Soviet Union, so let’s go to the 
archives and dig it out!”. First of all, Soviet archives are problematic. Second, it was a tool for soft power, 
and many of them were actually created to brainwash people from the Global South into socialism. But 
still there was genuine interest, people found each other and some of them who are still alive are still 
friends, they still remember the time when it was actually possible to have a dialogue bypassing Western 
dominance. We could revive this in interesting ways, but it would have to happen through grassroots 
activities, not through somebody creating an organisation like that. 
About capitalism, as Anibal Quijano writes very persuasively in one of his first works, capitalism is an 
essential part of global coloniality. Marxists however tend to overestimate the economy. Capitalism is 
at the core, but there are other nuances that should be added, and this is why coloniality also has the 
concepts of race and gender there, which are not discussed in classical Marxism. But at the same time, 
this is the easiest way to explain it to the broader population who do not think they are colonised or 
coloniser, because capitalism is a more mainstream equivalent of modernity and coloniality, with this 
marketisation of everything. This is something everybody experiences, and it is also true in academia. 
In your book 6 “What Does It Mean to Be Post-Soviet? ” you discussed the role of art in decoloniality 
and in constructing different futures in the post-Soviet space. In Western Europe, we also see more 
and more efforts being put into decolonising museums as spaces where imperial aesthetics and 
knowledge are re-produced. Which connections do you see between these movements in the post-
Soviet space and in the West?  
I think there are a lot of them. Actually, I find more connections and dialogues in the art world than in 
the academic world. I found this out long ago, when we first started to write, in my decolonial group, 
about decolonial aesthetics. There were several art events, exhibitions in which we were first formulating 
these ideas, back in 2009 to 2011. I found that there were international communities of artists, from 
the West, from the Global South, from semi-peripheries, they very easily mingled and sometimes 
created projects together, installations, video-art… for them it was really a borderless world. I started 
thinking about why it was so easy in the art world, including also the museums and curators, and why 
it was so difficult in academia. I think that it’s partly because academia deals with words, with articles, 




And it also affects what you write: you cannot write your dissertation as a poem or you cannot write it 
from the position of a shaman. You will have to pay for that, if you do. So you first have to break 
yourself, to force yourself to do it in a certain way. While if you are an artist you don’t have to: you work 
with images, with metaphors, with symbols, and often something that cannot be formulated in this 
logo-centric way can be done in a project, and it would tell much more to the people who would come 
to this exhibition, they would just grasp it… or they won’t, if they don’t have this sensibility for 
coloniality. You don't need to explain anything with words. And it’s also universal in the sense that you 
can bring it to Russia, to New York, and people would just read it. So that was one of the reasons why 
I wanted to write about art in that book. I thought that in many cases just watching a 10-minute video 
of Taus Makhacheva7 is enough to understand how decoloniality works in the Caucasus in the Chechen 
case, in the Dagestani case, and she’s trying to work with images and with these ideas of decolonising 
museums.  
In Europe as you know this is a very widely spread movement, there are so many curators and museums 
that work with this, and it’s very interesting that lots of the artists who are Russian originally, or from 
the Russian colonies I mentioned, work with European museums and curators, and what they do is 
amazing. I prepared several texts for artists’ books, catalogues, and the curator were all Western. But 
they were very attentive to understanding what they were actually dealing with. There are wonderful 
examples in Europe, like the Van Abbemuseum in Eindhoven in the Netherlands, to which we have 
recently moved our Decolonial summer school. So yeah, I think there is a future there, in this kind of 
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3.4 In search of Basebya Gilbert: Exploring the experience of 
African students in the USSR through fiction 
 
Sandra Muteteri Heremans  
 
My interest in the geopolitical and artistic relations between the Soviet Union and the African 
continent, as well as the experience of African students in the Eastern Bloc during the 70s, was triggered 
by coincidentally falling on a letter from Moscow in my family archives, sent by a family friend, who 
was a Rwandan studying near Moscow in the 70s. Both the period and this kind of geographic 
encounter had also previously caught my attention, due to me being a visual artist and filmmaker, as 
several filmmakers from the African continent had studied in the Soviet Union and carried home the 
renowned Soviet montage in their films. Illustrative of this is Ousmane Sembène, along with Sarah 
Maldoror and Abderrahmane Sissako1. Consequently, I started my research by exploring both the 
political, artistic interrelations in all the “layeredness” of the 60s and 70s, trying to gain an insight of 
the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War, their repercussions on the African continent after the 
independences – and particularly on the experience of an individual studying, through a scholarship, in 
the USSR. This research not only challenged my perceptions about that period in time, being of the 
generation that was raised after the fall of the Berlin wall, but started to give me a deeper comprehension 
of this turbulent, but also insightful period for contemporary society. Being born in Rwanda but being 
raised in the West, had inevitably framed my perception of history, and by extension my imagination 
and understanding around the Cold War and Eastern Europe. 
This essay aspires, thus, to give an insight into the beginning of my (artistic) research which aims to 
result in an experimental film. This exploration of history helps me to create a fictional character called 
Basebya Gilbert. A character that is being constructed by archive research, testimonies, fictional (film) 
characters of that period in time. 
The essay will initially provide a general geopolitical and historical context for the period and afterwards 
it will provide a modest glimpse into the life of the fictional character based on a true story, Basebya 




Historical context  
The rhetoric of Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) and his ideas around colour-blind internationalism and 
solidarity among the “oppressed of the world” resonated throughout the globe, including in the colonies, 
where social and racial inequality were an inseparable part of then contemporary society. Intellectuals 
from different parts of the world, as in Africa, the Caribbean as well as African Americans, saw the 
Soviet Union as a meeting point and thus a cradle for many communist-inspired revolutionary ideas. 
The 1950s, more specifically from 1953 on, following Joseph Stalin's death (1878-1953), had been 
characterised, under his successor Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971), by a growing interest on the Soviets’ 
part towards developing long-term relationship with several countries on the African continent. These 
stimulating interactions between the Soviet Union and the expanding independence movements on the 
African continent culminated in the symbolic organisation of the 6th World Festival of Youth and 
Students in 1957 where several delegations of African students were welcomed. The festival attracted 
34.000 people from 130 countries. 
Subsequently, on February 5th 1960, the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University) 
was established. Soon the university was renamed after the murdered Congolese politician Patrice 
Lumumba. It aimed at giving students from Asia, Africa and Latin America an opportunity to receive 
education and to transform themselves into specialists in various fields in order to contribute to the 
construction of their newly independent countries. In 1961, this need for education was confirmed 
during the Conference of African States dedicated to education in Africa that took place in Addis 
Ababa. The delegates stressed the importance of education for the economic and social development of 
their respective young countries. Consequently, in the early sixties and during the Cold War, faced with 
a shortage of cadres in the aftermath of independence, a large number of students, seeking for 
themselves a socialist experiment, an anti-imperialist experience (e.g. Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania, Congo-
Brazzaville, Mali, Guinea, Ghana) or coming from national liberation movements (e.g. ANC, MPLA, 
FRELIMO, SWAPO) became students in the URSS and popular democracies, such as China and 
Cuba. Until the mid-1970s, the Soviets developed relationships with radical strands of the 
independence movements in Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, some of whom fought for 






A fictional dialogue as a mode of insight  
As mentioned earlier, the essay seeks to give an insight, based on testimonies, into the experiences of a 
Rwandan student in Moscow and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The interactions between 
Idrissa and Gilbert are fictional, but the information told is real. The starting questions in developing 
this dialogue are: “What would their experiences be? How do these geopolitical realities impact their 
daily lives? What were their thoughts about their surroundings? How was the contact with the other 
students?”  
Studying in Voronej (Russian SFSR) and Odessa (Ukrainian SSR) 1974-1979 
 
1. First encounter with the weather  
 
Two African students sit face to face being visibly tired at a dining room table. 
The light is off. The radio is on. A voice seems to read the latest news in Russian. 
 
Gilbert 
Idrissa! You still look hungry! 
 
Idrissa 
It's only the food that manages to warm me up. 
It's so cold outside. 
 
Gilbert 
Oh, this snow… So white... but so cold. 
It is so beautiful. I've never seen anything like it. 
 
Idrissa 
Winter has barely begun and it is already -15°c 
 
 






Oh yeah, what are your impressions of the Soviets? 
 
Idrissa 
They drink a lot 
 
Gilbert 
Ha, yes so true! 
But most of them seem to be nice. 
Especially to foreigners. 
 
Idrissa 
The Soviets, some of them 
are closed and others are obsessed 
by everything that comes from abroad: 
clothes, songs... even watches. 
 
Gilbert 
Yes, I noticed that too 
But you have to understand: 
on the radio, on TV… 
In the newspapers, they only talk about 
the Soviet Union and the socialist states... 
It's normal, isn't it? 
 
 
3. The grading system at university  
 
Idrissa 
How do they evaluate us? 






The Soviets rate all the works on 5 points, 5 = YB, 4=B, 3=AB, 2=M. The Russian students normally 
have a scholarship of 40 rubles - when a student always receives 5 points during a year, the scholarship 
is increased to 100 rubles. When a student receives 4, he passes but his scholarship is not increased. 
 
If a student receives 3 points, he passes, but does not receive a scholarship and is kicked out of the 
university residences. So all the Russian students work a lot for fear that their scholarship will be cut. 
 
But I have to admit, I like this system very much 
I think that such a system would stimulate the students' work. 
 
Here, everything is provided for the students to study well. 
Books cost almost nothing. Books that cost 2000 francs at home do not 
cost even one ruble here. And every night there is a teacher available for students. 
 
 
4. Learning Russian  
 
Idrissa 
How does it go with learning Russian? And what about your friends? 
 
Gilbert 
I am making sensational progress in the study of Russian. We can already follow a lecture or a course 
in Russian (with difficulties of course!). Many Russian words are similar to French or English words. 
The declensions are very similar to Latin declensions. We adapted much more easily than others who 
do not know these languages. 
 
We learn Russian via the radio, the TV; we also have language labs where the teacher only speaks to 
you in Russian (and most of them only know Russian), even for the first lesson! We also live with 






I really hope that by the end of the year we will be ready to enter university. 
 
 
5. Religion in the USSR  
 
Idrissa 
What about religion? Do you go to church? 
 
Gilbert 
You know, the Soviet youth is taught from an early age – and they are all convinced without exception 
– that God does not exist! 
But the contradiction is that old people believe in God and they go to church often. I went to church 
once, and there were only old people there. I decided not to go back there anymore, because there are 
only orthodox churches here and I find it is very difficult to follow in this crowd of old people. 
 
 
6. New Year party with other students  
 
Idrissa 
Happy New Year, Gilbert! 
What did you do for the New Year? 
 
Gilbert 
Thank you very much for your New Year's wishes! 
 
We have started the new year very well. We celebrated the New Year, 
all Rwandans together with friends we met here. This is one of the good things about studying 
abroad. It's the possibility of getting to know other people and living with them. Here I have friends 
from Vietnam, the DDR, Latin America and Asia. At parties, like New Year's Eve, we have the 






7. Traveling while living in the Soviet Union (September 1976) 
      
Coming back from Belgium 
 
Idrissa 
Gilbert, how was it coming back? 
Your return from your trip to Belgium? 
 
Gilbert 
How was my trip to Belgium? 
Everything went well. My return was very tiring. 
The trip lasted two days and two nights. 
Fortunately, I was able to rest in Moscow 
Where I spent the whole day of August 20. 
I was a bit annoyed at the customs in Brest. 
While searching, a soldier had come 
across a book I had been given by a 
friend in Belgium: 
“The Failures of Marxist Economics”. 
He had it read by interpreters, 
and it was refused to me, 
saying that it was bourgeois propaganda. 
 
Idrissa 
But didn't you protest? 
 
Gilbert 
Of course I did! I protested and 
I claimed my right: 
Freedom of conscience and reading! 





Already before my departure, 
what a story with this Soviet currency 
which is not convertible! 
Do you know that it pushed some people 
to turn to the black market to get dollars. 
It's really not safe, this approach! 
 
Wanting to travel to Rome 
 
Gilbert 






They refused my exit visa! 
I tell you, they control us too much 
 
 
Feeling stuck in the USSR, Odessa (Ukrainian SSR) 1976 
 
The Student Strike 
 
March 1976  
 
Idrissa 
What are you doing? 
 
Gilbert 
We, the Rwandan students, 









We have been asking for a long time 
the Rwandan government to grant us 
vacations to the country, 
until now the government has been silent... 
 
I don't know if you understand, 
how difficult a situation we are living in! 
To spend six years in 
the USSR without returning home! 
Can you imagine? 
 
Idrissa 
But is it difficult for everyone? 




It’s very difficult to bear and 




But what are you going to do? 
 
Gilbert 
We are thinking of going on a general strike 






But how are you organizing? 
 
Gilbert 
On the whole territory of the USSR 
Rwandan students have held 
meetings to study 
how the strike would be conducted 
 
Idrissa 
But the Soviet authorities, 
how will they react? 
 
Gilbert 





So how did it go 
with your ideas to invade 
the Rwandan embassy? 
 
Gilbert 
Yes, our plans to invade 
the embassy and chase the ambassador away? 
 
Look, our plans were aborted. 
The Soviet authorities noticed 
the uneasiness that reigned among us 




against the embassy of Rwanda, 
armed militiamen were placed. 
 
Idrissa 
So you gave up? 
 
Gilbert 
No, no! Listen to what we did. 
We decided to go through the laws 
and asked the 
Soviet Ministry of Education 
for permission to send a delegation to the embassy. 
 
The delegation was received 
by the ambassador, 
who answered that he had 
not received any order 
from Kigali and that our requests 
were still under consideration. 
The delegation returned 
unsatisfied and 
we started the strike. 
 
The Rwandan students refused 
to attend classes, 
until their demands were met. 
 
Idrissa 
But how did the Soviets react? 
 
Gilbert 





The Soviets threatened to expel 
all the leaders of our organization 
if we didn’t calm down. 
 
So, on the request 
of the central committee, 
we stopped this strike. 
 
But you know, 
we will start again 
if the Rwandan government 
continues to keep silent. 
We have decided, however, 






Closing reflections: The metaphor of the snow 
First, I want to address the symbolic potential of the encounter of snow in this context. The director 
Abderrahmane Sissako makes use of this metaphor as an encounter of both worlds and the 
complications that comes with it in a long scene in his film ‘October’ (1993, 37 min.). This film tells 
the story of a Mauritian student, Idrissa, living a tumultuous relationship with his Muscovite girlfriend 
Ira. At one point the young Idrissa is depicted on the ground in a park, taking his hands full of snow to 
his face. The scene seems like a baptism of sorts: an immersion into a new world. This scene, among 
many others, conveys Sissako's symbolic suggestion of what a “socialist friendship” inherently entails. 
Although the film explicitly addresses the historical fact of an interaction between Africans and the 
USSR, it leaves the cultural and political implications radically open2. 
Jean-José Maboungou’s article “Voyage en Brejnevie : Vie « Rêvée » des étudiants du Tiers-Monde en 
Russie soviétique” published in 2017 gives us interesting insights into what life might have been like for 
foreign students over there, as interactions with Africans was still a novelty. Until the end of World 
War II, the Soviet Union had remained largely closed to the West and to large parts of the world. 
Although many African communist anticolonial activists had attended the Comintern or Cominform 
training schools as well as the important university named after African leader Patrice Lumumba, and 
the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Science (established in 1959, it had already published 
more than 620 books on Africa by 1974), it seems that relations between Africa and the Soviet Union 
were of a fairly recent occurrence. It follows that in 1974 many Soviets had never met an African 3 
Since the Soviet Union had remained largely closed to the West throughout a period, students, as 
mentioned in the dialogue above, noticed a certain fascination in their interaction with the Soviet 
students. This is well mentioned in Maboungou’s article, along with the Soviets’ genuine curiosity about 
the foreign students’ lives abroad, their tastes and their visions of the world. This often led to great 
discussions when students met in the dorm, such as in the dialogue above the discussions about religion. 
Also palpable in the study is a sense of isolation, of extreme loneliness, a need to be outside the university 
or doing anything else than studying. It feels like this growing isolation throughout the years of studying 
abroad pushed foreign students to find solace in alcohol. I encountered many testimonies echoing that 
upon returning to their country of birth the alcohol consumption of some African students often did 
not go unnoticed. According to Maboungou this tendency toward alcoholism wasn’t a simple reflection 




aforementioned sense of isolation4. This could also have been a tangible motive for the organization of 
student strikes, and explains such a mental need to go home. In fact, Gilbert mentioned a lot of his 
fellow students started to feel “mentally deranged”. 
What is also worthy of mention here is the perhaps simple but also very human notion of opportunity. 
Not all students who left for the URSS defined themselves as communists, but rather as eager to learn 
young adults who wanted to discover something new and, above all, contribute to the construction of 
their country. Asked in an interview why he went on studying in Russia, Abderrahmane Sissako 
answered as such: “First, not only in this time but also now, the big problem for young Africans was we 
didn’t have the opportunity to choose something — not where to travel, or where to study. If we got an 
opportunity, any opportunity, to do something different or to go somewhere… for me, is the most 
important thing for a human being. When I was 19, I got the opportunity to go to Moscow to learn 
cinema, and only the Soviet Union gave me this opportunity. And sometimes people think, “It was 
because you are a Communist.” No. Any young guy is a Communist in some way. And that is not a 
problem, to have the concept of sharing what we have. That is important for me, this vision. But I got 
this opportunity to go to Moscow to learn, and it was a big chance for me.”5 
This brings us back to the human experience, the lived experiences, with all the complexities that go 
along with it, that I have the freedom to explore in the construction of a fictional character. The 
administrative surrounding of Gilbert Basebya has an undeniable impact on his life and his experience 
of the world. What I mean by administrative surroundings is the state and its administration, the 
geopolitical negotiations and its very impact on people’s lives. This creation of this character reconnects, 
in my eyes, the ‘neutral’ historical texts that I have been reading with the very human experience of it, 
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3.5 Black Poland: History of the Polish Black Community, 




The Black community is not something that immediately comes to mind while thinking about the 
people of Poland. It may seem surprising that there are Black people living or even originating from 
Poland. Such reaction is generally justified, as there is a relatively small number of the Black Poles 
compared to the White Poles. At the same time, the assumption that the Black community does not 
exist in Poland is not correct. The Black community has been in Poland for centuries. There are notable 
Black Poles, including politicians and athletes. Moreover, NGOs and other initiatives serving the 
interests of the Black community are present in Poland. Recently, the activities of the Black community 
in Poland contributed to the change of discourse related to the terms that Black people should be called 
cancelling the racist and archaic word Murzyn. It is definitely a step forward in a direction of anti-
discrimination and inclusiveness.  
 
Black Poland: A historical outlook 
The history of the Black community in Poland might seem to be relatively short due to the countries’ 
lack of colonies and imperialist ambitions. In fact, according to the historians, Black people were present 
in Poland since medieval times. 
At that time, Black people were brought to Poland as servants in the second half of the 16th Century. 
It happened mainly in royal courts and estates of magnates. At first, only men were brought.1 
Even though the slavery almost did not exist in historical Poland, there is some evidence regarding 
Black presence in different noble and royal mansions. For the most part, they were servants brought 
from abroad for entertainment purposes. Some of the examples include a Black lady in the royal mansion 
of Sigismund II Augustus2 in 1563 and a Black servant of Marina Mniszech, a Polish noblewoman and 




written to Marie Casimire Louise de La Grange d’Arquien (queen consort) on October 10, 16834. The 
governor of Spis5 Teodor Lubomirski (1683-1745) had a Black accompany, according to the chronicle 
by Andrzej Komoniecki6. The governor is also believed to have had more Black servants in his mansion 
in Przemysl7. Hieronim Florian Radziwiłł, a Polish-Lithuanian nobleman, is believed to have imported 
Black slaves. He brought 12 Black slaves in February 1752 to his manor in Białła8. 
There is some evidence for the presence of Black people in the royal manor of Stanislaus II Augustus 
in the description of king’s court and servants “Laufrów było czterech. Był takoż u dworu murzyn Ledou 
i turek nazwiskiem Kirkor”9. 
Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746-1817), Polish national hero and military leader, had a Black butler - Jan 
Lapierre, also known as Domingo. He is also believed to have been Kościuszko’s comrade in arms. Later 
on, Lapierre served Dominik Radziwiłł, a nobleman.10 
There were two most notable Black men in 17th and 18th century Poland. One of them was Aleksander 
Dynis, the 17th century servant of Cracow’s bishop who married a Polish woman and became a governor 
of Koziegłowy village.11 The other one was Władysław Jabłonowski, brigadier general of the Polish & 
French army, born in Gdańsk in 1769.12 He fought in the Kościuszko Uprising and became brigadier 
general in the Polish Legions, leading the Danube Legion (3rd Polish Legion serving Napoleon’s 
France).13  
Władysław Jabłonowski was not the only Black man fighting in Polish uprisings. In fact, there is at 
least one other story, that of August Agbala Browne also known as Ali. He came to Poland from Nigeria 
and became a famous jazz musician in Warsaw during the mid-1920s. When the Second World War 
broke out, he volunteered to fight for Warsaw’s Ochota district, and then was an insurgent within the 
“Iwo” battalion of major Jerzy Antosiewicz.14 He was a member of a communication platoon and was 
known for riding a motorcycle with a red-and-white armband. 
In contemporary Polish history, there are many notable Black people, including naturalized athletes and 
politicians. In the 2000s, soccer player Emmanuel Olisadebe was glorified as he contributed 
tremendously to the advance of Polish national team in the 2002 world cup in Korea & Japan. Wilfredo 
Leon Venero, one of the best volleyball players in the world, became a Polish citizen in 2015 and is 
currently a leader of Poland’s national volleyball team. When it comes to politics, so far there have been 
only two members of parliament who happened to be Black – John Godson and Killion Munyama. 




parliamentarian. Currently, he plans to run for President of Nigeria in the upcoming 2023 general 
election15. Munyama comes from Zambia and came to Poland in 1981 for studies. He was elected an 
MP in 2011 
 
Current status of the Black community in Poland 
Poland is mostly a homogenous country, meaning most people are of the same ethnicity – they are 
White Poles. In the 2021 national census, no question regarding ethnic origin was included, therefore 
there are no estimates on the number of Black people living in Poland.  
For the most part, the Black community in Poland consists of people coming from other countries 
(especially African countries) for work and studies, as well as their children. The presence of Black 
people in the public sphere might still cause strange looks and reactions, especially outside of main 
Polish cities, such as Warsaw, Cracow, or Gdańsk, as the number of Black people in Poland compared 
to the entire population is relatively small.  
Due to the fact that the community is relatively small, there are not many NGOs related to the Black 
community. Yet, there are some that are notable, including Nigdy Więcej (Never Again), founded in 
1996, with a mission to promote multiculturalism and tolerance. They build a broad and diverse 
movement against discrimination in various areas of social life and also initiated a successful campaign 
to put a ban on fascist and racist organizations in the Polish Constitution (Article 13).16 The 
organization has an archive of the incidents committed by neo-fascists and the extreme right as well as 
racist, xenophobic and discriminatory incidents in Poland called Brunatna Księga (Brown Book). 
Another popular NGO, widely followed in social media is Ośrodek Monitorowania Zachowań 
Rasistowskich i Ksenofobicznych (Center for Monitoring Racist and Xenophobic Behavior). It’s an 
NGO whose main mission is to fight racism, xenophobia and endeavour broadly defined tolerance. 
Their day-to-day activities include reporting cases of racism to law enforcement, help and assistance for 
the victims of hate crimes, monitoring the scale, scope and trends of behaviour caused by hatred. 
Moreover, they conduct educational activities and raise public awareness of the danger of hate crimes. 
However, the way they conduct their activities may be perceived as quite controversial as they post 




Another NGO, Fundacja Porta, has been conducting anti-discriminatory workshops since 2004. The 
vice-president of the organization, Arinze Nwolisa, is the father of the girl behind the Stop Calling Me 
Murzyn slogan, Bianka Nwolisa. 
 
What does it mean to be a Black Pole? 
Black Poles are a small community, coming or originating from many different countries. Black Polish 
culture differs from family to family or even from person to person. Most of the Black Poles are simply 
identified as Poles or mixed Poles, or as their original nationality, based on the country of origin. When 
it comes to mixed Poles, in the situation when one of the parents is an ethnic Pole, the other one is 
Black or mixed, the factors influencing the identity is the relationship with foreign family members and 
their presence in the life of a child. The culture of a parent or family member who are present in the 
process of raising a child influences the future identity of said child. Due to the complexity of these 
relationships, Black Polish identity is as various as the people who identify themselves as Black Poles. 
Also, it is worth noting that there are Black Poles who identify simply as Poles.  
 
Challenges for the Black community of Poland  
Not that long ago, racism in Poland was usually associated with incidents in soccer stadiums where 
hooligans yelled racist slogans or hung offensive banners and single incidents of attacks by people 
associated with subcultures, usually some neo-Nazi who are growing stronger in Poland in recent years. 
Currently, as Poland becomes less monogenous and more and more people are coming from different 
countries and start living in Poland, racism is more present than ever. Often, non-White people are 
treated with prejudice. Between 1987 and 2008, there were 2500 racist and xenophobic incidents 
registered in Poland, in 2009-2010 over 400, and in 2011-2012 – 600.17 Even worse, in some very 
serious incidents, racism and hate crimes caused the death of people of colour.  
An infamous incident happened in 2010 with Polish citizen of Nigerian descent Maxwell Itoi.18 He had 
a stand in the market close to one of Warsaw’s train stations. The police came and tried to arrest one of 
the tradesmen. A quarrel started and Itoi was shot dead by the police officer when he tried to intervene. 




shot by the police officer, the evidence was insufficient to stand trial. The investigation conducted for 
2 years was discontinued. No one was held responsible for the death of a Black man.  
Another outrageous situation happened in one of the stores in a shopping mall in Warsaw. Two citizens 
of the Congo bought a jacket. They came back to the store because the safety tag wasn’t removed by 
the seller. They had a receipt, but still the store assistant accused them of stealing. The police came and 
the men spent a night in detention. The cost of the jacket was PLN 79 (around $20). Even if it had 
been stealing, it would have been a misdemeanour since the value was small (less than 500 PLN), yet 
they were treated as criminals. 
 
Black identity in Polish language – “Stop Calling Me Murzyn” 
During the wave of Black Lives Matter protests following the death of George Floyd in May 2020, 
special attention was brought to the word “Murzyn” – a pejorative substantive describing a Black person 
in Poland. During a protest in front of the United States Embassy in Poland, a Black girl named Bianka 
Nwolisa brought with her a sign with, on it, the phrase Stop Calling Me Murzyn.  
The etymology of the word Murzyn comes from a German word Mohr derived from a Latin word 
Maurus, meaning an inhabitant of Mauretania19 – and related to the English word Moor. Many non-
Black Poles believe that this word has no negative connotations and perceive it as rather neutral.  
However, this word is perceived as offensive for the Black Poles due to the racist context the word has 
been used in. Often, Black people in Poland are approached very directly by being called Murzyn instead 
of their real name or simply proszę Pani/Pana (sir/madam). The experience of many Black people in 
Poland related to this word is traumatic. The word has been used as offensive, indicating inferiority in 
relation to non-Black people. In Polish schools, there are no classes on the topic of non-discriminatory 
language. It is very challenging to find one Black person who grew up in Poland and was not called 
Murzyn in a pejorative way.  
A famous poem for children by Julian Tuwim, “Murzynek Bambo” is commonly known in Poland. 
Many argue that it should be analysed in the context of its time, yet it perpetuates stereotypes and 
implies the inferiority of an African child. What contributes more to the reinforcement of stereotypes 
is the fact that in elementary and junior high school, there are neither classes nor workshops tackling 




For years now, the Black community in Poland has been calling to quit using the word Murzyn to 
describe Black people. The majority of Black community treats this word as a Polish equivalent of the 
English word Negro. The word is treated as defamatory. Given the fact that Murzyn is used in many 
negative phrases, the word becomes more and more negative as the language evolves. Some of the 
phrases where the word Murzyn is used include someone forced to work hard (usually physically) or a 
person executing tasks of someone else’s.  
Historically, the word was used to describe a Black person and in fact did have a neutral meaning. As 
of now, the meaning of the word has pejorative connotations.20 Following the assessment of Marek 
Łaziński for Council of the Polish Language, the word has been used in media outlet on both sides of 
the political spectrum rather rarely; yet, when this word is used, it usually creates disputes21. Further, 
Łaziński mentions that Wielki Slownik Języka Polskiego (The Great Dictionary of Polish Language) 
denotes the word as offensive.22 
Also, he stretches the fact that all words change connotations as the public awareness naturally evolves, 
as in the 1980s and 1990s the word was rather neutral and not used by people in a negative context 23. 
Currently, based on the author's analysis, the word is not only offensive but also archaic. 
The Council of the Polish Language brings attention to one interesting matter – in most Western 
languages, the name Black people were called during slavery has changed.24 It is seen especially in 
English and French, as these societies were involved in the slave trade to a high extent. The change was 
visible in other languages as well, however the extent and timeframe of those changes differed. What’s 
interesting, it states that Polish is one of a kind when it comes to using phrases that enhance the 
stereotypes related to Black people. The scale of this phenomenon is much greater than in any other 
language.25 Worth mentioning is the fact that even though the pejorative phrases related to other ethnic 
groups exist, they don’t have such a strong connotation. The word Murzyn strongly emphasizes the 
historical ties between Black people and colonial slavery. 
Of a greatest importance is the fact that people of colour in Poland (either people of Black descent or 
internationals coming to Poland) treat this word as offensive. Often, the word Murzyn was translated 
in English & French dictionaries as Negro – a highly offensive word, associated with the times of 
slavery. In this matter, the way Black people take it should be the main indication whether or not the 




The word Murzyn can simply be replaced by the ethnicity/nationality itself (African, Senegalese, etc.) 
or simply the word ciemnoskóry (dark-skinned), czarnoskóry (Black-skinned) or simply czarny (Black). 
The word czarny (Black) might have seemed offensive decades ago, yet it is acceptable by Black people. 
Afro-Polak (African-Pole) is not a typical noun in Polish language, so is not a preferred alternative of 
the word Murzyn. At the same time, many Black Poles find this particular alternative acceptable and 
encourage using it. 
Thus, even though the etymology of the word might indicate neutral meaning, the usage and evolution 
of the language indicate otherwise.  
 
The testimony of a Black Pole 
Growing up Black in Poland made me absolutely hate the word Murzyn. Being Black was the reason 
why I did not have many friends and did not get along with my peers. I was constantly called Murzyn 
instead of my actual name. I grew up in a small town in 1990s Poland where people kept staring at me. 
At first, I was not really sure what is the reason for it, but when I was about 5-year-old I realized that I 
did look a little bit different than the rest of the kids in the neighbourhood. One of the events that made 
me recognize this slight discrepancy was the fact that my neighbour turned his dog on me. I was bitten 
and traumatized which resulted in years of stuttering and anxiety.  
As I grew older, I realized that standing out in a crowd can be an advantage. My skin colour makes me 
easy to remember and people find me more approachable, which might have something to do with 
peoples’ curiosity. At the same time, my faults or any wrong doings are judged much more strictly 
because of being Black. One of my main issues with living in Poland is the fact that my boundaries are 
not respected; I often get many personal questions about my origin that a non-Black person would never 
be asked about. What is more, people often try to touch my hair without my permission. Apart from 
that, I still get verbal insults from random people due to my skin colour. That never happens when I 
spend time abroad.  
At times, I don’t feel safe walking down the streets in my own country. In 2018 during the Polish 
Independence Day, far-right organizations staged the march in Warsaw. While trying to get home, the 




Every year, there are more and more internationals coming to Poland. Even though the history of Black 
community in Poland is not extensive, the public sphere becomes multicultural and the Black 
community is growing. The estimated number of Black people in Poland is much lower than in Western 
Europe, yet, there are multiple organizations and initiatives that serve the Black cause. The 
recommendation of the Council of the Polish Language regarding the use of the word Murzyn is 

























1 Janusz Tazbir, Przybysze z innych kontynentów, „Problemy”, nr 4 (513) kwiecień 1989, s. 2–4. 
2 M. Wilska "Karły na dworze królewskim - mit czy rzeczywistość", w: "Kościół. Kultura. Społeczeństwo. Studia z dziejów 
średniowiecznych i nowożytnych"; 
3 J. Tazbir "Polska sława Krzysztofa Kolumba" 
4 List do Marysieńki - Przeciwko Strygonium pod Parkanem, z dnia l0 X [l683] rano  
5 Region in north-eastern Slovakia, with a very small area in south-eastern Poland 
6 "Gryfita" Białostocki Magazyn Historyczny, nr 2, 1994/ 
7 Tanzbir 
8 J. Barua "Niewolnicy Rzeczypospolitej", "Newsweek" 14 września 2003/ 
9 K. Wójcicki "Archiwum domowe do dziejów i literatury krajowej z rękopisów i dzieł najrzadszych zebrał i wydał Kaz. Wł. 
Wojcicki" Warszawa 1856, s. 12 
10 .Średziński, M. Dioufa "Afryka w Warszawie. Dzieje afrykańskiej diaspory nad Wisłą" 
11 Polityka 6.2014 (2944) z dnia 04.02.2014; Historia; s. 59 
12 Polityka 6.2014 (2944) z dnia 04.02.2014; Historia; s. 59 
13 Polityka 6.2014 (2944) z dnia 04.02.2014; Historia; s. 59 







19Wielki Słownik Języka Polskiego. Narodowy Program Rozwoju Humanistyki. 
https://wsjp.pl/index.php?id_hasla=9750&ind=0&w_szukaj=murzyn+ 
20 Marek Łaziński dla Rady Języka Polskiego. 
https://rjp.pan.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1892:murzyn-i-murzynka&catid=44&Itemid=208 
21 Marek Łaziński dla Rady Języka Polskiego. 
https://rjp.pan.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1892:murzyn-i-murzynka&catid=44&Itemid=208 
22 Wielki Słownik Języka Polskiego. Narodowy Program Rozwoju Humanistyki. 
https://wsjp.pl/index.php?id_hasla=9750&ind=0&w_szukaj=murzyn+ 
23 Wielki Słownik Języka Polskiego. Narodowy Program Rozwoju Humanistyki. 
https://wsjp.pl/index.php?id_hasla=9750&ind=0&w_szukaj=murzyn+ 
24 Wykluczenie poprzez język. Poprawność polityczna. Iris Forster. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Dossier Sprache 
und Politik. Translated by Karolina Kuszyk. https://www.goethe.de/ins/pl/pl/kul/dos/fnw/21458973.html 











Circumstances leading to the introduction of the Look East Policy 
In the 2000s Zimbabwe was condemned to British, American, and European sanctioning as 
punishment for its land redistribution programme and human rights violations. The former British 
settler colony had fought a brutal, decade-long war of independence against the white supremacist 
Rhodesian state. Upon independence in 1980, Britain pledged to fund a land redistribution programme 
from white settlers to the indigenous people after ten years’ ‘de-escalation’.  Twenty years later, 4000 
white farmers held as much land as 800 000 peasant farming families (Mkandawire, 2020), and resisted 
government proposals to negotiate on the land question. While black Zimbabweans remained in the 
reserves and infertile areas they were forced into pre-independence, the British government repeatedly 
refused to honour its agreement. By 2000, rural black Zimbabweans refused to keep waiting, and 
organised themselves alongside veterans of the independence war, occupying white farms in what 
became known as ‘farm invasions’. A ‘Third Chimurenga/ Third Revolutionary War’ was declared- the 
final push to restore the land that had been the central focus of the independence war (Hanlon et al., 
2012). The government, held accountable by the grass-roots for failure to deliver land, and sensing 
mutiny should they turn against their rural support base (Moyo and Yeros, 2007), came out in support 
of the occupations, and announced the ‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme’ to structure the 
movement already in action on the ground. White owned land was expropriated, and redistributed to 
the indigenous peasant class. Naturally, the process was not without violence; many white farmers 
refused to leave, and continued to refuse the government’s offers of land share (Blair, 2001; de Castella, 
2007). Rallying behind them, the West introduced harsh sanctions on the country, crippling it as 
punishment for the redistribution while using the discourse of human rights as a political dog whistle. 
Within years the economy had collapsed and there was an exodus of millions of Zimbabweans (Dillon, 
2013) fleeing political tensions and starvation caused by sanctions alleged to be aimed at their 
government (Ogbonna, 2017; OHCHR, 2021).  In response to this, Zimbabwe’s government shifted 
focus ‘East’ to countries like China. 
The Zimbabwean case is important to understand and dispel myths of fraternal relationships between 




as a ‘family’ (The Commonwealth, 2021) despite working to facilitate the interest of global capital that 
further weakens states (Power, 2009), while the CFA zone sees a loss of state sovereignty to the French 
Treasury and the perpetuation of underdevelopment (Taylor, 2019). It is not revolutionary to point out 
how exploitative and oppressive these relationships are; all parties involved are aware of this (Dearden, 
2017; Nkrumah, 2021). However, it must be faced that this dynamic is finite- the economic ties between 
these South and West must be significantly appraised and decolonised should they endure. While it is 
a fact that countries in the global South have retained significant trade relations with their colonisers; 
although pragmatic, these relations are counterproductive. Existing ties to colonial powers grant access 
to markets, but at the expense of interference in internal affairs and policy.  
While China is this decade’s villain in Western rhetoric, the country has been a long-standing friend to 
decolonising forces across Africa- in colonies that Europe refused to give up without a fight. Zimbabwe 
is no exception. The relationship between China and guerrilla fighters had arguably won Zimbabwe’s 
war of independence: Maoist training of ZANLA guerrillas had influenced nationalists’ politicisation 
of the peasantry (Griffith, 2015), cleaving the black population from the colonial state. Nationalists 
forged close ties with the Eastern bloc and its allies (Alexander et al., 2017; Moyo, 2016), receiving 
political and practical training in countries such like China, Yugoslavia, Romania, the USSR, and 
Tanzania. Unified against white supremacy and colonial violence, with equality and liberation-oriented 
ambitions, anti-colonial fighters and their rural supporters allied with Eastern countries, who naturally 
sought to expand their sphere of influence, but lay in ideological opposition to Western traditions of 
colonialism and imperialism.  
Despite this, independent Zimbabwe had not rejected Britain as might have been expected; President 
Mugabe steered the country down a Western-aligned path (Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013). Britain 
was able to continue its extractive relationship with the country, which joined the ranks of the 
Commonwealth. However, even at this heyday of British-Zimbabwean relations, the dynamics were 
far from equal. The power imbalance and coercive dynamics between West and global South were never 
far from the surface. Zimbabwe was pressured to take on a structural adjustment programme in 1990 
(Mkandawire, 2020; Moyo and Yeros, 2007) that disastrously saw the dismantling of the welfare state, 
harsh austerity measures, and entrenchment of non-indigenous land ownership (Monjane et al., 2019). 
As the land question returned to the fore, contempt for Zimbabwe and for indigenous peoples was 
communicated clearly in Short’s infamous response to repeated requests to the British to honour their 







British construction of enmity 
In response to its decision to unilaterally pursue redistribution, Zimbabwe was made an example of. 
Britain and its allies punished a symbol more even than the state itself:  the country was martyred to 
practice communal discipline to sympathetic countries across the region that similarly experience 
racialised land hunger and social hierarchies (Moyo, 2007).  Zimbabwean redistribution simply could 
not be allowed to happen, and later, to succeed, lest a precedent be set for practical decolonisation in 
other independent African states. Zimbabwe is a significant cog in a global disciplinary regime that 
seeks not only to protect Western interests, but protect Whiteness within former colonies, whether in 
the distribution of resources and internal power hierarchies or through political muscle.  
The economic crash that followed the sanctioning of Zimbabwe was framed in the West in the same 
victim-blaming language as the coverage of the land reform. The country’s suffering was tied to 
redistribution and the government that allowed it, with Britain’s part in the story erased. The indigenous 
Zimbabweans occupying and receiving land were reduced to caricatured native figures, spoken of in the 
language of ‘mobs’, ‘invaders’, or ‘squatters’, while only white people were consistently referred to as 
‘farmers’ or ‘owners’ by British media (Newsome-Magadza, n.d.). Western media and the British 
government’s language featured deeply paternalistic discourse, constructing black Zimbabweans as 
chaotic, destructive, and ignorant, and Crisis portrayed as an “African pathology” (Moyo and Yeros, 
2007). Rural people, when mentioned at all, were portrayed as the regime’s pawns, unable possess their 
own political judgements or moral sensibilities. Imperial narratives prevailed of indigenous people being 
inefficient, incapable of using land (Moyo, 2007), uneducated and therefore unknowledgeable, 
apathetic unless led, but still dangerous and volatile. Western action was portrayed as necessary to 
“correct” behaviour (Talbot, 2002), acting on behalf of powerless Zimbabweans needing Western 
saviourism.  
Conversely, economic collapse was framed as the result of incompetence and mismanagement by 
leadership rather than sanctions, and linked to a failure of land redistribution. Simply put, Zimbabwe 
was shot in the leg, blamed for it, then critiqued for being unable to run. The refusal of the country to 
preserve colonial dynamics and defer to British judgements provoked a siege response, underscoring the 
constancy of Western imperialist mentalities. The millions of black Zimbabweans who starved or 
became economic refugees were considered collateral, the responsibility of a non-compliant 
government. With Western nations self-authorised to act illiberally to police and isolate ‘disorder’ 
(Abrahamsen, 2005), the suffering of these black bodies was considered a rational means to an imperial 
end. Healthcare support and funding was denied on political grounds (Ogbonna, 2017), and hospitals 
collapsed at the height of a cholera outbreak (Hungwe, 2008), leaving Zimbabwe with one of the world’s 
lowest life expectancies by 2010 (BBC News, 2010). Black Zimbabweans and other Africans were 




rights concerns, and causing pushback.  This tension was seen when Britain attempted to exclude 
Zimbabwe from the 2003 Europe-Africa Summit: in defiance of Britain, African nations refused to 
participate without the country represented (Tull, 2008), and “supported Zimbabwe… to chair the 
United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development in 2007, allegedly to show African solidarity 
against Western opposition” (Zengeni, 2016, 5). 
The actions of the Zimbabwean peasantry in taking matters into their own hands offered a better way 
to see poorer countries- and poorer social classes- after colonialism: agential. Specifically, the land 
reform, however unorganised and corrupt at times, showed a real threat to Whiteness and enduring 
colonial status quos, overturning narratives of white indispensability and black gratitude. The response 
in the West of evoking images of savagery and chaos (Abrahamsen, 2005) was instrumental in 
constructing a defensive, reactionary picture of decolonisation painted with moral panic. Black anger 
and black pain were equated to Black Threat, incursions on British power itself through white farmers 
that “locally represented” British dominance (Chigora and Dewa, 2009, 94). Similar to Anderson’s 
imagined communities, (post)colonies represent imagined captive communities to Britain, outliers but 
affixed to a central power, therefore punishable; barbaric, but still a responsibility to codify. As Schwarz 
(2011) notes, neither Empire nor decolonisation are considered external processes in Britain. With 
Whiteness considered home, and settler outposts replicating that familiarity, perceived attacks on white 
farmers were inflammatory. Britain as a metropole is imbued with coloniality, bolstered by the 
Commonwealth- this is reflected in its poor observance of sovereignty and lack of real decolonial 
commitment. Despite narratives of mutual respect, the country actively protects colonial hierarchies 
within independent states. 
Indigenous people were constructed as alien to their own land- outsiders rattling the gates of order, 
productivity, and legitimacy. In their rejection of land redistribution and decolonial justice, Western 
powers perpetuated the displacement of the indigenous physically and normatively. White colonialists 
gatekept ‘the native’ (Schwarz, 2011), so they translated Zimbabwe’s crisis to the metropole, capturing 
narratives of authenticity and victimhood for themselves over black generations’ pain. The othering and 
silencing of indigenous people and black discourses allowed for their subsequent construction as villains, 
and the state as rogue, “illegitimate and irrational” (Talbot, 2002). This is emphasised by Britain’s 
prevention of SADC countries speaking in support of Zimbabwe at the 2003 Commonwealth meeting 
(Hasu and Patel, 2006).  
Britain simultaneously removed itself from Zimbabwe’s story (ignoring its colonial atrocities, land theft, 
and commitment to land reform) and reinserted itself as a defender of human rights and order. While 
condemning the supposed instability caused by the Zimbabwean government, Blair’s own government 
attempted to create conditions sparking unrest within Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, the perception that land 




deeply paternalistic attitudes to former colonies by Western countries. Britain took on the right to 
pronounce on the land question over Zimbabweans themselves (Palmer, 1989), enabling itself to dictate 
terms without honouring those agreed upon independence. It is unsurprising that alongside the revival 
of wartime language, vice signalling and siege mentality, Zimbabwe turned once again to wartime ally 
and ‘all weather friend’, China (Gu et al. 2016). 
Zimbabwean agency in surviving sanctions 
Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy, while never strictly formalised, emerged in about 2003 in response to 
the British-led siege. As the situation became increasingly desperate, the government sought allies and 
trade partners outside of the Western sphere of influence (Chigora and Dewa, 2009) such as China, 
Malaysia, Iran, and Russia (Zengeni, 2016). Citizens were urged to ‘look East’ for business, tourism, 
and education. Conversations shifted: a relative began importing Chinese eyeliners; newspapers listed 
winners of scholarships to Iran; we greeted Chinese couples visiting Mosi Oa Tunya; my high-school 
began offering Mandarin classes. This doesn’t seem to be slowing, either. Even after the dust settled 
after land reform, and President Mnangagwa’s Second Republic’s efforts to court the West, 
Zimbabweans are still looking East. Many Zimbabweans study in China, Malaysia and Russia and one 
regularly encounters people returning from business in China on flights home. I still see the yellow and 
red hardwood pencils in stationary tubs in shops, first imported on a mass scale when we ran out of 
pens, and then out of paper.  
Zimbabwe’s stand against neo-liberalism and discourse of pro-poor black empowerment resonated with 
other African states. Thus, Zimbabwe’s pariah label and weakness were reappropriated as advantage 
and allowed the state to project African leadership through a politically productive martyr identity 
nationally, and the elder figure of Mugabe individually. These maintained the solidarity of SADC and 
much of the AU, who condemned British interference as an “extraordinary sense of 
superiority…backward and reactionary” (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). This impacted European 
cohesion on Zimbabwe, as the leverage of these blocs pressured European states to go against British 
will (Chafer, 2005). More widely, Zimbabwe became symbolic of global threads of discontent about 
the inequal global system, and could manipulate this position creatively to survive (Chigora and Edson, 
2011). Britain internationalised its bilateral conflict with Zimbabwe intending to create a universal 
villain, but drew the attention of the global South to the illogicality of Western institutions hurting 
poorer nations to ‘help’ them (Ogbonna, 2017). Shielded by China in the UN, Zimbabwe kept its 
battles on home territory in African institutions, where countries like South Africa refused to be 
Britain’s ‘stone-throwers’ (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010). 
China and other Eastern nations have been portrayed as outliers in the international system, powerful 
and vaguely threatening. However, this role again assumes the West to be a centre from which 




and language such as “resource-hungry China” being juxtaposed against positive portrayals of the USA’s 
military-heavy initiatives (Smith, 2012). Discourse places Western powers as underdogs being 
overtaken by China- this portrays Western influence as a lesser evil, non-threatening, or altruistic. The 
logic of trade between the East and African nations, however, is conveyed in language of complicity in 
human rights violence- ‘see no evil’ terms (Tull, 2008). Power imbalances and extractive, often 
exploitative aspects of the relationships are stressed and scrutinised, casting Eastern powers as inherently 
unethical against implied Western benevolence.  
However, it is simplistic to attribute deepening Sino-African engagement to complicity between rogue 
states. This allows for a narrative of abnormality to rise around othered states in the East and global 
South, obscuring the logic of these relations.  Most of the world’s population exist in the global South- 
this population has also been the victims of colonialism and imperial violence. Countries like China and 
India have developed more recently, overcoming colonial pasts. As such, parties can build relationships 
on mutually empowering discourse of South-South co-operation: Chinese interest in Africa is framed 
as ‘the poor helping the poor’ (Tan-Mulin et al, 2010). As disingenuous as this seems, it is no more 
inauthentic than the West’s claims to democratic commitment, and holds significant narrative strength. 
Constructing a turn to China as abnormal or irrational suggests a reality where the continuance of 
Western threats, interference, and violence is normal. The invalidation of poorer countries’ efforts to 
seek alternatives fails to acknowledge the continued damage wrought on their societies and economies 
by Western institutions in the name of ‘nation building’. 
Sino-African trade first developed in the 1950s, based on political solidarity (Scoones et al, 2013), with 
the 60s onwards seeing military partnerships with anti-colonialists rise in importance (Debongo and 
Wu, 2020). For Zimbabwe, cultural exchanges and scholarship opportunities hark back to the war, 
when a number of nationalists studied and trained in China (Alexander et al., 2017), or encountered 
those who had. With many nationalists now political leaders (Ismael, 1971), as well as parents and 
grandparents of the generation studying in China at the present, Eastern links are a longstanding feature 
in Zimbabwean lives. Chinese aid only shifted from ideological to economically motivated post-1995 
but is more continuous and multifaceted than given credit for (Bräutigam, 2011). Internally, a 
continuity of Chinese rhetoric that emphasizes fraternity and references African support in securing 
China as a UN member (Bei, 2019) highlights mutuality in Sino-African allyship. 
Building on this, the Zimbabwean government could subvert some sanctions economically, but also 
through the transformation of trade into a performative cultural-political symbol. Where the West 
attempted to discredit the state, it in fact drew credibility from its outsider status, juxtaposed against 
neo-imperial coercion. The ‘sloganized’ Look East Policy (Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013) allowed the 
government a framework to perform resistance and agency, as well as access aid. Chinese state media 




allyship but also Zimbabwean choice, allowing for a show of equality where the conditionality of 
Western aid overtly undercuts Southern assertions of autonomy, and disempowers governments. 
It must be noted that China’s presence in Africa is considerably less entrenched (Bräutigam, 2011; 
Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013) than the USA and the former colonisers, but this must not be taken for 
granted.  Focus on Chinese aid being solely economically-driven has understated the pursuit of soft 
power (Shambaugh, 2013). Zimbabwe’s land reform coincided with the establishment of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation, strengthening Chinese ties to African nations under the diplomacy-
oriented Ministry of Foreign Affairs. State support for firms entering Africa (Gu, 2011), and the 
establishment of the China-Africa Development Fund, indicates a long-term commitment to 
relationships, while concerted efforts to engage diplomatically on pan-African and national levels work 
to communicate China’s authenticity as a “voice of the developing world, critical of traditional donors” 
(Gu et al. 2016). Importantly, African governments stand to gain forms of soft power internally from 
these interactions by displaying autonomy from the West and performing anti-colonial discourse. After 
the failures of Western-imposed structural adjustment programmes, China’s development model offers 
a means to develop without weakening the state (Scoones et al, 2013), while Chinese Official 
Development Assistance is shown to effectively stimulate recipients, of which Zimbabwe ranks in the 
top five (ChinaPower Project, 2021). Debongo and Wu (2020) found a broad range of Africans believed 
China did not threaten internal decision-making, and that there was greater opportunity for equal 
partnership with China than the West, with only 8% viewing the ‘One Road, One Belt’ FDI initiative 
negatively. Notably, Chinese efforts made to communicate with locals is contrasted to Western 
immigrant workers, perceived to live overtly luxurious lifestyles (Bräutigam, 2013) in the Western aid 
industry with fewer efforts to interact locally- visually reminiscent of coloniality. 
We must therefore go beyond perceptions of African states as passive partners and acknowledge their 
assertiveness in pursuing ties with China. This looks to heighten as the African Union increasingly 
focuses on BRICS countries (Gu et al., 2016). African states exercise considerable agency in pursuing 
and utilising Sino-African interactions, and are able to ensure largely beneficial outcomes (Mohan and 
Lampert, 2013; Scoones et.al, 2013). In being pressured into seeking new opportunities, and opening 
as a new market as trade with the West faltered, Zimbabwe strengthened relationships with countries 
outside of Britain’s sphere of influence, able to leverage its vulnerability. There is a positive correlation 
between the prospective size of the market and Chinese investment (Chen, Dollar, and Tang, 2018; 
Maswana, 2015) – with its own manufacturing failing, Zimbabwe became a fairly attractive prospect. 
Chinese request-based funding allows for governments to exercise agency and decide their own 
priorities (Bräutigam, 2013). For the Zimbabwean government, this meant the ability to perform anti-
colonial discourse, and position new trade within a continuum of resistance that affirmed Zimbabwe’s 
political trajectory as in line with its revolutionary history, with China an ally against Britain both pre- 




China Wanjin Agricultural Development Ltd (equipping new farmers to train in commercial 
agriculture (Gu et al, 2016)) and Tian Ze’s tobacco outgrowing, have been a lifeline to the rural economy 
(Scoones et al, 2013), normalising and assisting black ownership. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the success of the Look East Policy is open to analysis on multiple levels. Zimbabwe is still far 
from wealthy- far even from secure- and it could not curb mass emigration. After decades of sanctions, 
it is difficult to tell what the country’s trajectory would have been, and how much the current economic 
woes can be attributed to these sanctions (Ndakaripa, 2020), ineptitude, or the outcomes (or lack 
thereof) of an Eastern focus. An estimated 54% of Zimbabwe’s productive potential was lost between 
2000 and 2010 (Magure, 2012). One may assess it in terms of the practical and the existential.  
Practically, the policy was a lifeline in some of the country’s hardest times. It developed new 
opportunities and established new trading routes, especially for small businesses. Zimbabwe’s power, 
mining, and agricultural sectors received impactful infrastructural and mechanical assistance (Chigure 
and Dewa, 2009, Mude, 2016), alongside loans. Many ordinary Zimbabweans travel regularly to and 
from China and the Emirates to buy products for resale, and Chinese investment has provided crucial 
injections of capital and infrastructural assistance. However, undercutting of local industry by the influx 
of Eastern product has been a significant problem. While these products were beneficial in the years 
where Zimbabwean industry folded, these have hindered their revival (Chipaike and Mhandara, 2013; 
Gukurume, 2019; Kushata, 2017). Further, scholars like Lorenzo (2007), Maswana (2015), and Moyo 
and Mdlongwa (2014) have raised concerns of neo-colonialism, highlighting exploitative dynamics. 
Employing a more constructivist view, the policy was important in battling disengagement within 
Zimbabwe. Presenting Eastern countries as exciting new opportunities and willing partners, the policy 
gave ordinary Zimbabweans options at a time when doors seemed to be shutting to them. It provided 
a discourse of progression and momentum as conditions within the country seemed to stagnate, tying 
Zimbabwe to the rise of the East. It signified the agency of the country in refusing to bow to external 
pressure. An assertation of sovereignty, the Look East Policy was extremely important in 
communicating a commitment to land reform, and therefore a certain government strength and 
assertiveness, even as the country struggled greatly in the face of Western pressure.  
For all the efforts to discount Sino-African trade, in this case Britain handed China the narrative tools 
to maintain an anti-colonial face, and draw on a positive history of decolonial aid.  It is necessary for 
European governments to take real steps to remedy the paternalistic, colonial dynamics prevailing to 
the present-day (Bräutigam, 2013) and allow African countries to exercise their sovereignty and agency 




forward (Korkmaz, 2019; Sylla, n.d.). The sense that agreements made with African countries are less 
binding, or that the will of indigenous people is dismissible, must be challenged if Europe and African 
countries are to have healthy, mutually beneficial relationships. Likewise, if European countries are 
going to maintain power in the global system, there is an urgent need to rebrand, as China looks to 
grow in influence and power not only through its industries and productivity, but through Western 
countries’ dogmatic replication of colonial discourse and norms. As Namibia and South Africa both 
grapple with a volatile land question (Chigora and Dewa, 2009; Mubecua and Mlambo, 2021; Progress 
Namibia, 2018) with calls for colonialists to “face up” (Melber, 2017), Western discourse is again 
negative around the issue. With South Africa one of China’s biggest partners in Africa, and deals with 
China most numerous in Southern and East Africa (Chen, Dollar, and Tang, 2018), it would be unwise 
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3.7 Russia and India, Best Friends for Ever? An Honest 




“Russia is India’s best friend.” 
“Sure, but only because they’re not your neighbour!” 
This essay came about because of conversations between an American with Lithuanian roots and his 
Indian girlfriend, conversations that caused both to spend time thinking about how and where and 
when they had grown up and what they had learned about some of the same things along the way. I am 
an American and do not pretend to be anything else, but Lithuania is my second home, where my family 
still lives and where I return whenever I can. I did not grow up in a Soviet country, and I did not live 
through the tumultuous aftermath of the Union’s collapse – something nevertheless seen as an 
overwhelmingly good thing in the eyes of the Balts. But I have spent a substantial portion of my life 
trying to understand that specific part of the world and the fears, hopes, and dreams of its people, my 
relatives and friends. I can never be precisely one of them, but perhaps I can be a useful intermediary 
from time to time. 
What this essay is about, then, is really how both of us grew up thinking about Russia and the United 
Kingdom, their relationships with our respective “homelands”, and the stark differences in our 
perceptions we discovered quite by chance when the subject arose. What does India’s relationship with 
the United Kingdom offer by way of example to Russians and Lithuanians, as distinct from the states 
of Russia and Lithuania? What roles are played by language, culture, and ideas of status? How do Russia 
and Britain feature in popular imagination? Hero, villain, something in between? This essay does not 
pretend to have found any answers, but perhaps through honest dialogue it can propose helpful 
questions and demonstrate why such dialogue is good for its own sake at an individual level. 
In the beginning, it is important to note that when I use phrases like “Russia” or “Britain” I am not 
actually referring to Russian or British citizens or even necessarily to the Russian or British governments 
and states. Instead, what I intend is more the individualized, imaginary personification of a country 
which each of us produces and carries in our own minds. This imaginary personification, or archetype, 
does not have to be “real” in order to influence how we think. In fact, it is the imaginary which often 




how well it may match concrete reality. They are not the extent of our knowledge about something, but 
rather, what comes to mind first when we think of something in the abstract, carrying the greatest 
emotional weight. Archetypes are ideal types, and even though the archetypes each person holds in their 
minds about specific things will be different in some ways from those held by everyone else, it is still 
possible to discuss archetypes as being shared, albeit imperfectly. Models, as they say, are always wrong 
but sometimes useful. 
At present, the Lithuanian archetype of Russia is unlikely to assist in producing positive change in the 
currently fraught political relations between the two countries. Russia is a malevolent figure, 
untrustworthy and malicious. There was real fear in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of eastern 
Ukraine in 2014 that Lithuania might be next. The government published a small booklet telling 
citizens how to survive in the woods, find food, and make shelters, a throwback to the partisan war of 
the 1940s and 1950s against the Soviets. Conscription was reintroduced, defence spending was greatly 
increased, and military exercises with NATO allies multiplied. 
I was part of one of those exercises in 2014, Operation Atlantic Resolve. I remember walking through 
Vilnius past the presidential palace at one point. There is a large square in front of the entrance, with 
three flag poles. In 2010, these had all held national flags. Now in 2014, they flew NATO and EU 
flags, while the square had been filled with large free-standing frames containing photographs of various 
world leaders (Barak Obama and Angela Merkel were especially prominent) shaking hands with the 
then-president of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė. The message was clear. Back off, Russia, or you can 
expect to hear from our friends. 
One of the things we did a lot of during our time in the Baltic in 2014 were airborne operations – 
parachuting out of planes carrying weapons and gear in order to land and conduct follow-on missions, 
like airfield seizures. One friend, whose job it was to survey potential drop zones related the following 
story to me, as told to him by a Lithuanian soldier accompanying him. He was warned to watch out for 
a tall, spiky plant called Hogweed. If touched, the plant had small spines that produced an enormous 
and extraordinarily painful rash. The Lithuanian soldier said that they had not had such plants in the 
past, and that they were a recent arrival from elsewhere. “It came from the east,” he said. “Like all bad 
things.” 
This negative association with Russia is deep-rooted, and not especially unreasonable, given Lithuania’s 
history with its neighbour. Over the last 275 years, Lithuania has been invaded, occupied, partitioned, 
annexed, or some combination of all of the above at least eight times by the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet Union alone (1768, 1792, 1794, 1830, 1863, 1918, 1940, and 1944). Suspicion seems justified, 
under the circumstances, particularly as the current Russian Federation has done little to allay the 




at the drop of a hat. Its most recent actions in Ukraine have firmly cemented the distrust of its 
neighbours for yet another generation. 
The Indian experience with the United Kingdom and the resulting archetypes it produced shares many 
similarities. When Indians think of “Britain”, much like the Lithuanians thinking of Russia, they think 
of violence, Partition (with a capital letter, in this case, referring specifically to the events of 1947), 
humiliation, large-scale theft, grandiose rhetoric about civilization that masked selfish and mean-
spirited aims, insidious and omnipresent racism, and cultural and linguistic hegemony. “Britain” is wily, 
duplicitous, always seeking an advantage, and never to be trusted. 
Some excellent portrayals of this archetype can be easily found in contemporary Bollywood to illustrate 
the point. My personal favourite is the 2001 film Lagaan, which translates as “Tax”. Set in 1893, a 
group of villagers appeal to their Raja for a tax reprieve, as the monsoon rains have failed and they are 
unable to grow enough crops to pay. The Raja is initially busy watching the local British garrison play 
a game of cricket, which the villagers do not understand and make fun of from the side lines. A 
particularly villainous British officer, Captain Russell, who speaks atrociously-accented Hindi overhears 
them and challenges them to a match in three months, saying that if they win, they will not have to pay 
taxes for three years, but if they lose, they will have to pay a triple tax this year. The film’s hero, played 
by Aamir Khan, accepts the challenge despite having no idea how to play the game but certain the 
villagers can learn in time. Secretly coached by the officer’s sister (who falls in love with Aamir Khan’s 
character in the process), the village team eventually wins in a nail-bitingly close finish. The story 
concludes with the officer who made the challenge having to pay the missing taxes himself and being 
transferred to a posting in Central Africa, with the British garrison itself leaving a few years later. 
What made the film so interesting to me was first and foremost the way in which the British officers, 
particularly the villain, Captain Russell, were portrayed as almost cartoonishly evil. Even as a non-Hindi 
speaker, listening to him speak I could tell that he sounded ridiculous in Hindi. But this is made even 
more interesting because at the same time other British civilians and officers, beginning with Captain 
Russell’s sister but also including most of Captain Russell’s superiors, are portrayed as being much more 
sympathetic to the villagers. Even if we discount Captain Russell’s sister’s actions as being due to love, 
his superiors are extremely unhappy with his conduct and berate him for it, even sympathizing with the 
villagers at different points throughout the final cricket showdown. On the surface, the story seems very 
straightforward, as the heroic villagers defeat the arrogant British at their own game and everyone lives 
happily ever after. But scratch the surface, and even though the general picture remains the same, some 
of the details are subtly different. Humanity and sympathy are found at times from specific British 
characters and they individually are often portrayed positively, but the final scenes of the film showing 
the British garrison’s departure show these same individuals leaving alongside the especially unpleasant 




overshadowed by a larger-scale pattern of negative moral behaviour perfectly encapsulates India’s 
complicated relationship with the idea of Britain and the legacy that the colonial past has left. 
Moving to a real-life example of this nuance in the present, my girlfriend was able to compete for and 
win a scholarship offered by the British government to students from Commonwealth countries to read 
for a DPhil at Oxford. Yet we have gone to the British Museum and the Victoria and Albert Museum 
together on various occasions, and she has been able to point out item after item to me and explain how 
each was stolen, appropriated, or otherwise acquired through morally and legally dubious behaviour by 
the British in India. The United Kingdom today is seen in India as a prestigious place to study or work, 
but at the same time it is still a thief and an untrustworthy entity. The positive attributes Indians ascribe 
to Britain are certainly not shared by Lithuanians looking towards Russia. 
Racism is another area in which British-Indian relations have reached a strange middle ground. 
Although the sort of British to Indian racism depicted in Lagaan was both very real and very persistent, 
today it would be difficult to find someone like Captain Russell shouting things like, “You bloody slaves 
will remain under my boots!” and getting away with it. Though racism unquestionably still exists and 
plays out today, the way it manifests itself has changed, and the perpetrators can just as often be 
culturally anglicized Indians speaking to less culturally anglicized Indians as it could be “white” speaking 
to “brown”. In a very strange way, this goes to show just how successful the British were at influencing 
certain parts of Indian culture and causing many Indians to internalize and emulate completely external 
value systems, something which is rightly resented by many other Indians today. 
Returning back to the idea of British and Russian archetypes compared side by side, we find a great 
many commonalities between the Lithuanian and Indian experiences with external domination. I 
deliberately use the term external domination here because of the problems inherent in trying to blend 
the two concepts of post-socialism and post-colonialism together. 
Both peoples came to experience a sense of loss, debasement, and missed opportunities as a result of 
their interactions with their respective invasive states. During my master’s fieldwork in Vilnius in 2017, 
a theme that was repeated back to me, again and again, was that Russians – Soviet Union, Russian 
Empire, didn’t really matter – were uncultured and their primitive notions of economics, particularly 
under communism, had taken Lithuania from being one of the wealthiest and most advanced countries 
in Europe and reduced it to the ranks of the poorest and most economically backwards. The Russians 
had a reputation for stealing absolutely everything not nailed down, and if left alone long enough even 
the things that were. Likewise, my girlfriend explained to me how the British siphoned off the wealth 
of India for not just decades but centuries, a fact easily verifiable by a visit to practically any major 
London museum. Since the idea of colonialism was the economic benefit of the colonizing country, 
regardless of the economic outcome for the colony or colonies, this makes perfect sense. Yet I think the 




Lithuanian one with the Russians until I learned more about it from my girlfriend, despite the practical 
similarities. The saying in India was that the British had brought “the English language, cricket, and 
the railroads”, but took everything else in exchange, a poor deal if ever there was one and one that I can 
only now begin to properly appreciate the resentment for. After Lithuania declared its independence 
from the Soviet Union in 1990, Gorbachev attempted to coerce the country into returning to the Soviet 
fold by arguing that the newly-independent state owed the Soviet Union £21 billion for all of the 
infrastructure investments Moscow had made there since 1940. The parallels at times can be striking; 
Moscow and London both built the “railways” for their own benefit, but after the fact it was easy to 
chalk up such things to being done out of altruism instead. 
Apart from economics and material wealth, there is also the cultural imposition and domination which 
came with it. In India under British rule, English became the primary language of instruction in almost 
all formal education. Indian languages, literature, and sciences were actively demoted and devalued as 
compared to their English counterparts. Lord Macaulay, the author of the now infamous “Macaulay’s 
Minute” from 1835 which ultimately came to describe the official plan for the future of the Indian 
education system under British control, stated “A single shelf of a good European library is worth the 
whole native literature of India and Arabia.” He went on to say, “We must do our best to form a class 
who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian in 
blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, words and intellect.” This attitude and this ambition 
have quite obviously had a lasting impact on Indian education as well as Indian social hierarchies. Up 
to the present day even in an independent India, English is still perceived as the language of those who 
possess social status. To speak it fluently, particularly with a suitably “British” accent, is more prestigious 
than to speak any number of Indian languages. An Indian who speaks sufficiently “British” English is 
in a position to socially put down one who does not. As I have personally witnessed, it does not even 
matter how well the English language is actually spoken and comprehended – the cachet of simply 
sounding British matters more to many. 
Lithuanian experiences with Russian linguistic and cultural domination are similar enough to be worth 
comparing, though for a variety of reasons the legacy of Russian language and culture has played out 
differently than in India. Lithuania being much smaller and dramatically less heterogenous linguistically 
and culturally than India, there has been a more clear-cut pushback against all things Russian because 
there was a single alternative supported by the vast majority. In contrast, in India one reason that 
English continues to be widely spoken, apart from global economic considerations, has to do with 
regional linguistic politics – South Indians would rather speak English than the Hindi (or indeed any 
other language) of North Indians. Lithuanian press bans in 1865 under the Russian Empire lasted until 
1904, and then after the Soviet annexation in 1940, Russian was made the language of all official 
business and the education system began to strongly emphasize learning Russian, though teaching was 




between the languages and a reflexive repugnance for the imposed Russian was inculcated into 
generations of Lithuanians. Following independence in 1990, there was a dramatic shift away from 
Russian, which can be easily observed today: most Lithuanians in their late 30s or older can understand 
and often speak Russian as a foreign language, but anyone younger than that tends to speak and 
understand English instead. However, even those who can understand and speak Russian often refuse 
to do so absent a specific and pressing practical need. Speaking Russian is seen as being supportive in 
some way with the Soviet Union or the current Russian Federation, something that is undesirable to 
most. 
Having discussed the many similarities, it’s important to take note of some very important differences 
too. The first and most important of these have to do with the relative locations of Lithuania and Russia 
on the one hand, and India and the United Kingdom on the other. Lithuania and Russia share a border 
in the form of Kaliningrad, a heavily militarized Russian exclave. Lithuania’s eastern border also abuts 
Belarus, an authoritarian ally of Russia’s, whose military is heavily integrated into that of its larger 
neighbour. India by contrast is more than 6,000 kilometres straight line distance away from the United 
Kingdom. By any route one might physically travel, it is even further away. 
Second, Lithuania has a population of 2.7 million, compared to Russia’s 146 million. On the other 
hand, India has 1.38 billion compared to the United Kingdom’s 68 million. The distances involved 
combined with the respective population disparities help to demonstrate why Lithuanians live with a 
very specific and concrete fear of re-invasion and their own cultural erasure that Indians do not. This 
dynamic of fear and tension cannot help but colour their archetypal view of their neighbour. 
Finally, the outcomes of the independence of the two countries set different kinds of dynamics in 
motion locally. The collapse of the Soviet Union was largely peaceful; although many newly 
independent states emerged from the rubble, Russia remained as the biggest and most powerful country 
by far. Indian independence and Partition, on the other hand, was intensely bloody and traumatic. 
Perhaps as many as 20 million people were displaced, and up to two million were killed in waves of 
ethnic cleansing. The creation of Pakistan and the wars fought between the two states starting just 
months after their official beginnings – four as of 2021, not counting violent skirmishes – meant that 
the most important threat was no longer the British, but a neighbouring state. Now, three generations 
later, the British may still be the archetypal enemy and be blamed for causing the Partition in the first 
place, but Pakistan is the practical threat and the one who actually carried the Partition out. 
So, what do India and Lithuania have to say to one another when it comes to dealing with the legacies 
of domination and the continued, more or less mandatory interactions with the states that did the 
dominating? Russia for my girlfriend was a place that produced great literature and beautiful childhood 
stories, a source of scientific and industrial inspiration and technological know-how, and an eager 




slave labour camps staffed by Eastern Europeans who’d been mercilessly kidnapped, starved, and 
tortured. For me, the United Kingdom was an inoffensive country full of overly polite people, a beautiful 
island with bland food, unpleasant weather, and an interesting history. For my girlfriend, it was the 
source of most of her home country’s misery, imperial, condescending, rapacious, humiliating, and 
casually brutal behind a mask of supposed Christian civilization. I do not believe that any of the 
archetypes that we hold of these countries, good or bad, are precisely wrong. States are made up of 
millions or billions of individuals, and compressing all of those actions and intentions down into a truly 
representative archetype is effectively impossible. 
The value in these archetypes, as I see it, is that they allow us to have these sorts of conversations 
between individuals in the first place even though no archetypes can ever be truly representative. The 
archetypes we hold within ourselves represent tentative starting points rather than the sum total of our 
understanding of the world around us. They’re the inherited homes that we eventually learn to leave 
behind as we go out into the world on our own and experience more and more of it, eyes and ears open. 
The true worth of an archetype lies in the dialogue with others that it allows us to begin. Through the 
process itself, we can come to appreciate one another’s perspectives, especially when these are 
dramatically different from our own, and appreciate the reasons why they are different in the first place. 
This makes it possible for us to have serious discussions about things we may disagree on, or at any rate 
initially see very differently. Listening to my girlfriend and trying to put myself in her shoes, my own 
archetypal portrait of the United Kingdom became at least a little more nuanced and less blindly 
positive. She in turned was shocked by many of the things I told her about Russia and found 
Solzhenitsyn an especially compelling reading. Both of us, through honest and respectful conversation, 
added a little more detail to our respective archetypes. Our feelings towards Russia and the United 
Kingdom became just a little more complicated, coming just a little closer to a truer reflection of reality. 












A selfie from and for mankind 
On Christmas Day 1968, a special Christmas Card was sent to mankind. This day, the picture 
“Earthrise” was taken by US-astronaut William Anders. For the first time, a whole picture of planet 
earth was shown. According to the crew of Apollo 8, who has taken this picture, the whole universe 
seemed to be dark, just one coloured spot in the middle, emphasising, that Earth really looked like just 
one planet, or to be more poetic, to speak with the words of commander Frank Borman: “It was the 
only thing in space that had any color to it. Everything else was either black or white, but not the earth” 
(Borman, 1988, p. 212). Appealing to that magical moment, author Norman Cousins argued in 1975, 
that the historic moment could be found less in mankind setting a foot on the moon, than setting an 
eye on Earth (NASA, 1976, p. 44). Consequently, it could be argued that on Christmas day 1968 
mankind was taking the first group selfie, embracing all human beings, mirroring who we are and who 
we want to be.  
Building upon this little spacefaring story, attitudes and behaviours towards others, other people, other 
countries, other cultures… are mostly based on how we perceive the world. Already Plato’s Allegory of 
the Cave emphasizes the importance of visual behaviour. In this cave the difference between things as 
they really are and as they appear to us becomes visible (Plato, 2009, p. 198). Based upon this allegory, 
the pictorial turn; - a scientific focus on the influence of visual artefacts; - was coined by art historian 
William Mitchell, who invented the famous slogan: “You can hang a picture, you can't hang an image” 
(Mitchel, 2009, p. 320). Here, the different features of pictures and images become obvious. The picture 
presents the object, as it is, according to its materiality, such as for instance a marble sculpture or a 
painting, simply put the item as it is. Conversely, the image stands for the virtual abstraction of mind, 
referring to the allegory of the shadows of the visual (ibid. p.321ff.). This distinction can be found in 
the two diverging terms of visibility and visuality. Visibility appeals to the social construction a certain 
visual artefact presents, conveying its meaning. Visuality is a feature, addressing the emotions, ideas, 
and images that are triggered in the mind of the observer, being active in doing something. Put in other 
words, visibility deconstructs, meanwhile visuality creates (Callahan, 2020, p. 19). Doing research on 




(ibid. p.25). Discussing cartography in the context of colonialism raises the question of what is shown 
on the map, as what is not shown on the map. This contribution approaches mapping from two sides. 
On one side the first part will look at the history of cartography as a constitutive aspect of colonisation. 
On another side, the second part will focus on mental maps, including a discussion about visual 
education as a path for the decolonisation of the mind.   
Building upon this introduction into visual literacy, this chapter is structured as following. The first part 
will present the evolution of maps as a tool for visualising the world and worldviews of power. The 
second part will introduce the concept of mental maps, as individual representations of cultural attitudes. 
The third part shows the importance of nation branding as a tool for getting attention from a global 
audience. The fourth part will discuss some educational proposals that might support the decolonising 
of mind. Concluding an outlook from outside towards inside into the visuality of globalisation will be 
given.  
 
Mapping as the first framing of the world  
“We are living in a global world”. This statement is claimed by politics, economics, science, education 
and many more sectors alike. For that reason, some conceptions or pictures of globalisation are needed 
to grasp the essentials of the visible/invisible process called globalisation. This part will show that 
historically cartography has been less about depicting a certain landscape through science but revealing 
certain concepts about power and superiority.  
When doing research for this contribution, I suddenly stumbled over a fascinating video called “World 
in the last 200 years!1”. This video showed the evolution of countries from the year 1800 until today. 
However, when showing this video to a colleague he attentively noticed that it seemed like no African 
countries were shown on the map until the period of decolonisation starting in the 1950s. Watching 
that video, it seemed that especially Africa did not exist until the moment foremost European colonisers 
have put it onto the map, neglecting the long history of African culture, taking the profound history of 
kingdoms such as Abyssinia, which apart from a short period of Italian colonialism (1936-1941) existed 
from 980 BC to 1974 AC.  
Human beings have the power to create meaning out of nothing (Léon, 2016, p. 85). According to an 
analysis of 30 textbooks from various countries for students between 16 and 19 years, globalisation was 
mostly depicted in the terms of information and technology. Mostly, those are the tools needed to 
 





explore, discover, and civilise the world, presented as a naturalistic inevitable process currently taking 
place (ibid. p. 86). Visualising information through the technology of maps traces back towards a long 
history. However, maps never just presented a depiction of reality. Conversely, cartographers used a 
very anthropomorphic approach, through revealing a deeper meaning by symbols and allegories, often 
included as an embellishment at the frame of the map. This to be said, maps could be considered less a 
representation of the world, but rather a representation of power, showing who governs those worlds 
Having a look at the first maps of the world designed in Europe the world was not presented according 
to the geographical knowledge of that time, yet, rather providing a deeper and hidden meaning through 
the use of symbols and allegories. Here, Europe was put in the centre as a “symbol of culture and 
civilization” (Barron, 2008, p. 445). In contrast to that, medieval Arab maps for instance put the Arab 
world in the centre, depicting the world as a bird with the Arabian Peninsula as a head Asia and Africa 
as wings and Europe as the tail (Tibbetts, 1992, p. 91). 
For a long time, maps of the world were formed through literature, where visual depictions only served 
as some form of supplement. Mostly people relied on narratives and stories for orientation in unknown 
territories, where even the Quran provides a wide range of geographical descriptions (EI-Sayed, 1992, 
p. 158). During the Golden Age of Islam, ranging from the 8th to the 14th century, Arab scholars 
established the fundaments of modern cartography by combing the projections of Ptolemy with 
mathematical skills, coming from the scientific tradition of India and Persia (Tibbetts, 1992, p. 92). 
The most iconic artefact is the Nuzhat al-mushtāq fī ikhtirāq al-āfāq ("The Excursion of One Who is 
Eager to Traverse the Regions of the World") in the West mostly known as Tabula Rogeriana conceived 
by the Arab Scholar Muhammad al-Idrisi (1100-1164). Al-Idrisi was born in what today is Morocco 
and travelled throughout Europe and the Middle East, presenting the most comprehensive map known 
in European and Arab world during that time (Bacharach, 2006, p. 140). Along with the colonisation 
of the world, methods of cartography constantly improved, new regions and countries suddenly 
appeared on the map complementing the picture drawn of the world, getting a better understanding of 
the globe.   
During the political turbulences of the 19th century satirical maps first “brought people and leaders onto 
the map, like actors on a stage, and then absorbed them into the very map itself” (Barron, 2008, p. 446). 
Looking at the map shown beyond, some general aspects of mental maps as a tool to express attitudes 
and worldviews become obvious. Mental maps do not present the world according to geographical 
patterns but through personal cultural impression. Those will be discussed in the next part. Probably 
those satirical maps could be considered as a prototype for nowadays memes, commenting on current 
politics, mocking people in charge. The map beyond depicts the turbulence of the year of revolution 
1848 when the popular demands for more democratic participation of the people came to an end. What 




personification of a Prussian soldier or other regions through certain stereotypes of European countries 
depicted in the form of military uniforms as a symbol of power and conflict.  
 
Figure 1 Rundgemälde von Europa im August MDCCCXLIX (1849)                                                                   
by Ferdinand Schröder in Düsseldorfer Monatshefte. 1849 
 
Hereby, it is less what is seen on the maps, but rather what is not seen on the maps, that makes critical 
cartography fruitful for decolonisation studies. Taking for instance medieval maps, the focus was put 
less on practical use for navigation as to reveal concepts, such as foremost the Christian mission to 
conquer and civilise the world (Bellone et al., 2020, p. 21). Science and technology, as shown above in 
the example of textbooks, were never neutral but a tool for legitimizing power. Visually spoken, this 
claim became obvious with Flemish mathematician Gerardus Mercator in the 16th century. The 
Mercator projection became a standard for designing globes. However, as a side effect this method led 
to a distortion exaggerating the size of the Northern Hemisphere while belittling the Southern 
Hemisphere. Greenland incorrectly appeared to be the same size as Africa. In 1973 eventually, German 
historian Arno Peters presented the Peters projection, respecting a more equal representation of the 




Referring back to the concept of maps as a two-dimensional depiction of geographic phenomena can 
be found in the conception of Globalisation according to Wallerstein, providing the following 
definition: “Globalisation represents the triumph of a capitalist world economy tied together by a global 
division of labour” (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 11). Building upon that, the new world system could be 
distributed into three different categories. There is the Core, referring to the older industrial centres in 
North America, Europe, and Japan. Transnational corporations have their headquarters located here. 
Secondly, the Semiperiphery describes centres, which are industrialising fast such as Mexico, Brazil, or 
Korea. Finally, there is the Periphery, what seems to be left from global economic chains. Such areas 
comprise the Ural, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa. There, only little industry can be 
found, the economy was defined as mostly determined by agrarian production. The status attributed to 
a country within those networks might determine the potential for development within this global world 
(Friedmann and Wolff, 1982, 310ff.). Nevertheless, this concept appears to not be fitting anymore for 
an ever more digital and global world to emerge through interconnected networks.  
 
Mental Maps as a meaning of the world  
A common English saying states that seeing is believing. According to what we see, everybody draws 
certain conclusions, contributing to the forming of impressions and beliefs. Having discussed physical 
aspects of cartography and colonisation, this part will focus on the psychological aspects along the 
concept of mental maps for the (de)-colonisation of the mind. 
Amongst navigation systems, maps are considered accurate devices to depict geographical phenomena 
on a two-dimensional scale. However, this argument is not applicable to medieval maps. Those mappae 
mundi contained more information than modern maps, telling stories about history, traditions, religion, 
and myths revealing conceptions about earth, cosmos as the position of mankind within (Choubey and 
Bansal, 2017, p. 41). Put in other words, those medieval maps give an overview of how people of that 
time viewed the world ought to be. Appealing to those maps of the world as views of the world, the 
Brazilian born Israelian philosopher Marcelo Dascal defined the term of colonisation of mind. Besides 
taking control of the land, as seen on maps of the colonial empires, the purpose of colonialism was to 
take control of the mind of the people. Imposing new forms of seeing should make people unconsciously 
relinquishing their own cultural norms, considering those inferior to patterns of seeing the world, 
tradition and norms brought by the colonisers (Dascal, 2007, p. 1). The goal was to alienate the 
colonised from their identity, imposing the colonised identity of the colonisers (Biko, 2004, p. 45).  
This brings us to the concept of mental maps. According to the French urbanist Henri Lefebvre every 
space can be distributed into three categories. Isotopy describes space simply as spatial extension without 




cities. Utopia eventually reveals what a certain space should become. Here people endow certain values 
such as home to it (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 39). Mental maps are individual tools for sense making, enriching 
certain spots with values, history, culture, and identity. Those maps reveal how each individual person 
is emotionally attached to a certain spot. Giving a clarifying example, American psychologist Stanley 
Milgram asked passersby to draw a picture of their Paris. Conversely to a tourist map, those locals draw 
pictures of their neighbourhood emphasizing aspects like the local café, shops, parks, or places of work 
(Milgram, 1976, p. 93). Every reader is invited to draw a personal mental map after reading this chapter, 
making visible what might be characteristic for your country, region, or city, wherever that might be. 
Mental maps emphasize identity and emotional attachment to a certain place. 
Nowadays, facing the digital means of our millennium; “Globalisation is a compression of time and 
space” (Harvey, 1989, p. 284). Taking digital nomads, just in time production or instant news coverage 
through social media, it seems that space and time are losing their importance. Traditional maps used 
for navigation seem to have lost their power, as nowadays everybody has access to them. However, those 
were replaced by new types, this time mental maps.  
Looking onto a map seems like looking onto a picture. There is a perspective to look at a scenery as 
there is a centre and a periphery. However, appealing to the renowned Information Society, what is 
striking, so more information so less knowledge. According to Fleck ´s Law, every new knowledge 
reveals just more things that are still unknown. However, information is not equal to information: 
“Information is reported, Knowledge is produced” (Krohn, 2003, p. 100). Knowledge depends on the 
given context, consequently, facing the rise of information, there is no centre anymore, yet different 
perspectives from various networks looking onto the world. 
“There is no "top" to the World-Wide Web. You can look at it from many points of view”. Those word 
were among the first to be published at the first website, launched on 6th of August 19912. This 
corresponds to Manuel Castells proposal of a network society Globalisation is shaped by the corporation 
of space of flows and space of place... The space of flows consists of investment, ideas, persons not 
bound to a certain place. Those are hovering around searching for a spot to land, as there is no place 
existing by itself within those flows (Castells, 2010, p. 442). Nevertheless, those spaces of flow meet the 
space of place, or to be more precise the space where people spend their daily life. Space of flow 
embodies aspects like investment or skilled workforce in search for the place that seems to provide the 
best infrastructure for their demands (ibid. p.458). Attracting spaces of flow countries promises lucrative 
outlooks, why regions as space of place search to become a landing strip or nodal hub in those networks. 
 




At this point, mental maps are retrieved as tools for navigating through an ever more complex world. 
The Japanese urbanist Takashi Machimura emphasizes: “No global city story can be understood without 
reference to the local processes, which give it its substantial form” (Machimura, 1998, p. 184). 
Consequently, individuals, regions, and nations are confronted with the challenge of asking what is 
their position in that network, who do they want to be? Reminding to the video mentioned in the 
previous part, it seems that Africa just did come into existence, when suddenly it appeared on the minds 
and maps of European colonisers. Similar to dealing with mental maps, it seems that certain regions 
come into existence on those maps, when there is something interesting worth remembering. Therefore, 
regions and countries have to attract global attention so as not being forgotten. Here, the challenge 
seems to consist in balancing the demands of global competition and the heritage of local traditions, 
ensuring local and global integration alike (Brenner and Keil, 2014, p. 13). Every spot eager to benefit 
from Globalisation has to offer something for being part of the network. However, adapting to global 
competition while preserving certain cultural norms and identity is not an easy task. The figure beyond, 
adapted from urban research, gives an idea of these challenges taking the case study of the medieval city 
of Nuremberg and its evolutionary branding over time (Raab, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 2 Challenges of local and global integration (Raab, Stephan 2018) 
 
Here, the city is facing two challenges. On the one side there is the global system (Systemintegration), 
where every city and country searches to be part of for being part of the global world. On the other side, 
there are the local patterns (Sozialintegration) defined through the political system, economic 




attached to a certain space, willing to contribute to shaping this identity. Transferred to the global level, 
this identity, or more precisely what the global audience assumes to be the identity, determines how the 
city is perceived and assessed, evaluating chances for investing attention or even moving there. If there 
is a particular identity there might be a spot on the mental map, otherwise to put it quite harshly for 
the global audience of politics, economics, and culture this place might not exist, might be neglected.  
 
See to be seen or Nation Branding 
“Imagine” is a famous song by John Lennon, cherishing the dream of a mankind united in sharing just 
one world despite differences in wealth and culture. Referring to the concept of “Imagined 
Communities” by Benedict Anderson, based on common history, culture, norms and values, members 
of a certain network define their membership through sharing an “imagined world” (Anderson 1983, 
6f.). Until now the difference between physical maps as visual depictions of the word and mental maps 
as a psychological representation of individual world views has been discussed.  This part will elaborate 
more on the mental maps, discussing aspects of how to appear on those maps through Nation Branding.  
Through lenses of culture, perceptions, attitudes, and images of the world are shaped. A classical centre-
periphery is no longer applicable to our global embeddedness in various networks. Nowadays, it is rather 
about the perspective from where Globalisation is perceived and shaped. According to Indian 
geographer Arjun Apparduai, global image flows can be described along five dimensions. Technoscapes 
reflect the high interconnectedness of complex modern technology. Financescape depicts the 
international flow of capital. Ethnoscapes describe images of certain spots created by migrants, business 
travellers or tourists. Together with Ideoscapes and Mediascapes, they determine certain ideas about a 
country or a region, making it either interesting or rather uninteresting for further observation by global 
eyes (Appadurai, 1990, pp. 296–300). Depending on that perception, decisions for attention, migration, 
or investment are taken. A country with a good reputation such as Switzerland might have less trouble 
in attracting global attention, meanwhile smaller countries located more in the south are facing more 
challenges for being taken into consideration by a global audience (Anholt, 2020, p. 8). The 
attractiveness of a certain branding has been measured by the Nation Branding Index since 2005, giving 
an overview of which countries are perceived best globally, in terms of values, norms, aesthetics, 
relevance in the world as the technological advancement (ibid p.26). 
Regarding the importance of images there are two questions to be answered. How does a country see 
the world? What is there to show the world to be seen? Here, bigger countries might have an advantage, 
as countries such as the United States or Germany are known for something. Conversely, rather small 
countries in the global south struggle to build their own identity, which can be shown to and seen by 




regions. Dissociating from the rather capitalist perception Simon Anholt offers an alternative 
perception. In “The Good Country Equation” he argues that Globalisation should be seen less through 
the eyes of competition but rather by looking for corporation, facing global challenges ahead (Anholt, 
2020, p. 2). Instead of looking at what every country can take out of globalisation, this equation looks 
at what every country might contribute to the global challenges. Bhutan, a rather small country in the 
Himalayan Mountains is a great example. Probably, a lot of people do not know the first thing about 
its history, but they do know about the Bhutanese Gross National Happiness (ibid. p.58). 
Consequently, this index pledges for a dual mandate of every nation, thinking about its own citizens, 
meanwhile what they can contribute to solving global problems (ibid. p.166). Eventually, this comes 
along with the idea of integrating global and local patterns together, trying to balance both dimensions.  
 
Memes and their message to the world 
“Countries that aren't powerful need to be interesting. They need to exercise attraction if they cannot 
exercise compulsion and the source of that attraction can only be their unique, individual identity, their 
culture, their history, their land, their tradition, their genius, and their imagination” (Anholt, 2020, 
p. 41). Having discussed the various implications of (mental) maps in colonisation, this part will discuss 
certain ways, how it might be possible to encourage a decolonisation of mind after having started 
decolonizing the maps.   
Addressing the decolonisation of the mind starts by addressing languages aspects to raise consciousness. 
Mental Maps are formed through impressions, through experiences as through communication. 
According to the Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o language is decisive:  
“Language as communication and as culture are then products of each other. Communication creates 
culture: culture is a means of communication. Language carries culture, and culture carries, particularly 
through orature and literature, the entire body of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and 
our place in the world. How people perceive themselves and affects how they look at their culture, at 
their place’s politics and at the social production of wealth, at their entire relationship to nature and to 
other beings. Language is thus inseparable from ourselves as a community of human beings with a 
specific form and character, a specific history, a specific relationship to the world” (Ngugi, 1986, p. 16) 
In his book “Decolonising the mind” he argues that the choice of language is essential for creating an 
own identity (ibid. p.4). Ngũgĩ became famous for criticizing the fact that the term “African literature” 
meant African literature mostly in English, French, or Portuguese yet, not in African native languages 
(Ngugi, 2018, p. 3). Decolonising education is a tough challenge, requiring consciousness of one’s own 
role and responsibility in setting up respectful intercultural relationships without replicating power and 




education requires educators to unlearn, reread and relearn history behind the purview of colonialism 
(Lopez, 2021, p. 36). “Practice can be transformed through the process of learning, unlearning, 
rereading, and reframing” (ibid. p.37). This process comes along with the constructive theory presented 
by educationist Kersten Reich. Education takes place through the process of construction, 
reconstruction, and deconstruction (Reich, 2004). But what are the tools necessary to start such an 
education process, promoting new perspectives and decolonisation of education?  
Discovering a flourishing creative culture of social media, could serve as an inspiration for a valuable 
tool in education, talking about Memes. In recent years, memes have played a decisive role in several 
major electoral campaigns, taking for instance the USA, Brazil, or India. Political memes are about 
making a point and participating in a normative debate about how the world should look like what is 
the best way to get there (Shifman, 2014, p. 120). Having analysed the Brazilian case, three types of 
memes could be defined. Persuasive memes used by campaign teams aim to persuade an electorate of a 
political message, dealing foremost with content of proposals. Grassroot action memes cover content 
produced by supporters often sharing their content for free. Public discussion memes address common 
topics such as the personality of person, corruption, or ideologies, being rather broad and situational 
(Chagas et al., 2019, np). Memes are flexible, interactive and to be used by everyone. Nevertheless, this 
democratisation of shaping perceptions requires more democratic competencies to discover stereotypes 
and manipulations (Plevriti, 2013, p. 42).  
Decolonising the mind consists of three steps. Those are firstly naming, giving a name to certain events 
such as oppression, shame, or inferiority. Secondly there is reflection, beginning to question the colonial 
narratives involved. The third step consists in taking action, translating the new conclusions into 
concrete change (Strobel, 1997, p. 69). Applying those decolonial education onto constructive didactic, 
those steps are reflected here. Construction is the first step, inviting us to experiment and to explore. 
Taking the pictural basis of a meme reveals the visual perception of a person or a group regarding a 
certain topic or region. Reconstruction combines old knowledge with new, as here adding a text message 
to the picture, Deconstructions eventually open the way for a critical reflection of the own mental map, 
setting it into relation with other concepts presented through visual artefacts such as media coverage or 
own experiences (Reich, 2004, p. 106). Through this process, meme creators become aware of how 
certain images are produced, as how they can be used for a beneficial purpose, however also revealing 
why certain stereotypes must be overcome for decolonising the mind.  
A central piece of colonisation was not just taking the land, but also conquering the minds, depriving 
people of their own identity. Having a look at the map, many areas, landscapes are named after certain 
foremost Western people who claimed to have “discovered” those spaces. Decolonising gives access to 
new perspectives on globalisation, worldviews, and the use of indigenous knowledge. A first step is 




terms called native toponyms. “Toponyms are an integral component of the cultural identity of a people'' 
(Uluocha, 2015, p. 180). Giving a particular name to a place tells the story of a place, emphasizing the 
significance of a certain culture tied to it. Conversely to rather material cartography, indigenous 
cartography is based more on oral traditions, inheriting knowledge and tradition as histories through 
narratives and storytelling (ibid. p. 182). Consequently, changing the physical map, by bringing back 
indigenous names encourages retelling the trajectory of certain places and the people endowing 
emotional and cultural value to it. Making those changes visible could also stimulate discovering new 
spots on each mental map. Taking for instance renowned world heritage sites, “there is a need to think 
about how Indigenous peoples can use maps and stories for interpretation of UNESCO cultural 
landscapes” (Palmer and Korson, 2020, p. 184). Through declaring certain places world heritage sites 
those can become lighting points on the physical as mental maps. This way awareness-raising for the 
local trajectory of a certain spot and its people can be encouraged. Appealing to the dual mandate one 
contribution from indigenous traditions could enrich the perspective of critical cartography, focussing 
less on environment as a resource, but rather conceiving mankind as part of an interrelated system (Shaw 
et al., 2006, 269f.). Although indigenous people represent only 5% of the world’s population, according 
to the UN Report on Biodiversity at least 25% of global land mass is owned, used, managed or occupied 
by indigenous communities (IPBES 2019, S. 16). Empirical findings prove that giving land back to 
these indigenous communities is beneficial for the whole environment. In the USA, several areas were 
repatriated to First Nations. Applying old indigenous knowledge due to management or co-
management by indigenous communities from California to Alaska, biodiversity could be improved. 
Based on those traditional perspectives, indigenous mental maps can provide a contribution for 
measures against climate change (Robbins 2021). 
 
From mapping to meaning – a concluding message 
The message of “Imagine”, aspired by John Lennon, could also be conveyed by “Give me hope Joana” 
by Eddy Grant, from Guyana, singing: “Maybe pressure can make Jo'anna see how everybody could live 
as one!” Concluding this introduction into visual perspectives on postcolonialism, it could be shown, 
that Globalisation once started with the evolution of proper maps, supporting explorers, traders to find 
their way through the wide world, Nevertheless, those maps never simply represented reality, but always 
reflected a certain concept of power and people possessing those powers. Nowadays, connecting people 
through the power of media, those maps were supplemented by mental maps, supporting people all over 
the globe to navigate through the complexities of Globalisation. However, mental maps are never 
neutral but shaped by the mutual process of how we are seeing the world, as the world sees us. Thus, 
mental maps might give an orientation yet, stereotypes and prejudices can lead to rather conflictive and 




stereotypes, relearning history of mankind from different perspectives, opening new future windows of 
opportunity.  
Based on that, it was pointed out that Globalisation today seems to be shaped less by thinking in 
categories of centre and periphery but rather in networks. Being a member of a certain network 
determines the perspective on looking at the world. Attraction is an asset, determining where global 
attention in the form of investment, migration, and tourism will be located towards. Consequently, 
countries are facing the challenge to adapt to the demands of global attention, meanwhile keeping the 
attention of what about them is unique to be shown to a global audience. 
Once, mankind developed maps to show their imaginations of the world. A long time after that, 
mankind had a chance to prove their assumption, by taking a group selfie, including all mankind, 
however, the proof still seems to be pending. Nowadays, this analysis has shown, globalisation takes 
place through the process of visualisation. On the one side there are physical maps like globes or GPS 
systems as depictions of the word. On the other side there are mental maps as representation of how 
each person perceives the world. Addressing the cultural multi-perspectives on mental maps could 
contribute to answering questions about where mankind comes from as where it is going, in a global 
and constantly more interconnected future. Concluding maps are more than depiction of geography, as 
mental maps are representations of how we construct the perception of the world all mankind, opens 
up to sharing and bringing this diversity together. A constructive quote by South African singer Zenzile 
Miriam Makeba will conclude this contribution. Mama Africa reminds us: “Be careful, think about the 
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Laura Luciani is a PhD Candidate at Ghent University (Belgium), working at the intersection of critical 
international relations and political sociology. Her research examines the EU’s 'promotion' of human 
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and NGOs. She is also an editor with East Journal and co-author of Kiosk, two Italian media outlets 
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Sandra Muteteri Heremans 
Sandra Muteteri Heremans (°1989, Rwanda) is a Rwandan-Belgian visual artist. She received a master’s 
degree in Art History and later in Social and Cultural Anthropology, both at KU Leuven in Belgium. 
She explored in previous work her (family) archive. This archive embodies an (abandoned) life in 
Rwanda and turned out to be a materialized testimony of larger political stories. This re-visiting of 




experimental short film ‘La Mazda Jaune et Sa Sainteté’,  in which she explored the political and 
intimate potential through a very solid and rhythmic editing of photographs, archival material and the 
missing image: the black image. She is currently working on Gusubira Imuhira: tales of a Rwandan 
student in the USSR. She investigates through the experiences of a Rwandan student in the USSR, the 
geopolitical realities in the 70s and the relationship between the cold war and the African continent. 
 
Żaneta Kubicka 
Żaneta Kubicka is a Black Polish woman, born and raised in Poland, currently working as an analyst 
for a financial institution in Switzerland. She is a graduate of Mississippi College (Cum Laude, BS-
2016), College of Europe (MA-2017) and Southeastern University (MBA-2019), and winner of the 
Alan Jones Award and Outstanding Student in Political Science Award. Her interests include 
international politics and culture. She is a huge fan of basketball and her Samoyed dog. 
Malaika Newsome-Magadza 
Malaika Newsome-Magadza is a Zimbabwean researcher with a master’s degree in Conflict Studies 
from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research interests lie primarily in 
Southern Africa and Palestine, with a specific focus on anti-colonial action, the intersections of race, 




John Alulis is the Research Manager for the University Consortium, an inter-regional training program 
for outstanding students from the US, Europe, and Russia. He completed his MPhil in Russian and 
East European Studies at St Antony’s College, Oxford, graduating with distinction in 2018. His thesis 
topic was on contemporary Lithuanian collective memory about 1940 to 1953 and the impact this has 
on present-day Lithuanian society. Previously, John served as a cavalry officer in the US Army’s 173rd 
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), achieving the rank of captain. During his time with the 
Army, John deployed to Afghanistan and participated in a variety of exercises and NATO missions in 







The Institute for a Greater Europe 
 
The Institute for a Greater Europe is a non-profit youth-led think tank based in Brussels, Belgium with 
members and interests all over Europe and Beyond. Founded in 2018, the Institute has members and 
writers from over 30 countries in Europe, North America, Middle East and North Africa, and Asia. 
The mission of the Institute is to generate challenging new ideas, bridge cultural divides and foster a 
community based around shared values across a wider European scale. 
The Institute decided to become involved with the Europe Lab through the initiative of its Editor-in-
Chief, Valentin, and began to work on its core project, “Places in the Sun” in early 2021. It has been an 
important project for the Institute and one of its first major grant-based projects. Following the Europe 
Lab, the Institute will continue to work with the themes and ideas generated from the book into its 
further work across the following years. You can find more information about the Institute on its 
website: www.InstituteGreaterEurope.com  
 
The EU-Russia Civil Society Forum 
 
EU-Russia Civil Society Forum (Forum, or CSF) is a network of thematically diverse non-
governmental organisations from Russia and the European Union, established as a bottom-up, non-
partisan civic initiative. The Forum serves as a platform for members to engage in joint activities, 
articulate common positions, provide support and solidarity, and exert civic influence on policy- and 
decision-making on the (inter)governmental level. Driven by a vision of ‘the civil society beyond 
borders’, the Forum brings together organisations and people and therefore contributes to the 
integration between Russia and the EU, based on common values of pluralistic democracy, rule of law, 




Members and supporters of the Forum are driven by a vision of ‘the civil society beyond borders’ – a 
joint future with a common political, economic, and cultural space. They share a belief that strong and 
vocal civil society plays a key role in peaceful and sustainable development of the European continent 
and in addressing common challenges and issues of public interest topical to both Russia and the EU.  
 
 
Europe Lab 2021  
 
Europe Lab is a programme initiated by CSF and implemented with various partner organisations. It 
unites young people from over 30 European countries, unlocking opportunities for dialogue and 
common learning. Participants work on cross-sector topics, share best practices, network, develop 
partnerships and start common international initiatives. Over the last five years, the Europe Lab 
community has grown to include young activists, cultural practitioners, researchers, artists, NGO and 
media actors, (social) entrepreneurs and representatives of many more sectors.  
Every year, the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum invites active people aged in their 20s and 30s from 
the EU, Russia and other European states for the annual summer Lab and various other 
activities.  Common projects developed during the Lab, get the chance to receive follow-up grants. 
Since the creation of Europe Lab in 2015, participants have had the opportunity to visit Lithuania, 
Croatia, Poland, Romania, Italy, and Slovenia each time with a focus on a specific issue relating to 
European historical memory. Dozens of projects have been supported and hundreds of participants 
have learned, engaged, and discussed. 
The current, 2021 edition of Europe Lab, focuses on the topic of Decolonial Encounters and features 






The projects from the 2021 Edition of the Europe Lab can be found below: 
Places in the Sun 
Places in the Sun (PITS) is the overarching name for the Institute for a Greater Europe’s project, 
featuring a core book and spokes of other events relating to the themes and ideas inside the book. As 
well as the book itself, featuring 23 chapters across three different parts, PITS organised two podcasts 
to discuss with members from the other project (Bodies Unbound), and with the CSF to discuss their 
themes. It also organised an event with academics on "The Legacy of Empire for Russian Foreign 
Policy" with renowned Professors Viacheslav Morozov (University of Tartu) and 
Vladislav Zubok (LSE) and Dr. Aude Merlin (ULB). PITS will also be launching an event in 
September to promote the book, which will be available freely with donations, and organise a way to 
discuss and disseminate the book more widely.  
 
To get a copy of the PITS book in print, do consider emailing Chair@Institutegreatereurope.com and 
we will happily work with you to deliver a copy to your institution. All other PITS projects are 
intended to be housed on their own website in the future.   
 
Bodies Unbound 
Combining archival research, documentary poetry, and performance art, Bodies Unbound connects 
Europe’s colonial history of sexual regulation to the contemporary policing of the bodies of women of 
colour. Laws regulating women’s labour or sexuality have curtailed freedom and maintained patterns of 
racism, fetishism, and surveillance from Europe’s colonial past to the present day.  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, many doctors assumed non-European women were 
prostitutes and thus vectors for venereal disease. Seen as threats to family integrity and society’s morality, 
such women were easy targets for sexual regulation. Cities required sex workers to register their place 
of residence, use an identification card, and undergo frequent medical exams (many of which would be 
recognized as rape today). Such laws, ostensibly aimed at stopping disease, served to control the bodies 
of women of colour and the working class.  
This violence reverberates today in the fearful climate of the pandemic and in the literal policing and 
murders of women of colour (such as the March 2021 shootings of six spa workers in Atlanta, Georgia). 
Until we reckon with this racist and sexist history, authorities will continue to enact harmful 
immigration and vice raids while ignoring the economic precarity and fetishization that truly endanger 
sex workers and women of colour. 
Missing from historical accounts of these abuses are the voices of the women. We start by breaking 
apart texts such as parliamentary debates and police reports. Drawing from public archives (e.g. 




from docupoetry to transform these primary source materials into lyrical works that illuminate and 
transcend trauma. The texts are then reinterpreted through performance to create an embodied 
conjuration of monologues from today’s Myanmar, Vietnam, China, and Morocco that is capable of 
carrying the weight of these women’s stories. 
––Lena Chen, Elise Hanrahan, and April Yee 
 
Yesterday was Warmer than Today 
The territories of Ossetia were annexed to the territory of the Russian Empire as a result of cruel 
punitive expeditions and acts of genocide. In Soviet times, for the convenience of administration and 
management of territories, a single ethno-geographical community of Ossetians was divided into 
North and South Ossetia. The northern part went to the RSFSR, and the southern part to the 
Georgian SSR. Despite the short period of indigenousization (korenizatsiya) - the development of the 
national culture and language, the united people was subjected to cultural assimilation in different 
ways: from the translation of writing into the Cyrillic and Georgian alphabets, to the prohibition of 
teaching in their native language. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the fact that the right of territorial self-determination of the 
Ossetian people was not realized: Georgia refused to recognize itself as a federal state, and to give 
South Ossetia the status of a Republic or autonomy. Zviad Gamsakhurdia's policy was aimed at 
compulsory assimilation of the non-Georgian population, and the region of South Ossetia began to be 
referred to by the Georgian side as Samachablo, thus ignoring the history of the Ossetian population 
living in these territories. "The Ossetian people are garbage that must be swept out through the Roki 
tunnel". A huge number of people fled to North Ossetia, receiving refugee status. 
Until now, even after a series of open military conflicts in 1992, 2004 and 2008. the Ossetian-
Georgian conflict is unresolved and is in a frozen state. In contemporary Ossetia, in recent years, a 
discourse has been formed about the genocide of Ossetians by Georgia, shifting the emphasis from 
the territorial issue to the issue of interethnic confrontation. Unfortunately, nationalist rhetoric 
ignores centuries of peaceful coexistence and mutual cultural exchange between two peoples. 
The project “It Was Warmer Yesterday” offers a new representation of the relationship between the 
Georgian and Ossetian population. The project will abandon political definitions and base on atypical 
forms of representation of these relationships: the stories of ordinary people who, for various reasons, 




The project team will tell the stories of Ossetians who found themselves in Georgia due to various 
historical circumstances and the stories of Georgians living in Ossetia. On the one hand, this project 
is about the migration context of representatives of the once fraternal peoples who, by someone's 
political will, find themselves in a war situation with each other, and about their families separated by 
borders. On the other hand, it is about confused identity, when it is difficult for characters, some of 
whom were born and raised in mixed families, to clearly and unequivocally determine who they are - 
Georgians or Ossetians, “whose side they are“ on, and where their real home is. 
Circumstances force one of the characters of the project to pass through this inhuman choice - Alexei 
Buchukuri, a Georgian who has lived his entire life in Ossetia and declared an “enemy of Georgia” 
after negotiations with Gamsakhurdia. There is no place for hatred in these stories, but only 
annoyance and dreams of a once stable, but - now - such a fragile peace. 
“Yesterday Was Warmer” - is a project about today. About breaks and raptures that somehow 
inexplicably appear overnight. What happens in these gaps of the night when loved ones become 
strangers and when the memory of a once warm relationship turns into nightmares of war? What, 
why and when breaks down? In these spaces “in between”, when the mind falls asleep. When 
consciousness is dreaming. 
The project is designed to contribute to the processes of building peace in the region using the 
methods of cultural diplomacy, and to hear unrepresented voices. 
This volume explores and confronts two ourishing and neighbouring 
intellectual traditions in a timely manner. First, the decolonial and 
post-colonial movements of the Western World, with their long lega-
cies of struggle and activism still relevant today. And second, the 
emerging academic trend of decolonialism in the wider post-Socialist 
space, that is slowly gaining a foothold in mainstream discourse. The 
volume’s many contributors (researchers, academics, writers, activists, 
artists…) discuss a multiplicity of issues related to the decolonial mo-
vements in Europe and beyond, through a variety of formats ranging 
from essays to ction. Not content to be only examined separately, 
both traditions are brought into a dialogue, to nd where they diverge 
and where they meet.
Places in the Sun is a multidisciplinary and mixed-media project led by 
a team of writers and editors from the Institute for a Greater Europe, in 
partnership with the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum.
